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the	 former	 Yugoslavia,	 Peru,	 to	 the	 Côte	 d’Ivoire.	 Yet,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	assume	 that	 sexual	 violence	 is	 ubiquitous	 in	 conflict	 (Cohen	 and	 Nordås	 2014).	Sexual	 violence	 in	 intrastate	 conflicts	 contributes	 to	 and	 exacerbates	 short-	 and	long-term	 consequences	 for	 the	 affected	 people	 and	 countries	 as	 well	 as	surrounding	 countries.	 These	 challenges	 include	 internally	 displaced	 people,	refugees,	 diminished	 state	 capacities,	 weakened	 economies,	 and	 regional	instability.	 The	 immense	 costs	 and	 threats	 to	 human	 security,	 political	 and	economic	stability,	and	development	underscore	the	importance	of	managing	and	permanently	 resolving	 such	 intrastate	 conflicts.	 Accordingly,	 improving	 our	understanding	of	when,	why,	and	how	successfully	belligerents	engage	in	conflict	resolution	 is	crucial.	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	approach	 these	questions	with	a	gender	 lens	that	highlights	previously	overlooked	gendered	influences	on	conflict	resolution.			 Conflict	 in	general	 refers	 to	 the	pursuit	of	 incompatible	goals	by	different	actors	 (Ramsbotham,	 Woodhouse,	 and	 Miall	 2016).	 This	 broad	 definition	encompasses	 a	 number	 of	 potential	 combinations	 of	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	(e.g.	interstate	conflict	between	states,	intrastate	conflict	between	the	government	of	a	state	and	at	least	one	domestic	non-state	actor,	or	communal	conflict	between	non-state	actors	without	the	involvement	of	the	government)	and	also	implies	that	not	all	conflicts	are	pursued	violently.	In	this	thesis,	I	focus	on	a	subset	of	conflicts.	Specifically,	 I	 focus	 on	 armed	 intrastate	 conflicts,	 i.e.	 violently	 pursued	incompatibilities	over	governance	or	territory	between	the	government	of	a	state	and	 at	 least	 one	 domestic	 group	 that	 result	 in	 at	 least	 25	 battle-related	 deaths	(Gleditsch	et	al.	2002).		The	term	conflict	resolution	refers	to	positive	and	nonviolent	processes	in	which	 conflict	 parties	 seek	 a	 shared	 solution	 to	 the	 underlying	 incompatibility.	Conflict	 management	 is	 a	 related	 term,	 which	 is	 narrower	 and	 refers	 to	 the	settlement	 and	 containment	 of	 armed	 conflict.	 Conflict	 management	 can	 take	different	 forms	 such	 as	 peacekeeping	 to	 mitigate	 and	 geographically	 contain	violence	 or	 negotiation	 and	 mediation	 to	 come	 to	 a	 formal	 settlement	 (e.g.	ceasefire	 or	 peace	 agreements)	 that	 officially	 halts	 or	 terminates	 the	 armed	conflict	 (Ramsbotham,	Woodhouse,	 and	Miall	 2016).	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 engage	with	negotiation	and	mediation	as	 forms	of	 conflict	management,	which	seek	 to	settle	the	 conflict.	 Although	 settlement	 suggests	 certainty	 and	 finality,	 conflicts	frequently	 recur,	 which	 I	 also	 address.	 Conflict	 recurrence	 indicates	 that	 the	
	 10	
underlying	 incompatibility	 has	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 addressed.	 Hence,	 for	 the	overall	thesis	I	draw	on	the	broader	concept	of	conflict	resolution.		Research	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 three	 fundamental	 factors	 regarding	 the	resolution	 of	 armed	 intrastate	 conflict:	 country-level	 structural	 factors,	 conflict	dynamics,	and	external	 interventions.	 In	this	thesis	I	draw	attention	to	gender	as	an	 important	 aspect	 of	 these	 factors	 that	 has	 been	 overlooked	 in	 systematic	conflict	 resolution	 research.	 Conflict	 processes	 are	 frequently	 deemed	 gender-neutral	and	as	a	result	conflict	research	is	often	gender-blind.	One	reason	for	this	is	that	 men’s	 behavior	 and	 perspectives	 are	 assumed	 to	 represent	 the	 universal	human	 experience	 (Scheman	 1993).	 Put	 differently,	 conflict	 processes	 become	gender-neutral	and	the	study	of	them	becomes	gender-blind	because	men	assume	their	 perspective	 to	 be	 the	 universal	 norm	 (Sjoberg	 2012).	 Only	 by	 bringing	women	in	does	gender	become	visible	because	women	are	perceived	as	gendered	beings	while	men	are	not.	Hence	women	are	frequently	seen	as	a	proxy	for	gender	and	vice	versa.	However,	 it	 is	a	critical	 to	 ‘not	only	add	women	but	also	ask	how	gender	–	a	structural	feature	of	social	life	–	has	been	rendered	invisible’	(Peterson	and	True	1998,	23).	Accordingly,	in	this	thesis	I	apply	a	gender	lens	to	make	these	gendered	 influences	 on	 conflict	 resolution	 visible.	 The	 overarching	 research	question	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 is:	 To	what	 extent	 do	 gendered	 aspects	 of	 society	and	violence	influence	conflict	resolution	in	intrastate	conflicts?	Research	 shows	 that	 country-level	 structural	 factors	 such	 as	 terrain,	economic	development,	quality	of	governance,	underlying	conflict	incompatibility,	and	ethnic	divisions	shape	conflict	parties’	decisions	to	start,	continue,	end,	and	re-start	armed	conflict	(Buhaug,	Gates,	and	Lujala	2009;	Toft	2003,	2010;	Fearon	and	Laitin	2003;	Walter	2015).	While	other	domestic-structural	 factors	such	as	youth	bulges	or	horizontal	and	ethnic	inequalities	have	received	ample	attention	and	are	considered	 important	 variables	 to	 control	 for	 in	 systematic	 analyses	 (Cederman,	Weidmann,	 and	 Gleditsch	 2011;	 Fearon	 2004;	 Østby	 2008;	 Urdal	 2005,	 2006,	2008),	gendered	influences	are	rarely	addressed	or	included.	Yet,	research	shows	that	gender	is	an	integral	organizing	element	on	both	societal	and	state	institution	level	playing	a	crucial	role	in	decision-making,	influencing	participation	in	political	violence,	 and	 shaping	 who	 receives	 protection	 (Barnes	 and	 O’Brien	 2018;	Bjarnegård,	Brounéus,	and	Melander	2017;	Carpenter	2003,	2005,	2006;	Hudson	et	 al.	 2012;	 Karim	 and	 Beardsley	 2017).	 Domestic	 structural	 factors	 that	 shape	
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conflict	 behaviour	 are	 underpinned,	 upheld,	 and	 institutionalized	 by	 gendered	practices	(Caprioli	2000,	2003,	2005;	Caprioli	and	Boyer	2001;	Hudson	et	al.	2012;	Melander	2005a,	2005b).	A	 fundamental	 tenet	 of	 conflict	 research	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 conflict	actors	 are	 rational	 actors	 who	 assess	 all	 available	 information	 to	 weigh	 the	expected	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 their	 actions	 (Fearon	 1995).	 This	 assumption	underpins	 most	 research	 explaining	 the	 occurrence	 and	 success	 of	 conflict	resolution	 efforts	 (Clayton	 2013;	 Clayton	 and	 Gleditsch	 2014;	 Thomas	 2014;	Wood,	 Kathman,	 and	 Gent	 2012;	Wood	 and	Kathman	 2014).	 Characteristics	 and	dynamics	of	a	conflict	thus	are	information,	which	belligerents	assess	 in	terms	of	costs	 and	 benefits	 to	 decide	 whether	 to	 continue	 fighting	 or	 to	 entertain	 peace	talks	 (Clayton	 2013,	 2016;	 Greig	 and	 Regan	 2008;	 Kaplow	 2016;	 Melin	 and	Svensson	 2009).	 Accordingly,	 the	 ability	 to	 impose	 costs	 on	 the	 opposition	 is	crucial,	 particularly	 for	 insurgents	 who	 typically	 operate	 within	 an	 asymmetric	conflict	 against	 a	 more	 powerful	 state	 (Cunningham,	 Gleditsch,	 and	 Salehyan	2013).		One	 way	 of	 imposing	 costs	 is	 targeting	 strategic	 centers	 of	 gravity,	 i.e.	civilians,	 to	 break	 the	 opposition’s	will	 to	 fight.	 Or	 put	 differently,	 the	 power	 to	hurt	 the	 opponent	 through	 civilian	 victimization	 is	 power	 to	 bargain	 (Schelling	1960).	What	remains	implicit	and	unacknowledged	in	this	rationalist	framework	is	the	 gendered	 logic	 that	 underpins	 civilian	 victimization	 and	 centers	 of	 gravity.	First,	 states	 (consciously	 or	 unconsciously)	 frequently	 perceive	 women	 as	‘beautiful	 souls’	 and	 biological	 and	 cultural	 reproducers	 of	 the	 nation	 rendering	them	 the	 strategic	 center	 of	 gravity	 (Elshtain	 1987;	 Sjoberg	 2013).	 Second,	 the	gendered	division	of	civilians	(women	and	children)	and	combatants	(men)	tasked	to	protect	these	women	and	children,	clearly	assigns	gendered	roles	of	(feminine)	vulnerable	groups	and	their	(masculine)	protectors	(Carpenter	2003,	2005).	Third,	an	attack	targeting	the	feminine	strategic	center	can	be	perceived	as	a	challenge	to	the	 protector’s	 masculinity.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 victimization	 of	 civilians	 (read	women)	 is	 employed	 to	 symbolically	 hurt	 the	 presumed	 protector.	 Hence,	 the	power	 to	 hurt	 strategy	 is	 inherently	 gendered.	 Yet	 the	 majority	 of	 conflict	literature	remains	gender	blind	(Sjoberg	2013).	Research	 is	 equally	 gender	 blind	 in	 its	 analysis	 of	 how	 conflict	 dynamics	influence	decisions	to	propose	and	accept	conflict	resolution	offers.	The	rationalist	
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framework	 suggests	 that	 self-interest	 rather	 than	 normative	 concerns	 influence	third	parties’	decision	 to	 intervene	because	 interventions,	military	or	diplomatic,	are	 associated	 with	 a	 range	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits.	 In	 diplomatic	 efforts,	 third	parties	could	face	negative	publicity,	receive	blame	if	the	peace	process	collapses,	and	may	lose	face	as	result	(Bercovitch	and	Schneider	2000;	Beardsley	2008).	The	potential	 political,	 economic,	 and	 reputational	 costs	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 selection	 bias	that	 favors	 ostensibly	 easy	 cases	 that	 guarantee	 a	 successful	 outcome	 for	 the	intervening	 party	 (Melin	 2011;	 Regan	 and	 Stam	 2000;	 Young	 1967;	 Zartman	2000).	 Yet,	 intermediaries	 also	 often	 react	 to	 intense	 conflicts	 that	 present	 the	greatest	threat	to	international	security	(Bercovitch	and	Gartner	2006;	Beardsley	et	 al.	 2006;	 Greig	 2005).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 studies	 show	 that	 bargaining	information	and	the	balance	of	power	between	belligerents,	such	as	relative	rebel	strength,	number	of	actors,	and	mutually	hurting	stalemates,	influence	openness	to	third	 party	 conflict	 resolution	 efforts	 and	 their	 chances	 of	 success	 without	addressing	 the	 gendered	 understanding	 of	 power	 (Clayton	 2013;	 Cunningham	2006;	 Cunningham,	Gleditsch,	 and	 Salehyan	 2009;	 Fearon	 1995;	 Zartman	1995).	Although	 some	 research	 has	 called	 attention	 to	 the	 gendered	 dynamics	 of	interventions	 (Carpenter	 2003,	 2005),	 the	 gendered	 influences	 on	 decisions	 to	offer	 and	 accept	 interventions	 as	 well	 as	 their	 chances	 of	 success	 are	 largely	overlooked	in	systematic	conflict	research.		Overlooking	 the	 gendered	 aspects	 of	 domestic-structural	 factors,	 conflict	dynamics,	 and	 external	 intervention	 has	 multiple	 implications.	 First,	 gender	blindness,	rather	than	promoting	gender	equality,	conceals	and	perpetuates	power	structures	that	effectively	promote	gender	subordination	(Tickner	1992).	Second,	it	implies	a	narrow	understanding	of	peace	and	conflict.	Omitting	gendered	aspects	renders	 an	 incomplete	picture	of	what	 is	defined	as	 conflict,	who	are	 the	 actors,	victims,	and	survivors	of	conflict,	and	what	constitutes	peace.	Third,	as	a	result	we	are	 fundamentally	 limited	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 and	why	 these	 conflicts	start,	 end,	 or	 recur.	 Assuming	 that	 conflicts	 are	 gender-neutral	 blinds	 us	 to	important	 questions,	 such	 as:	 To	what	 extent	 does	women’s	 inclusion	 in	 society	influence	the	onset	of	nonviolent	conflict	management?	How	does	the	perpetration	of	 sexual	 violence	 by	 armed	 actors	 influence	 the	 onset	 of	 conflict	management?	How	 does	 sexual	 violence	 by	 armed	 actors	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 period	 influence	peace	durability?	Put	differently,	bringing	gender	in	enriches	our	understanding	of	
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different	 phases	 of	 conflict	 cycles	 by	 illuminating	 neglected	 aspects	 of	 decision-making,	power	dynamics,	as	well	as	government	and	rebel	group	behavior.	Fourth,	it	implies	that	our	understanding	of	conflict	resolution,	i.e.	what	works,	how,	when,	and	 why,	 is	 incomplete.	 If	 we	 do	 not	 recognize	 the	 gendered	 aspect	 in	 conflict	processes	and	subsequently	do	not	address	 their	 influence	on	conflict	 resolution	efforts,	 we	 cannot	 ascertain	 that	 measures	 work,	 nor	 that	 they	 work	 at	 this	particular	time	for	the	assumed	reasons.	In	other	words,	gender	is	an	integral	part	of	 traditional	 factors	 thought	 to	 influence	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 as	 such	 is	instrumental	in	recognizing	and	defining	the	concepts	of	security,	war,	and	peace.	Hence,	 I	 apply	 a	 gender	 lens	 to	 my	 analysis	 of	 conflict	 resolution	 processes	 in	intrastate	conflicts.		
1.2	Addressing	the	problem	–	Applying	a	gender	lens	It	is	important,	at	the	outset,	to	define	the	terms	gender	and	gender	lens.	I	draw	on	feminist	 international	 relations	 (IR)	 theory	 to	 define	 gender	 and	 explain	 what	constitutes	 a	 gender	 lens	 as	 well	 as	 its	 application.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	there	is	not	one	uniform	feminist	IR	theory.	Rather	there	are	different	approaches	within	 feminism	 akin	 to	 other	 IR	 theories,	 such	 as	 realist,	 liberal,	 constructivist,	critical,	post-structural,	and	post-colonial	(Tickner	and	Sjoberg	2013).	Throughout	this	thesis	my	arguments	and	analyses	are	informed	to	varying	degrees	by	a	liberal	feminist	 approach	 that	 focuses	 on	 women’s	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion,	 a	constructivist	 feminist	approach	 that	 focuses	on	gender	as	a	 socially	constructed	idea,	 and	 a	 realist	 feminist	 approach	 that	 focuses	 on	 power	 relations.	 I	 draw	on	these	three	approaches	because	each	helps	illuminate	a	different	gendered	aspect	of	conflict	resolution	processes	in	intrastate	conflicts.	In	chapter	2,	I	explicitly	draw	on	 a	 liberal	 feminist	 approach	 to	 examine	 patriarchal	 practices	 of	 women’s	exclusion	and	 their	effects	on	conflict	 resolution	efforts.	 In	chapter	3,	 I	primarily	turn	to	a	realist	feminist	approach	to	illustrate	the	gendered	nature	of	the	power	to	hurt	 logic	 and	 underscore	 that	 power	 relations	 between	 states	 and	 rebels	 are	shaped	 by	 gendered	 identities	 and	 gendered	 violence.	 While	 a	 constructivist	feminist	approach	is	fundamental	to	all	three	empirical	chapters	to	understand	the	gendered	nature	of	both	state	and	non-state	actors	as	social	creation,	whose	rules	and	 practices	 reflect	 the	 values	 of	 their	 creators	 and	members,	 it	 is	 particularly	pertinent	 in	 chapter	4.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 constructivist	 approach	helps	 explain	
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the	 gendered	 dynamics	 that	 underpin	 non-state	 actors’	 mobilization	 and	subsequent	escalation	of	violence.		Despite	 this	 heterogeneity	 within	 feminist	 IR,	 there	 are	 certain	 elements	these	 different	 approaches	 share,	 most	 importantly	 the	 central	 role	 of	 gender.	Unlike	biological	sex	categorization,	gender	is	understood	to	be	a	social	construct	(Peterson	 2004).	 This	 means	 gender	 is	 constructed	 by	 members	 of	 a	 culture,	society,	or	organization	that	 implicitly	or	explicitly	agree	to	 follow	certain	norms	and	conventions.	This	implies	that	gender	is	complex	and	intersubjective	because	it	is	neither	fixed	nor	universal,	but	dependent	on	time	and	space.	In	other	words,	different	 people	 in	 different	 places	 can	 construct	 gender	 differently	 at	 different	times.	 On	 an	 individual	 level,	 gender	 refers	 to	 socially	 constructed	 expectations	that	persons	who	are	perceived	to	belong	to	a	biological	sex	category	will	exhibit	certain	 traits	 and	 behaviors.	 On	 an	 institutional	 level,	 there	 are	 key	 interactive	processes	 through	 which	 organizations	 are	 gendered	 (Acker	 1990):	 First,	constructing	divisions	of	 labor,	of	appropriate	behavior,	of	physical	space,	and	of	power,	 along	 gendered	 lines;	 second,	 constructing	 symbols	 and	 images	 that	illustrate,	 justify,	 reinforce,	 and	 perpetuate	 these	 divisions;	 third,	 interactions	between	women	and	men,	women	and	women,	men	and	men,	that	produce	social	patterns,	 structures,	 and	 practices	 of	 domination	 and	 submission;	 fourth,	 these	processes	 diffuse	 and	 thus	 facilitate	 the	 production	 of	 gendered	 components	 of	individuals’	identities.	In	other	words,	gender	is	an	essential	part	of	the	production	of	 social	 structures.	 In	 family,	 kinship,	 informal,	 and	 formal	 organizations	 and	institutions,	 gender	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 individual,	 the	 collective,	 and	underlying	relations	in	the	collective.	To	be	conceptually	sound	and	empirically	viable,	research	always	has	a	lens	that	focuses	on	some	issues,	while	relegating	others	to	the	background.	A	gender	lens	highlights	‘gendered	power,	gendered	experiences,	gendered	knowledge,	and	gendered	values’	(Sjoberg	2013,	6).	Feminist	scholars	contend	that	despite	claims	of	gender	neutrality,	every	 level	of	politics	–	and	 therefore	also	armed	 intrastate	conflicts	 –	 are	 gendered	 (Enloe	 2000).	 A	 gender	 lens	 illuminates	 how	 social	expectations	 about	masculinities	 and	 femininities	 influence	 the	 onset,	 dynamics,	structure,	 and	 processes	 of	 conflict	 resolution.	 Examining	 conflict	 resolution	through	 a	 gender	 lens	 thus	 draws	 attention	 to	 gendered	 aspects	 in	 conflict	processes	 such	 as	 the	power	 relations	between	 conflict	 parties,	who	 is	 included,	
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who	 is	 excluded,	 and	what	belligerents	do,	 including	gendered	 forms	of	 violence	and	their	effects.	Concretely,	applying	a	gender	lens	for	example	means	focusing	on	who	experiences	(or	is	perceived	to	experience)	sexual	violence	(the	feminine,	i.e.	civilians,	 women	 and	 children)	 and	 who	 is	 deemed	 responsible	 for	 providing	protection	 (the	masculine,	 i.e.	 the	 state,	 soldiers,	men),	 and	what	 it	means	 if	 the	assumed	protector	fails	to	fulfil	its	fundamental	task	of	protecting	the	vulnerable.3		 A	 gender	 lens	 highlights	 that	 states	 are	 deeply	 gendered	 institutions	(Peterson	 1992;	 Tickner	 1992,	 2001;	 Sjoberg	 2013).	 Institutions	 provide	 the	structures	 for	social	and	political	order	through	establishing	formal	and	 informal	rules,	as	well	as	everyday	practices.	As	a	result	institutions	govern	the	behavior	of	individuals	 in	 their	 respective	 communities	 and	 organizations.	 Institutions	 are	fundamentally	 social	 creations,	 meaning	 their	 laws,	 rules,	 and	 practices	 reflect	their	 creators’	 preferences	 and	 values	 (Karim	 and	Beardsley	 2017).	 To	 this	 day,	men	have	created	and	continue	to	create	the	majority	of	institutions.	This	renders	institutions	 highly	 gendered,	meaning	 ‘advantage	 and	 disadvantage,	 exploitation	and	control,	action	and	emotion,	meaning	and	identity,	are	patterned	through	and	in	terms	of	a	distinction	between	male	and	female,	masculine	and	feminine’	(Acker	1990,	146).	Gender	thus	is	an	essential	part	of	institutional	processes,	‘embedded	in	 institutions	through	ongoing	practices,	values,	and	expectations	of	appropriate	behavior’	(Chappell	2010,	184).			States	 are	 the	 primary	 authority	 governing,	 i.e.	 creating	 and	 sustaining	social	and	political	order,	their	constituents’	lives	and	everyday	practices	through	the	establishment	of	 laws,	 rules,	 and	norms.	Therefore	governments	ought	 to	be	considered	formal,	highly	gendered,	institutions	(Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).	The	gendered	nature	of	states	 is	manifested	 in	multiple	ways.	From	a	 liberal	 feminist	perspective:	 men	 continue	 to	 exclude	 women	 from	 positions	 of	 power,	 i.e.	 men	occupy	 the	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 executive	 and	 legislative	 positions	 in	governments	 including	the	most	prestigious	and	powerful	portfolios	(Barnes	and	O’Brien	 2018).	 From	 a	 constructivist	 perspective:	 governments	 prioritize	 the	protection	 of	 vulnerable	 populations,	 women	 and	 children	 (Carpenter	 2003,	2005),	while	neglecting	male	victims	of	conflict-related	sexual	violence	and	other																																																									
3	This	does	not	imply	that	only	women	experience	sexual	violence,	but	reflects	the	socially	constructed	gender	roles,	which	lead	to	male	survivors	of	sexual	violence	often	remaining	unacknowledged,	marginalized,	and	feminized	regardless	of	their	biological	sex.	
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forms	 of	 gender-based	 violence	 (Carpenter	 2006).	 This	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 socially	constructed	gendered	protection	norm	based	on	the	separation	of	combatants	and	civilians	 along	 gendered	 lines	 (Carpenter	 2003,	 2005;	 Sjoberg	 2013).	 From	 a	realist	 feminist	 perspective:	 governments	 rely	 on	 masculine	 behaviors	 and	characteristics	 such	 as	 showing	 strength	 and	 aggression	 through	 military	posturing	 to	defend	and	protect	 themselves,	 their	citizens,	 territory,	and	 identity	(Sjoberg	2013).			Feminist	 IR	 theory	 approaches,	 like	 other	 IR	 theories,	 are	 primarily	frameworks	 for	 understanding	 state	 behavior	 in	 international	 relations	 and	interstate	 conflicts.	However,	 I	 draw	on	 these	 feminist	 approaches	 in	 applying	 a	gender	 lens	 to	 intrastate	 conflicts	 and	 conflict	 resolution	 processes	 in	 them.	Applying	a	gender	 lens	 foregrounds	how	women’s	marginalization	and	exclusion	from	 position	 of	 power	 influences	 decision-making	 and	 limits	 the	 repertoire	 of	acceptable	policies,	strategies,	and	tactics	of	how	to	deal	with	internal	challengers.	Applying	a	gender	lens	to	intrastate	conflicts	highlights	how	states’	self-perception	as	 protector	 and	 sole	 legitimate	 wielder	 of	 violence	 shapes	 how	 governments	respond	 to	 armed	 insurrections,	 rebels	 perpetrating	 sexual	 violence,	 and	international	 offers	 to	 mediate.	 Applying	 a	 gender	 lens	 to	 intrastate	 conflict	resolution	also	draws	attention	to	what	happens	in	the	post-conflict	period.	Which	actors	continue	to	exist?	What	kind	of	violence	do	they	perpetrate?	And	what	are	the	consequences	for	peace	durability?		Drawing	on	such	a	gender	lens,	I	seek	to	specifically	address	three	primary	research	questions	in	this	thesis:	(1)	To	what	extent	do	gender	relations	in	society	influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiations	 during	 intrastate	 disputes?	 (2)	 To	 what	extent	 does	 sexual	 violence	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	 management	 in	intrastate	 conflicts?	 And,	 (3)	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	conflict	years	influence	the	likelihood	of	a	return	to	active	armed	conflict?		
1.3	Contributions	This	thesis	offers	a	number	of	contributions	to	different	sections	within	the	field	of	conflict	 research.	 I	 argue	 and	 empirically	 demonstrate	 that	 structural,	organizational,	and	conflict	process	factors	previously	deemed	‘gender	neutral’	are	in	 fact	 inherently	 gendered.	 In	 applying	 a	 gender	 lens	 that	 draws	 on	 different	approaches	of	feminist	IR	theory	to	illuminate	multiple	facets	of	conflicts	I	present	
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a	 major	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	 the	 study	 of	 intrastate	 conflicts.	 In	 three	empirical	 chapters	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 applying	 such	 a	 gender	 lens	 poses	 new	questions,	 offers	 different	 perspectives	 on	 mainstream	 conflict	 research,	 and	provides	important	insights.	In	posing	and	answering	these	questions	I	show	that	a	gender	lens	can	help	detect	previously	overlooked	patterns	and	relationships	that	underpin	and	influence	conflict	resolution	in	intrastate	conflicts.			A	major	contribution	of	this	thesis	lies	in	combining	feminist	IR	theory	with	systematic	analyses	that	rely	on	positivist	methodology.	In	doing	so	I	contribute	to	an	emerging	body	of	 literature	 that	bridges	 these	 two	approaches	 that	 are	often	deemed	 incompatible	 (Sjoberg,	 Kadera,	 and	 Thies	 2018;	 Karim	 and	 Beardsley	2017).	 I	 illustrate	 that	 systematic	 analysis	 and	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 are	 not	 just	compatible,	 but	 have	 the	 potential	 for	 valuable	 synergies	 that	 enrich	 our	understanding	of	conflicts	and	conflict	resolution	processes.	As	a	result	the	thesis	underlines	the	benefits	of	combining	these	two	approaches	and	underscores	that	effective	conflict	resolution	requires	an	understanding	of	the	gendered	influences	in	intrastate	conflicts.		
	
Chapter	2	In	addition	to	this	overarching	contribution,	each	of	the	following	three	empirical	chapters	offers	specific	contributions.	In	chapter	2,	I	examine	the	question,	to	what	do	extent	gender	relations	in	society	influence	the	likelihood	of	nonviolent	conflict	management?	 Thereby	 I	 contribute	 to	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 examining	 the	connection	between	gendered	inequality	and	conflict.	Existing	research	finds	that	high	levels	of	gendered	inequality	influence	a	number	of	aspects	of	armed	conflict:	the	 likelihood	 of	 going	 to	 war	 (Caprioli	 2000),	 the	 likelihood	 of	 using	 severe	violence	(Caprioli	and	Boyer	2001),	the	likelihood	of	being	the	first	actor	to	resort	to	violence	in	an	interstate	dispute	(Caprioli	2003),	the	likelihood	of	civil	war	onset	and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 high	 intensity	 violence	 in	 such	 conflicts	 (Caprioli	 2005;	Melander	 2005b).	 Other	 research	 investigating	 the	 success	 of	 peacekeeping	missions	 finds	 that	peacekeeping	 is	more	 successful	when	women	have	a	higher	relative	status	in	the	country	where	the	peacekeeping	mission	is	deployed	(Gizelis	2009).	 I	 address	 a	 critical	 aspect	 in	 intrastate	 conflict	 cycles	 that	 has	 been	overlooked	 so	 far:	 belligerents’	 decision	 to	 engage	 in	 nonviolent	 conflict	management.		
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In	 this	 chapter	 I	 develop	 the	 general	 argument	 underpinning	most	 of	 the	systematic	 research	 on	 the	 gender-conflict	 nexus,	 which	 presents	 a	 substantial	theoretical	contribution.	In	line	with	the	literature	I	argue	that	patriarchal	gender	relations	that	manifest	in	the	violent	marginalization	of	women	are	at	the	heart	of	the	 connection	 between	 gendered	 inequality	 and	 conflict.	 To	 explain	 how	 these	societal	norms	and	micro-level	processes	shape	state	behavior	on	the	macro-level	I	introduce	the	concept	of	practices	(Bourdieu	1977,	1990).	Identifying	practices	as	the	 crucial	 missing	 link	 to	 explain	 how	 gender	 relations	 at	 the	 micro-level	 –	between	 individuals	 in	 society	 –	 influence	 state	 behavior	 at	 the	 macro-level	presents	 a	 key	 theoretical	 contribution.	 Practices	 diffuse	 between	 individuals,	society,	 and	 formal	 state	 institutions;	 they	 thereby	 influence	a	 state’s	 framework	for	how	to	govern,	including	how	to	deal	with	conflicts.	Put	differently,	introducing	practices	 is	 a	 crucial	 step	 towards	 delineating	 the	 causal	 mechanism	 that	 the	existing	 literature	 has	 put	 forward.	 This	 also	 opens	 new	 avenues	 for	 future	research	 because	 the	 concept	 of	 practices	 enables	 researchers	 to	 bridge	 the	perceived	 gap	 between	 a	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 and	 systematic	 analysis	 because	practices	make	intangible	norms	measurable.	I	 show	 in	 chapter	 2	 that	 more	 patriarchal	 gender	 relations,	 i.e.	 greater	exclusion	of	women	from	public	life,	decrease	the	likelihood	of	nonviolent	conflict	management	 in	 intrastate	conflicts.	This	thesis	 is	 the	 first	study	to	systematically	capture	this	relationship.	In	my	analysis	I	draw	on	new	data	on	women’s	inclusion	from	Sabrina	Karim	and	Danny	Hill	(2018)	as	well	as	new	data	on	negotiations	in	intrastate	conflicts	by	Baris	Ari	(2018).	These	data	allow	me	to	test	my	argument	on	all	intrastate	conflict	dyads	in	the	UCDP	dataset	between	1975	and	2014	using	logistic	regression	models.		The	robust	results	strongly	support	the	argument	that	patriarchal	gender	relations	expressed	through	practices	of	women’s	exclusion	are	an	influential	factor	in	intrastate	conflict	management.			
Chapter	3	Besides	adding	to	research	on	the	nexus	of	gendered	inequality	and	conflict,	I	also	contribute	to	a	burgeoning	body	of	literature	on	sexual	violence	in	armed	conflict.	The	vast	majority	of	existing	research	seeks	to	explain	causes	and	variation	(Alison	2007;	 Leiby	 2009;	 Wood	 2006,	 2009;	 Cohen	 2013a,	 2013b,	 2016;	 Cohen	 and	Nordås	2014,	2015;	Nordås	and	Rustad	2013;	Karim	and	Beardsley	2016;	Loken	
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2017;	Johansson	and	Sarwari	2017).	Despite	this	increasing	body	of	literature,	we	know	 surprisingly	 little	 about	 the	 effects	 of	 sexual	 violence	 during	 and	 after	conflict.	Only	three	recent	studies	have	started	to	investigate	the	consequences	of	sexual	 violence	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 they	 find	 a	 pattern	 of	peacekeeping	 operations	 in	 conflicts	 with	 sexual	 violence	 (Kreutz	 and	 Cardenas	2017;	Hultman	and	Johansson	2017),	and	on	the	other	an	increased	likelihood	of	negotiated	 settlements	 when	 both	 sides	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 (Chu	 and	Braithwaite	2018).	In	the	process	I	also	contribute	to	the	largely	gender	blind	body	of	literature	that	examines	the	effects	of	civilian	victimization	(Wood	and	Kathman	2014;	Thomas	2014;	Fortna	2015).	Chapter	3	presents	 a	 crucial	 contribution	 to	 the	nascent	body	of	work	on	the	effects	of	 conflict-related	sexual	violence	by	examining	 the	question:	 to	what	extent	does	sexual	violence	influence	the	onset	of	mediation	in	intrastate	conflicts?	Theoretically,	 I	 add	 a	 crucial	 piece	 to	 the	 puzzle	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 effects	 of	sexual	 violence	 cannot	 be	 fully	 understood	without	 understanding	 the	 gendered	nature	 of	 states.	 Specifically,	 I	 contend	 that	 reports	 of	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	emasculate	 the	 government	 by	 publicly	 exposing	 its	 inability	 to	 fulfill	 its	 self-appointed	 function	 as	 a	 protector	 of	women	 and	 children.	 This	 gendering	 of	 the	power	 to	 hurt	 logic	 presents	 an	 important	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	 and	refinement	 of	 the	 traditional	 rationalist	 conflict	 processes	 and	 management	literature.		In	 chapter	3,	 I	 draw	on	mixed	methods	 combining	a	 systematic	 statistical	analysis	of	all	intrastate	conflict	years	between	1990	and	2009	with	a	case	study	of	Sierra	 Leone	 to	 empirically	 support	my	 theoretical	 argument.	 For	 the	 statistical	analysis	 I	 use	 the	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Armed	 Conflict	 (SVAC)	 dataset	 (Cohen	 and	Nordås	2014)	and	the	Civil	War	Mediation	(CWM)	dataset	 (DeRouen,	Bercovitch,	and	Pospieszna	2011).	The	logistic	regression	models	show	that	mediation	onset	is	strongly	associated	with	rebel	sexual	violence.	I	further	corroborate	the	statistical	analysis	using	Sierra	Leone	as	a	crucial	case	for	the	theoretical	argument	because	the	 widespread	 perpetration	 of	 sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 RUF	 renders	 it	 the	 most	likely	case	to	observe	the	causal	link	between	sexual	violence	and	mediation	onset.	Drawing	 on	 government	 documents,	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 data,	NGO	 reports,	 and	 memoirs	 I	 illustrate	 how	 widespread	 rape	 by	 the	 RUF	
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accentuated	 the	 gendered	 protection	 norm	 thereby	 shaping	 the	 onset	 of	 the	mediation	process	following	the	siege	of	Freetown	in	January	1999.		
Chapter	4	In	 chapter	 4,	 I	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 post-conflict	 stability	 and	 conflict	recurrence.	The	pattern	of	recurring	civil	wars	is	well	established,	often	referred	to	as	the	conflict	trap	(Collier	and	Sambanis	2002).	Existing	research	largely	revolves	around	the	influence	of	structural	factors	on	conflict	recurrence	such	as	previous	conflict	 outcomes,	 good	 governance,	 and	natural	 resources	 (Kreutz	 2010;	Quinn,	Mason,	and	Gurses	2007;	Mason	et	al.	2011;	Hegre	and	Nygård	2015;	Rustad	and	Binningsbø	2012;	Walter	2004,	2015).	Only	recently	have	scholars	started	to	also	examine	 the	 influence	 of	 group	 characteristics	 such	 as	 cohesion	 and	 the	 use	 of	child	soldiers	on	conflict	recurrence	(Haer	and	Böhmelt	2016;	Rudloff	and	Findley	2016).	In	examining	to	what	extent	sexual	violence	influences	conflict	recurrence,	I	contribute	 to	 this	 literature	 focusing	particularly	on	 rebel	 groups’	 organizational	dynamics	and	mobilization	efforts	in	inactive	conflict	years.			Specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	 greater	 rebel	 group	 capability	 increases	 the	likelihood	 of	 conflict	 recurrence	 and	 that	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	conflict	years	is	one	possible	way	of	observing	rebel	mobilization	and	capability	in	such	 inactive	 periods.	 I	 contend	 that	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 signals	 capability	and	 mobilization	 in	 two	 ways:	 first,	 it	 is	 a	 clear	 sign	 that	 an	 identifiable	 group	continues	to	exist	and	is	capable	of	perpetrating	violence	at	a	detectable	level;	and	second,	it	indicates	mobilization	efforts	and	attempts	to	increase	group	capabilities	by	 building	 social	 cohesion	 among	 old	 and	 new	 fighters.	 Specifically,	 I	 draw	 on	Dara	Kay	Cohen’s	work	on	 rape	during	 civil	war	 and	her	 socialization	 argument	(Cohen	2013a,	2016,	2017)	to	argue	that	rebel-led	sexual	violence	increases	rebel	capability	and	 thus	 the	 likelihood	of	conflict	 recurrence	because	 it	 is	an	effective	way	 of	 creating	 social	 cohesion	 and	 improving	military	 effectiveness.	 For	 rebels,	sexual	violence	in	inactive	conflict	years	thus	facilitates	the	escalation	of	violence	to	levels	of	active	armed	conflict.	Chapter	4	thus	presents	an	important	theoretical	contribution	 in	 foregrounding	 the	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 gendered	 organizational	dynamics	that	contribute	to	the	escalation	of	violence	and	conflict	recurrence.		 To	 empirically	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 and	conflict	recurrence	I	rely	on	logistic	and	negative	binomial	regression	models.	I	use	
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an	updated	version	of	the	SVAC	dataset	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014)	that	includes	the	years	 2010	 to	 2015	 and	 the	 Armed	 Conflict	 Termination	 dataset	 (Kreutz	 2010).	The	 different	 models	 show	 a	 robust	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 in	inactive	 years	 and	 a	 subsequent	 escalation	 of	 violence.	 Accordingly,	 this	 chapter	presents	 a	 valuable	 contribution	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 how	 conflict-related	sexual	violence	influences	conflict	dynamics	and	conflict	recurrence.	 	
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2.	Gender	relations	and	negotiations	in	intrastate	conflicts	
2.1	Abstract			To	 what	 extent	 do	 gender	 relations	 in	 society	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	negotiations	during	intrastate	disputes?	A	substantial	body	of	literature	recognizes	gender	relations	as	integral	to	understanding	conflict,	yet	they	have	received	little	attention	 in	 systematic	 studies	 of	 conflict	 management.	 I	 argue	 that	 patriarchal	gender	 relations,	 those	 that	 reflect	 a	 preference	 for	masculinity	 over	 femininity,	influence	belligerent’s	susceptibility	to	negotiate.	To	explain	how	gender	relations	translate	 into	 shaping	 state	behavior	 regarding	 conflict	 I	draw	on	 the	 concept	of	practices.	 Specifically,	 I	 contend	 that	 practices	 of	 excluding	 women	 from	 fully	participating	in	public	life	legitimize	and	institutionalize	violence	as	the	preferred	masculine	way	of	managing	 conflict.	The	 implication	 is	 that	 countries	with	more	patriarchal	 gender	 relations	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	 negotiations	 during	intrastate	 conflicts.	 I	 systematically	 test	 this	 argument	 on	 all	 civil	 conflict	 dyads	between	 1975	 and	 2014.	 The	 analysis	 shows	 that	 countries	 that	 marginalize	women’s	 participation	 in	 public	 life	 are	 significantly	 less	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	negotiations.	The	robust	results	provide	strong	support	for	my	theoretical	claims	and	 offer	 systematic	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 core	 claims	 of	 the	 feminist	 peace	theory.	 These	 findings	 have	 implications	 for	 the	 study	 and	 practice	 of	 civil	 war	management.	
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2.2	Introduction	How	does	 the	 status	of	women	within	 a	 society	 influence	how	violent	 conflict	 is	managed?	Over	the	past	two	decades	a	substantial	body	of	research	has	emerged	supporting	the	link	between	gender	and	conflict	(for	an	overview	see	Reiter	2015).	Studies	show	that	men	who	subscribe	to	patriarchal	values	of	honor	and	idealize	masculine	notions	of	toughness	are	more	likely	to	participate	in	political	violence	(Bjarnegård,	Brounéus,	and	Melander	2017),	and	that	political	organizations	that	have	more	gender-inclusive	ideologies	are	more	likely	to	employ	nonviolent	tactics	(Asal	et	al.	2013).	Research	further	shows	that	states	in	which	gendered	inequality	is	 prevalent	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 go	 to	 war	 (Caprioli	 2000);	 use	 severe	 violence	(Caprioli	 and	 Boyer	 2001);	 be	 the	 first	 to	 use	 violence	 in	 interstate	 disputes	(Caprioli	2003);	suffer	intrastate	conflict	(Caprioli	2005);	escalate	to	high	intensity	violence	and	are	less	likely	to	deescalate	violence	once	it	begins	(Melander	2005b).	It	is	less	clear	how	gendered	inequality	influences	efforts	to	end	violent	conflict.	An	analysis	 of	 women’s	 relative	 status	 and	 peacekeeping	 missions	 shows	 that	peacekeeping	missions	 in	more	egalitarian	countries	are	more	successful	 (Gizelis	2009).	This	however	omits	a	critical	phase	in	conflicts:	conflict	parties’	openness	to	nonviolent	means	 of	 terminating	 a	 dispute.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 question	 of	 how	gender	relations	influence	a	state’s	preferences	towards	conflict	management	has	so	far	been	left	unexplored.		 I	 fill	 this	 lacuna	 by	 developing	 an	 argument	 linking	 gendered	 inequalities	with	 belligerent’s	 propensity	 to	 enter	 into	 negotiations.	 I	 argue	 that	 patriarchal	gender	 relations,	 those	 that	 reflect	 a	 preference	 for	masculinity	 over	 femininity,	influence	 belligerents’	 predisposition	 to	 negotiate.	 Specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	belligerents	 in	 countries	 with	 lower	 levels	 of	 women’s	 inclusion	 in	 the	 public	sphere,	 i.e.	 in	 societies	 that	 more	 extensively	 curtail	 women’s	 inclusion	 and	participation	 in	 education,	 commerce,	 and	 politics,	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	negotiations	 to	 resolve	 political	 violence.	 For	 patriarchal	 gender	 relations	normatively	 and	 structurally	 sanction	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 to	 manage	 conflicts	because	they	embody	and	reinforce	values	of	a	violent	hegemonic	masculinity	such	as	domination,	subjugation,	and	denigration	of	women	and	femininity.	As	a	result	I	expect	 that	 all	 else	 being	 equal,	 countries	 in	 which	 gender	 relations	 are	 more	patriarchal	are	 less	 likely	to	manage	conflicts	nonviolently.	 I	 identify	practices	as	the	missing	 link	 in	explaining	how	gender	relations	at	the	 individual	and	societal	
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micro-level	 influence	state	behavior	at	the	macro-level.	Practices	diffuse	between	individuals,	society,	and	formal	state	 institutions;	 they	thereby	 influence	a	state’s	framework	 for	 how	 to	 govern,	 including	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 conflicts.	 Gender	relations	 manifest	 in	 inequitable	 gender	 practices	 such	 as	 restricting	 women’s	access	 to	 economic,	 educational,	 and	 political	 opportunities,	 which	means	 these	practices	tangibly	express	a	gender	hierarchy	that	reflects	individual	and	societal	beliefs	about	masculinity’s	superiority	over	femininity.	I	 test	 this	 argument	 using	 logistic	 regression	 models	 in	 249	 armed	intrastate	 conflict	 dyads	 between	 1975	 and	 2014	 taken	 from	 the	 Uppsala/PRIO	Armed	 Conflict	 dataset	 (Gleditsch	 et	 al.	 2002).	 This	 involves	 1,989	 conflict	 dyad	years,	of	which	533	also	 feature	negotiations.	 I	 rely	on	recently	 released	data	on	negotiations	(Ari	2018),	and	gender	relations	 in	a	society	 (Karim	and	Hill	2018).	These	new	data	enable	me	to	capture	practices	that	reflect	 the	different	 levels	of	patriarchal	 gender	 relations	 within	 and	 between	 countries	 over	 time.	 The	statistical	analysis	substantiates	my	argument,	provides	cross-national	support	for	micro-level	 findings	 that	 patriarchal	 values	 and	 ideals	 of	 masculine	 toughness	drive	 participation	 in	 political	 violence	 (Bjarnegård,	 Brounéus,	 and	 Melander	2017),	and	offers	systematic	evidence	in	support	of	core	claims	underpinning	the	feminist	peace	theory.		 		
2.3	Conflict	management	
Why	and	how	do	disputants	manage	intrastate	conflict?	Violent	conflict	is	costly	and	rational	disputants	should	avoid	it	(Fearon	1995).	Yet,	violent	conflict	remains	prevalent,	although	nonviolent	conflict	management	offers	great	benefits	 to	disputants.	 Primarily	 it	 presents	 a	way	of	preventing	or	 ending	costly	 violence	 (Dixon	 1996).	 Conflict	 management	 can	 take	 multiple	 forms	including,	but	not	limited	to,	bilateral	negotiations.	Negotiation	is	a	voluntary	and	nonviolent	form	of	conflict	management.	Thus,	at	its	core	it	is	a	process	that	builds	on	collaboration	and	compromise,	rather	than	the	imposition	of	one’s	will	through	power	and	control.	To	facilitate	the	discussion	I	use	negotiations	interchangeably	with	conflict	management	in	this	article.	The	 rationalist	 framework	 posits	 that	 violent	 conflict	 is	 the	 result	 of	insufficient	 information	 about	 the	 resolve	 and	 capabilities	 of	 the	 other	 side	(Fearon	 1995).	 Fighting	 then	 becomes	 a	 way	 of	 obtaining	 this	 information.	
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According	to	this	framework,	prolonged	fighting	can	be	deemed	necessary	before	exploring	 nonviolent	 alternatives	 of	 managing	 conflicts.	 Using	 this	 rationalist	framework	 a	 significant	 body	 of	 research	 explores	 factors	 influencing	 the	likelihood	of	peace	talks	in	civil	wars.	Studies	focus	primarily	on	conflict	and	actor	characteristics	such	as	conflict	intensity	and	history	(Bercovitch	and	Jackson	2001;	Greig	 2005;	Melin	 2011),	 belligerents’	 strength	 and	 cohesiveness	 (Clayton	 2013,	2016;	Cunningham	2013).	A	common	theme	throughout	these	studies	is	the	role	of	power	 in	 influencing	 talks.	 Gender	 is	 integral	 to	 understanding	 power,	 yet	 has	received	little	attention	in	systematic	studies	of	conflict	management.			 Although	conflict	management	offers	many	benefits	and	is	 less	costly	than	violence,	 it	 is	not	 free	either.	The	 costs	and	benefits	of	 talks	differ	depending	on	when	 they	 take	 place.	 Talks	 to	 prevent	 violence	 are	 less	 costly	 than	 talks	 once	violence	has	erupted	because	that	can	be	portrayed	as	appeasement	and	framed	as	weakness.	 Before	 intrastate	 conflicts	 descend	 into	 violence	 the	 primary	impediment	 to	 conflict	 management	 is	 the	 question	 of	 legitimacy.	 Opening	 a	dialogue	 with	 a	 group	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 granting	 the	 group	 and	 its	 cause	legitimacy	(Svensson	2007;	Kaplow	2016).	The	government’s	decision	to	talk	can	be	 interpreted	as	a	de	 facto	acknowledgement	 that	 the	other	 side	 is	 a	 legitimate	actor	 or	 has	 a	 legitimate	 grievance.	 This	 can	 be	 problematic,	 particularly	 if	 a	government	 faces	 multiple	 separatist	 movements,	 because	 acknowledging	 one	group	 is	 likely	 to	 encourage	 others	 to	 further	 pursue	 their	 agendas	 (Walter	2006b).	 India	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	 this	 as	 the	 government	 continues	 to	 face	multiple	 separatist	movements	 in	 the	northeast	 of	 the	 country	 alone.	 Talks	with	one	group	would	undermine	the	government’s	ability	to	take	a	hardline	stance	on	others.	 I	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	 gendered	 dimension	 to	 this	 and	 that	 patriarchal	gendered	 relations,	 which	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 conflicts	 in	 Northeast	 India	 more	generally	 (Forsberg	 and	 Olsson	 2013),	 can	 also	 help	 explain	 the	 comparative	dearth	of	negotiations	in	them.		Once	 violence	 erupts,	 costs	 of	 conflict	management	 increase.	 In	 intrastate	conflicts	the	government	should	have	a	structural	advantage	in	terms	of	economic	and	military	resources	(Gent	2011).	This	asymmetry	often	results	in	the	pursuit	of	a	 military	 solution.	 The	 flipside	 is	 that	 agreeing	 to	 talks	 effectively	 signals	weakness	and	the	admission	that	despite	the	structural	advantage	the	government	is	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 outright	 win	 the	 conflict	 (Melin	 and	 Svensson	 2009;	
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Kaplow	 2016).	 Opening	 dialogue	 thus	 can	 potentially	 damage	 the	 government’s	reputation	with	 important	 domestic	 or	 international	 supporters,	who	might	 lose	faith	in	the	government’s	resolve	and/or	capabilities	(Kaplow	2016).	Accordingly,	the	 government	 will	 only	 agree	 to	 talks	 if	 the	 benefits	 of	 ending	 the	 violence	outweigh	 their	 costs	 (Melin	 and	 Svensson	 2009).	 Despite	 publicly	 claiming	 the	opposite,	governments	often	engage	in	talks	with	groups	that	use	terrorist	tactics	because	 the	 benefits	 of	 ending	 attacks	 on	 civilians	 outweigh	 the	 costs	 of	 talking	(Thomas	 2014).	 For	 example,	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 the	 UK	 government	 engaged	first	 in	backchannel	 talks	despite	denouncing	 the	 IRA	as	a	 terrorist	organization,	before	a	formal	mediation	process	delivered	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	in	1998.	Opposition	groups	stand	 to	benefit	greatly	 from	talks	because	 they	confer	legitimacy	 giving	 them	 a	 boost	 in	 domestic	 and	 international	 standing.	 For	 the	government,	however,	talks	cement	its	inability	to	withstand	opposition	pressure	(Melin	and	Svensson	2009).	Consequently,	groups	might	interpret	the	decision	to	accept	 talks	 as	 a	 signal	 that	 hard	 bargaining	 or	 further	 fighting	would	 result	 in	more	concessions,	potentially	leading	to	increased	support	from	the	population	or	the	emergence	of	new	groups	(Toft	2003;	Walter	2006b).		
	
2.4	Gender,	power,	conflict	States	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 formal	 institutions,	 which	 are	 “defined,	conceptualized,	and	structured	in	terms	of	a	distinction	between	masculinity	and	femininity”	 (Britton	 2000,	 419).	 Put	 differently,	 states	 are	 masculine	 entities	(Enloe	 2014;	 Tickner	 1992;	 Peterson	 1992;	 Sjoberg	 2013).4	This	 gendering	 is	embedded	 in	 institutions	 through	 practices,	 values,	 and	 expectations	 of	appropriate	 behavior	 and	 institutional	 norms	 and	 rules	 that	 privilege	 certain	behaviors	 and	 certain	 actors	 over	 others	 (Chappell	 2010,	 184).	Historically	men	have	 created	 most	 formal	 institutions.	 Yet	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that	 gender	differences	are	not	synonymous	with	sex	differences,	but	are	best	understood	as	the	result	of	social	expectations	and	interactions.	Gender	roles	are	fundamental	to	this.	 The	 values	 and	 behavior	 ascribed	 to	 masculinity	 and	 femininity	 that	 are	expressed	 in	 daily	 interactions,	 social	 norms,	 and	 gendered	 language,	 legitimate																																																									
4	It	 is	 important	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 nation,	 which	 is	 often	 framed	 in	feminine	 terms,	 e.g.	 ‘motherland’	 (Yuval-Davis	1997),	 and	 the	 state,	which	 is	 the	masculine,	formal	political	institution		
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and	encourage	men’s	domination	and	women’s	subordination	and	oppression	that	create	a	power	imbalance	between	the	genders	(Sideris	2001).			One	reason	for	this	imbalance	is	that	women	are	predominantly	socialized	to	 be	 submissive	 and	 peaceful.	 The	 socialization	 of	 women	 as	 stereotypical	feminine,	 e.g.	 nurturing,	 caring	 etc.	 instills	 peaceful	 values	 that	 are	 reflected	 in	women’s	use	of	language,	their	conception	of	power,	politics,	and	security	(Caprioli	and	 Boyer	 2001,	 504–5).	Men	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 are	 socialized	 to	 be	 dominant,	strong,	rational,	fighters,	and	protectors	(Tickner	1992;	Goldstein	2001).	They	are	seen	 as	 natural	 protectors	 that	 ‘suppress	 their	 own	 fears,	 brace	 themselves	 and	step	 forward	 to	 defend	 the	 weak,	 women	 and	 children’	 (Enloe	 2014,	 12).	 This	traditional	 division	 of	 gender	 roles	 leads	 to	 gender	 power	 imbalances	 that	subordinate	women	and	femininity	while	idealizing	men	and	masculinity.		 A	feminist	framework	places	gender	relations,	in	particular	the	underlying	norms	 of	 subordination	 and	 domination	 of	 others,	 at	 the	 center	 of	 structural	inequalities	 and	 violence	 (Sjoberg	 2013).	 Within	 such	 a	 framework	 gender	relations	between	wives	and	husbands,	parents	and	their	children,	are	at	the	most	fundamental	level	and	thus	present	the	blueprint	of	any	social	interaction	thereby	shaping	societal	norms	and	actions:	 ‘To	 the	extent	 that	 the	 father	dominates	and	controls	 the	mother,	 this	model	 teaches	 the	 child	 that	 domination	 by	 one	 group	over	 another	 is	 appropriate	 and	 normal’	 (Bjarnegård,	 Brounéus,	 and	 Melander	2017,	 752).	 Domestic	 structures	 and	 gender	 relations	 are	 templates	 for	 social	relations	 in	 larger	 society	 (Caprioli	 2000,	 2005;	 Hudson	 et	 al.	 2012).	 Put	differently,	 gender	 relations	 serve	 as	 a	 normative	 framework	 for	 social	interactions	in	wider	society,	placing	them	at	the	heart	of	any	conflict.	Accordingly,	more	peaceful	societies	are	characterized	by	norms	of	equality	and	egalitarianism	between	 the	 genders,	 whereas	 countries	 that	 have	 greater	 gender	 power	imbalances	are	more	violent.5			 However,	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 gendered	 inequality	 and	 conflict	 the	mechanisms	at	work	are	often	not	 clearly	delineated.	The	existing	 research	does	not	specify	how	norms	of	gender	relations	become	a	 framework	for	society,	how	these	societal	norms	 influence	policies,	and	particularly	how	these	norms	 inform	conflict	 processes.	 Drawing	 on	 Bourdieu’s	 concept	 of	practices	 (1977,	 1990)	 the																																																									
5	Of	course	there	are	other	 important	sources	of	hierarchies	such	as	race	or	class	that	frequently	intersect	or	interact	with	gender.	
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following	 section	 offers	 an	 explanation	 of	 how	 power	 imbalances	 based	 on	gendered	 roles,	 values,	 and	 behavior,	 influence	 conflict	 management.	 Put	differently,	 practices	 help	 us	 understand	 how	 gender	 power	 imbalances	 diffuse	within	society	to	influence	formal	institutions	and	state	policies.	As	such	they	help	us	bridge	 the	gap	between	micro-level	behavior	 that	prioritize	men	over	women	and	macro-level	state	decisions	to	rely	on	violence	to	manage	a	conflict.		
Practices	-	connecting	micro-	and	macro-level	Norms	 and	 values	 are	 intangible,	 difficult	 to	 measure,	 even	 invisible,	 only	becoming	 apparent	 when	 violated.	 Thus	 testing	 an	 argument	 based	 on	 gender	norms	and	relations	is	difficult	and	often	has	to	rely	on	crude	approximations	that	stretch	 the	 conceptual	 boundaries	 of	 the	 norms	 in	 question.6	One	 possibility	 to	overcome	 this	 inherent	 epistemological	 problem	 is	 to	 use	practices	 (Bigo	2011).	Practices	 combine	 into	 one	 concept	 the	 different	 notions	 that	 are	 captured	 in	 a	variety	of	terms	such	as:	customs,	tradition,	tacit	knowledge,	ideology,	framework	and	presupposition	(Turner	1994,	2).	Although	often	used	interchangeably,	the	concepts	of	behavior,	action,	and	practices	 are	 not	 the	 same.	 Practices	 are	 patterned	 actions	within	 an	 organized	context,	socially	embedded	through	learning	and	training	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011,	6).	Through	repeating	actions	or	reproducing	similar	meaning	over	space	and	time	practices	represent	and	reproduce	the	world	in	a	specific	way	implicitly	claiming	that	 this	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 world’s	 natural	 state,	 that	 this	 is	 ‘how	 things	 are	 done’.	Practices,	 therefore,	 are	 ultimately	what	 people	 use	 to	 explain	 their	 actions	 and	rules;	they	are	the	system	of	reference	by	which	they	interpret	events	and	actions	(Stern	 2000,	 61).	 Thus,	 practices	 are	 fundamental	 to	 any	 understanding	 of	 the	world,	 they	 ‘not	 only	 organize	 the	 world	 -	 they	 are	 also	 the	 raw	materials	 that	comprise	it’	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011,	13).	For	example,	the	democratic	practice	of	voting	 results	 in	 the	 governing,	 i.e.	 organizing,	 of	 our	 lives	 through	 democratic	institutions	 such	 as	 legislature,	 executive,	 and	 judicature.	 Accordingly,	 practices	bridge	 the	 perceived	 divide	 between	 tangible	 experiences	 and	 invisible	 norms	(Adler	 and	 Pouliot	 2011,	 17).	 Generally	 practices,	 then,	 can	 be	 defined	 as	‘meaningful	 patterns	 of	 action’	 that	 simultaneously	 perform,	 embody,	 and																																																									
6	See	 Karim	 and	 Hill	 (2018)	 for	 discussion	 of	 concept	 stretching	 in	 relation	 to	gender	inequality	
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challenge	 organized	 background	 knowledge	 and	 discourse	 (Adler	 and	 Pouliot	2011,	6).	 Simply	put:	practices	are	 ‘culture	in	action’	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011,	14	emphasis	 added).	 Practices	 perform,	 embody,	 challenge,	 and	 institutionalize	 the	values	and	norms	of	a	society.	This	renders	practices	as	markedly	political	as	they	serve	to	sustain	(or	undermine)	patterns	of	power	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011,	21).			 Ultimately,	practices	are	performed	by	individual	social	beings.	Collectively,	however,	 practices	 are	 structured	 and	 performed	 by	 communities	 of	 practice	 in	which	 they	 develop,	 diffuse,	 and	 become	 institutionalized	 (Bourdieu	 1990,	 59;	Adler	 and	 Pouliot	 2011,	 17).	 In	 line	with	 this,	 a	 society	 should	 be	 considered	 a	community	of	practice	(Adler	and	Pouliot	2011).	Gender	is	integral	to	practices,	as	Bourdieu	argues	 that	children	construct	 their	social	 identity	 ‘at	 the	same	time	as	[they]	construct	 their	 representations	of	 the	division	of	 labor	between	 the	sexes,	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 same	socially	defined	 set	of	 indissolubly	biological	 and	 social	indices’	 (Bourdieu	 1990,	 78).	 For	 example,	 patriarchal	 societies	 are	 normatively	upheld	and	behaviorally	re-enforced	by	family	structures	in	which	sons	experience	preferential	 treatment	 over	 daughters,	 which	 in	 turn	 sets	 the	 tone	 for	 the	oppression	 of	 women	 and	 others	 in	 general.	 In	 other	 words,	 communities	 of	practice	provide	both	the	normative	justification	in	which	action	is	grounded	and	the	habitual	framework	for	any	social	interaction.		 Based	 on	 this	 premise,	 gender	 practices	 are	 developed,	 diffused,	 and	institutionalized,	 becoming	 part	 of	 the	 normative	 framework	 for	 societal	interactions	in	general.	Women	and	men,	girls	and	boys,	are	raised	and	socialized	to	 adhere	 to	 gendered	 roles.	 ‘Boys	will	 be	boys’	 becomes	prediction,	 instruction,	and	excuse	(Ahmed	2017).	For	example,	soldiers’	combat	training	socializes	them	to	adopt	certain	behavior	that	possibly	cannot	simply	be	“turned	off”	outside	of	a	military	setting.	As	a	result	associated	practices	diffuse	into	other	areas	outside	the	military	 into	 society	 and	 politics.	 This	 further	 embeds	 the	 power	 imbalance	 in	gender	relations,	which	is	expressed	through	both	overt	aggressions	(for	example:	domestic	 violence,	 sexual	 assaults,	 or	 honor	 killings)	 and	 nonviolent	 oppression	(for	 example:	 exclusion	 from	 public	 life,	 relegation	 of	 women	 to	 “feminine”,	domestic	work).	Both	are	part	of	a	wider	set	of	practices	that	are	inherently	violent	and	oppressive	of	femininity	and	non-hegemonic	masculinities.	On	a	societal	level	the	practices	idealizing	masculinity	include	for	example	restricting	women’s	access	to	 education,	 commerce,	 and	 politics	 as	 these	 are	 deemed	 ‘masculine	 domains’.	
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These	societal	practices	cement	the	gender	power	imbalance.	The	pervasive	nature	of	practices	means	that	they	often	become	invisible	and	go	unquestioned	because	they	 are	 part	 of	 the	 social	 fabric:	 practices	 become	 naturalized	 through	
habituation,	 for	example	 in	 the	 investment	bias	 towards	sons	 in	 the	allocation	of	food	 and	 education.	As	 a	 consequence,	women	 themselves	not	 only	 accept	 these	practices,	but	are	co-opted	in	perpetuating	them	against	other	women	or	their	own	daughters,	 for	example	 in	cases	of	 female	genital	mutilation	or	 female	 infanticide	(Hudson	et	al.	2012).	
	
Hegemonic	masculinity	and	the	state	Society	 and	 its	 formal	 institutions,	 i.e.	 political	 parties,	 the	 government,	 and	security	institutions	such	as	the	police	and	military,	are	products	of	such	practices.	This	 implies	 they	 are	 gendered	 and	 therefore	 reflect	 the	 underlying	 gendered	power	 imbalances	 that	 award	 primacy	 to	 masculinities	 (Karim	 and	 Beardsley	2017).	Within	these	institutions	masculinity	can	take	multiple	forms	depending	on	the	 spatial,	 temporal,	 and	 political	 context,	 but	 some	 are	 hegemonic,	 i.e.	 a	‘configuration	of	gender	practice	which	guarantees	the	dominant	position	of	men	and	 the	 subordination	 of	 women”	 (Connell	 2005,	 77).	 Tickner	 highlights	 the	glorification	of	power	in	this	socially	constructed	ideal	of	a	hegemonic	masculinity	(1992).	The	ideal-type	hegemonic	masculinity	is	the	set	of	characteristics	to	which	men	in	a	given	society	are	expected	to	aspire	and	which	this	society	should	reflect	(Sjoberg	 2013,	 89).7	This	 implies	 that	 ‘within	 an	 institution	 certain	masculinities	have	 power	 while	 femininities	 and	 other	 masculinities	 do	 not.	 The	 structures,	rules,	 practices,	 and	 customs	 of	 the	 institution	 are	 oriented	 around	 the	 leading	masculinities,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 masculinity	 and	 femininities	 are	 subordinate’	(Karim	 and	 Beardsley	 2017,	 30).	 The	 key	 point	 here	 is	 that	 the	 gender	 power	imbalance	takes	a	central	role	in	shaping	institutions	and	policies.		The	idealization	of	a	warrior	identity	accompanied	by	the	militarization	of	masculinity	entrenches	this	gender	power	imbalance	(Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).	The	 warrior	 identity	 as	 the	 hegemonic	 masculinity	 conflates	 masculinity	 with	courage,	 toughness,	 rationality,	and	physical	prowess	 (Tickner	1992).	Femininity	and	 other	 forms	 of	 masculinity	 such	 as	 the	 stay-at-home	 dad,	 the	 metro-,	 or																																																									
7	Simultaneously,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 acknowledged	 that	 masculinity	 is	 understood	 and	conceptualized	differently	across	time	and	space,	that	masculinity	is	not	uniform,	and	that	like	any	social	construct	it	is	subject	to	change	(Sjoberg	2013).		
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homosexual	 man,	 then	 become	 synonymous	 with	 weakness,	 irrationality,	 and	dependence	(Tickner	1992;	Duncanson	2013).	The	warrior	identity	has	historical	origins:	participation	in	combat	presenting	the	ultimate	test	of	manhood	-	a	rite	of	passage	 needed	 to	 turn	 ‘boys’	 into	 ‘men’	 (Enloe	 1983;	 Elshtain	 1987;	 Goldstein	2001).	 The	monopoly	 of	 violence	 vested	 in	 the	 state	 plays	 on	 and	 feeds	 off	 this	warrior	 identity	 in	 attracting	 men	 wanting	 to	 prove	 their	 manhood	 in	 security	institutions	such	as	police	and	military	where	fighting	is	expected.	These	security	institutions	perceive	the	warrior	identity	as	an	ideal	to	which	they	aspire	resulting	in	 the	 privileging	 of	 fighting	 prowess	 over	 other	 characteristics	 such	 as	nonviolence	and	de-escalation	(Karim	and	Beardsley	2017,	31).	As	a	result	it	is	the	masculinity	 of	 the	 state	 and	 particularly	 the	 embedded	 warrior	 identity	 of	 its	security	 institutions	that	shape	state	policies	because	they	are	deemed	necessary	to	defend	the	nation	(Sjoberg	2013).		The	 second	 factor	 entrenching	 gender	 power	 imbalances	 is	 the	militarization	process	in	state	institutions	(Enloe	2000).	The	state	and	its	security	institutions	 need	 large	 numbers	 of	 recruits	 –	 primarily	 men	 –	 both	 capable	 of	fighting	 and	 willing	 to	 potentially	 sacrifice	 their	 lives.	 While	 the	 warrior	masculinity	 is	 instrumental	 in	 the	 recruitment,	 to	 increase	 capability	 and	willingness	 to	 fight	 the	 state	 relies	 on	 a	 militarization	 process	 (Karim	 and	Beardsley	 2017,	 38).8	As	 part	 of	 the	 militarization	 process	 state	 militaries	 and	armed	 groups	 frequently	 use	 violence	 to	 socialize	 their	 fighters	 into	 cohesive	combat	units	(Cohen	2013a,	2017;	Littman	and	Paluck	2015).	In	this	process	they	pit	 the	 “in-group”	 against	 an	 “out-group”	 as	 violence	 against	 outsiders	 is	 more	likely	to	lead	to	ties	among	insiders	(Littman	and	Paluck	2015).	State	officials,	such	as	 prime	 ministers,	 presidents,	 or	 defense	 ministers,	 tasked	 with	 managing	conflicts	 are	 overwhelmingly	 male	 (Barnes	 and	 O’Brien	 2018),	 and	 often	 have	often	 gone	 through	 such	 socialization	 processes,	 especially	 when	 they	 have	 a	military	background.	Gender	and	sexuality	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	creation	of	such	out-groups.	Important	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 the	 devaluation	 of	 femininity	 (Tickner	 1992).	 The	militarization	 process	 is	 designed	 to	 strip	men	 of	 their	 femininity	 by	 socializing	them	into	suppressing	emotions	and	individual	identities,	proving	their	manhood,																																																									
8	Pervasive	 socialization	 processes	 within	 armed	 groups/militaries	 ensure	 that	women’s	 inclusion	 does	 not	 substantially	 affect	 their	 practices	 (Cohen	 2013b;	Loken	2017)	
   32	
shaming	 others	 for	 “acting	 like	 women”,	 using	 violence	 without	 emotion,	 and	feminizing	the	enemy	(Whitworth	2004).	Particularly	soldiers	are	evaluated	based	on	their	adherence	to	this	militarized	masculinity	and	anything	that	does	not	fit	it,	including	 femininity	 and	women,	 is	 denigrated	 (Karim	 and	Beardsley	 2017,	 38).	States,	particularly	their	security	institutions,	promote	the	notion	of	proving	one’s	manhood	 and	 the	 kind	 of	 militarization	 based	 on	 the	 rejection	 of	 all	 that	 is	feminine.	 A	 militarized	 warrior	 masculinity	 requires	 the	 construction	 of	 the	“other”	as	feminine	and	thus	is	promoted	and	sustained	through	the	denigration	of	femininity	and	lesser	masculinities.		 	
Gender	and	conflict	management	Practices	 diffuse	 from	 society	 into	 formal	 state	 institutions,	 thus	 shaping	 states’	frameworks	for	how	to	govern,	including	how	to	deal	with	conflicts.	Specifically,	if	society’s	 idealization	 of	 masculinity	 is	 expressed	 in	 practices	 of	 exclusion	 and	subordination	 directed	 against	 women	 and	 femininity,	 then	 these	 practices	influence	the	state’s	policies,	particularly	its	reliance	on	violence	and	militarism.	It	is	this	gender	power	imbalance	that	shapes	state	policies.	As	Laura	Sjoberg	argues	‘policy	 options	 such	 as	 empathy,	 positive-sum	 collaboration,	 unilaterally	deconstructing	the	cycle	of	violence,	care,	or	empowerment	are	often	missing	from	states’	toolboxes	because	the	gendered	system	selects	for	power-over	rather	than	power-to	 or	 power-with’	 (2013,	 95).	 Similarly	Claire	Duncanson	 asserts	 that	 the	warrior	 identity	 influences	 policy	 priorities	 preferring	 combat	 to	 nonviolent	conflict	management	and	de-escalation	(2013,	137).	This	manifests	for	example	in	politicians’	reluctance	to	reign	in	military	spending	and	in	a	preference	of	meeting	threats	 with	 a	 “manly”	 response,	 i.e.	 force	 and	 violence.	 To	 exercise	 caution,	 to	choose	de-escalation	and	nonviolent	conflict	management,	is	perceived	as	feminine	and	thus	not	part	of	the	warrior	identity	(Duncanson	2013).			 Another	 aspect	 that	 helps	 explain	 how	 societal	 practices	 shape	governmental	 action	 is	 the	 selection	 of	 prototypical	 leaders.	 Groups	 commonly	select	prototypical	leaders	that	epitomize	practices	that	are	held	in	high	regard	by	group	members	(Hogg	1996).	For	leaders	this	entails	that	embodying	these	values	and	 norms	 grants	 them	 greater	 legitimacy	 because	 they	 are	 seen	 as	representatives	 of	 the	 group.	This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 political	 leaders	 as	masculinity	(power,	strength,	and	control)	is	what	is	supposedly	needed	to	defend	
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the	 nation	 (Sjoberg	 2013,	 199).	 This	 translates	 to	 citizens	 opting	 for	 masculine	leadership	because	 they	expect	and	demand	protection	 (Sjoberg	2013,	162).	The	idealization	of	masculinity	leads	to	a	prioritization	of	males,	whose	masculinity	is	naturally	 assumed,	 over	 females,	 who	 have	 to	 prove	 their	 masculinity,	 because	biological	 sex	 serves	 as	 a	 shortcut	 for	 identifying	 desirable	 leadership	characteristics	 (Sjoberg	 2013,	 141).	 States	 that	 idealize	 a	 warrior	 masculinity	develop,	 diffuse,	 and	 institutionalize	 practices	 that	 harm,	 oppress,	 exploit,	 and	exclude	women,	making	it	seem	that	this	is	the	world’s	natural	state	and	that	this	is	‘how	things	are	done’:	violently.	Thus	the	rejection	of	femininity	and	idealization	of	 a	 warrior	 masculinity	 results	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 leaders	 that	 exemplify	 the	desired	masculine	practices.	This	in	turn	influences	their	policies.	If	aggressive	and	violent	practices	are	what	leaders	know	and	what	they	think	are	expected	of	them,	then	that	is	what	they	will	employ.		 On	the	other	hand,	when	societies	do	not	 idealize	masculinity	to	the	same	extent	 this	 shapes	 their	 practices	 too.	 It	 can	 lead	 to	 practices	 of	 nonviolence,	respect,	and	egalitarianism,	which	increase	women’s	inclusion	in	the	public	sphere.	Societal	practices	that	reflect	a	greater	gender	power	balance	thus	should	result	in	greater	sex	parity	 in	public	domains	such	as	politics	and	the	 formal	economy.	As	women’s	 inclusion	 increases	 this	 further	 promotes	 practices	 that	 reject	governance	through	domination	and	coercion	and	instead	emphasize	and	embody	values	 of	 empathy,	 care,	 nonviolence	 and	 respect.	 Sweden	 is	 a	 good	 example	 of	this.	 In	2015,	 the	self-defined	 feminist	Swedish	government	declared	to	pursue	a	feminist	 foreign	policy	using	a	 toolbox	of	representation,	rights,	and	reallocation,	for	the	explicit	purpose	of	challenging	gendered	hierarchies	and	power	structures	(Aggestam	and	Bergman-Rosamond	2016).	The	case	of	Sweden	illustrates	that	the	increased	 inclusion	of	women	 and	 subsequent	 policies	 reflect	 changes	 in	 gender	relations,	 rather	 than	women’s	essential	peacefulness.	 Sweden	 is	part	of	 a	 larger	pattern	 that	 shows	 that	 as	 women’s	 inclusion	 in	 legislatures	 and	 executives	increases	countries	are	 less	 likely	 to	 increase	defense	spending	and	 initiate	wars	(Koch	and	Fulton	2011;	Shair-Rosenfield	and	Wood	2017).	Key	here	is	that,	when	violent	practices	of	subordination	are	less	dominant	in	gender	relations	one	would	expect	 society	 as	 a	 whole	 to	 be	 more	 peaceful	 as	 there	 is	 a	 greater	 normative	constraint	on	the	use	of	violence.		
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	 Practices	 rooted	 in	 a	 gender	 power	 balance	 recognize	 the	 other	 as	 equal,	and	thereby	acknowledge	the	validity	of	one’s	opponent’s	interests	and	grievances.	Sjoberg	 refers	 to	 empathy,	 care,	 and	 empowerment	 as	 policy	 options	 that	more	feminist	 states	 might	 integrate	 (2013,	 95).	 This	 applies	 to	 both	 intra-	 and	intergroup	 relations,	 affecting	 states’	 internal	 structures	 and	 societies’	 choice	 of	conflict	management	tools.	Within	societies	that	do	not	idealize	masculinity,	i.e.	no	longer	equate	leadership	skills	and	decision-making	qualities	with	masculinity	and	men,	 this	 should	 result	 in	 increased	women’s	 inclusion	 and	 participation	 in	 the	public	 sphere	 and	 decision-making	 positions.	 The	 inclusion	 of	 women	 and	 their	increasing	 influence	 should	 then	 lead	 to	 a	 self-affirming	 development	 in	influencing	 and	 shaping	 societal	 practices	 that	 place	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 on	collaboration	 and	 empowerment	 of	marginalized	 groups.	 In	 terms	 of	 intergroup	relations,	practices	based	on	a	gender	power	balance	that	highlight	care,	empathy,	and	 respect,	 are	 important	 because	 an	 influential	 factor	 in	 choosing	 a	 conflict	management	 tool	 is	 the	 concern	 for	 one’s	 opponent’s	 outcomes	 (Bercovitch	 and	Jackson	2001,	63).		At	 the	same	 time,	 it	 is	 important	 to	keep	 in	mind	 that	women’s	 increased	inclusion	does	not	guarantee	that	they	have	greater	power	in	these	public	spaces	or	 the	 ability	 to	 change	 institutional	 power	 structures	 (Karim	 and	 Hill	 2018).	Feminists	argue	 that	women’s	admission	 into	 these	 institutions	and	structures	 is	often	 based	 on	 meeting	 established	 standards	 of	 personality	 and	 practicing	masculinities.	Thus	women	in	decision-making	positions	cannot	be	simply	equated	with	growing	femininity	in	a	society	as	women	often	adopt	masculinized	personas	in	 politics	 (Sjoberg	 2013).	 Put	 differently,	 female	 politicians	 behave	 in	masculinized	 ways	 to	 be	 elected	 by	 an	 electorate	 looking	 for	 hegemonic	masculinity	 leadership	 traits	 thus	 preventing	 any	 feminization	 through	 the	inclusion	 of	 women.	 In	 other	 instances	 the	 higher	 percentage	 of	 women	 in	parliament	 might	 be	 the	 result	 of	 an	 external	 shock,	 for	 example	 Rwanda’s	genocide,	 or	 the	 result	 of	 quotas	 neither	 of	 which	 necessarily	 affect	 prevalent	societal	practices.9	Hence	it	 is	 important	to	look	at	women’s	inclusion	beyond	the	political	 realm	 to	 include	 different	 aspects	 of	 public	 life	 such	 as	 visibility	 and	participation	in	commerce,	the	formal	economy,	and	education.																																																									
9 	This	 is	 not	 an	 argument	 against	 quotas,	 but	 merely	 highlights	 that	 the	introduction	 of	 quotas	 without	 an	 accompanying	 shift	 in	 norms	 and	 attitudes	might	not	achieve	the	desired	changes.	
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	 I	argue	that	the	idealization	of	masculinity	expressed	through	the	exclusion	of	women	in	the	public	sphere	fosters	the	continued	use	of	violence	 in	managing	conflicts	 and	 hampers	 the	 use	 of	 nonviolent	 conflict	 management.	 Patriarchal	practices	 of	 excluding	 women	 from	 public	 life	 normatively	 and	 structurally	sanction	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 to	 manage	 conflicts	 because	 they	 embody	 and	reinforce	 values	 of	 a	 violent	 hegemonic	 masculinity	 such	 as	 domination,	subjugation,	 and	denigration	 of	women	 and	 femininity.	 Put	 differently,	 the	more	patriarchal	 gender	 relations	 are,	 the	 less	 likely	 is	 the	 use	 of	 nonviolent	 conflict	management	methods	 that	 are	perceived	as	more	 feminine	 such	as	negotiations.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 a	 more	 inclusive	 society,	 practices	 should	 produce	 both	normative	and	structural	restraints	against	violence.	Practices	that	reflect	greater	gender	 power	 balance	 through	 the	 inclusion	 of	 women	 should	 challenge	 the	predominance	of	the	warrior	masculinity	and	thereby	discredit	the	use	of	violence	to	manage	conflicts.	The	diffusion	and	 institutionalization	of	practices	expressive	and	 reflective	 of	 greater	 gender	 power	 balance,	 i.e.	 greater	 levels	 of	 women’s	inclusion,	should	manifest	as	a	normative	and	structural	restraint	against	violent	conflict	 management,	 while	 fostering	 nonviolent	 conflict	 management	 and	 de-escalation.	 In	other	words,	when	deciding	on	how	 to	manage	a	 conflict,	 states	 in	which	there	is	a	greater	gender	power	balance	should	be	less	constrained	in	by	a	societal	 desire	 to	 adhere	 to	 a	 militarized	 warrior	 masculinity.	 Subsequently,	 if	violent	conflicts	do	erupt,	states	that	are	more	 inclusive	should	be	more	 likely	to	employ	 nonviolent	 methods	 to	 manage	 them,	 i.e.	 negotiation.	 From	 the	 above	discussion	I	derive	a	testable	hypothesis:			 	
Hypothesis:	Higher	levels	of	women’s	inclusion	in	society	increase	the	likelihood	of	negotiations	in	intrastate	conflict.		
2.5	Methodology	
Data	and	models	In	 testing	 this	 hypothesis	 I	 draw	 on	 new	negotiation	 data	 collected	 by	Baris	 Ari	(2018),	 and	 UCDP/PRIO	 Armed	 Conflict	 data.	 The	 argument,	 however,	 is	 not	specific	 to	 negotiations	 and	 could	 be	 extended	 to	 other	 nonviolent	 conflict	management	 tools	 such	 as	mediation.	 I	 use	Ari’s	 data	 for	 two	main	 reasons:	 (1)	The	 unit	 of	 analysis	 is	 conflict	 dyad	 year,	 meaning	 it	 is	 more	 fine-grained	 than	
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other	available	data;	(2)	Mediation	depends	on	a	third	party’s	willingness	to	offer	its	services	and	disputants’	willingness	to	accept	the	mediator	and	to	give	up	some	level	of	control	over	the	process.	Put	differently,	mediation	processes	introduce	a	third	set	of	interests	and	accentuate	both	benefits	and	costs	of	negotiations,	which	can	substantially	change	the	incentives	for	conflict	parties	to	participate	in	a	peace	process.	 Therefore,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 theoretical	 focus	 on	 patriarchal	 gender	relations	within	a	country	the	empirical	focus	of	the	primary	models	is	on	bilateral	negotiations	 between	 governments	 and	 non-state	 actors.	Nonetheless,	 I	 also	 run	robustness	checks	using	 the	Civil	War	Mediation	data	 (DeRouen,	Bercovitch,	and	Pospieszna	2011).	Negotiations	might	also	take	place	when	fighting	is	suspended.	Thus	I	also	include	non-active	years	that	do	not	reach	the	UCDP	threshold	of	25	battle-related	deaths.	 In	 robustness	 checks	 I	 also	 run	my	 full	 model	 using	 only	 active	 conflict	dyad	years.	As	the	dependent	variable	is	binary,	I	use	logistic	regression	models	to	estimate	the	probability	that	there	will	be	a	negotiation	in	a	conflict	dyad	year.	To	control	 for	 a	 potential	 lack	 of	 independence	 of	 observations	 I	 cluster	 standard	errors	 on	 the	 country.	 To	 account	 for	 temporal	 dependence,	 i.e.	 negotiations	running	for	multiple	years,	or	a	negotiation	process	in	one	year	prompting	another	round	of	negotiation	in	subsequent	years,	I	include	time	since	last	negotiation	and	its	cubic	polynomials.	Logistic	regression	models	evaluate	how	the	log	odds	of	an	event	 change	 with	 the	 independent	 variable.	 The	 parameters	 of	 a	 logistic	regression	model	cannot	be	interpreted	in	their	raw	form;	hence	I	also	provide	the	marginal	 effects	 of	 women’s	 inclusion.	 Marginal	 effects	 measure	 the	 expected	change	in	the	dependent	variable	(negotiation	occurrence),	for	one	unit	change	in	the	 independent	 variable	 (women’s	 inclusion)	while	 holding	 all	 other	 covariates	constant.			
Dependent	Variable	Negotiation	is	defined	as	‘a	meeting	between	a	state-party	and	a	non-state	armed	group	that	is	recognized	by	both	parties	and	that	is	held	to	fully	or	partly	resolve	the	 conflict	 through	 verbal	 communication’	 (Ari	 2018).	 The	 data	 only	 include	acknowledged	 negotiations,	 thus	 indirect	 or	 secret	 backchannel	 talks	 are	 not	included.	 Negotiation	 is	 coded	 as	 dichotomous	 (0	 =	 no	 negotiation,	 1	 =	
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negotiation).	Table	 I.	 displays	 that	533	observations	 (or	27%	of	 all	 conflict	dyad	years	in	the	sample)	see	a	negotiation	process.			Table	I.	Negotiations	in	intrastate	conflicts								
Independent	Variable	I	 argue	 that	women’s	 level	 of	 inclusion	 captures	 a	 given	 society’s	 idealization	 of	masculinity,	 which	 is	 embodied	 and	 reinforced	 through	 the	 subordination,	oppression,	and	exclusion	of	women	and	 femininity	 from	the	public	 sphere.	This	implies	a	distinct	mechanism,	which	requires	me	to	distinguish	women’s	inclusion	from	other	dimensions	of	gendered	inequality	that	have	been	posited	to	influence	conflict	such	as	women’s	physical	security	captured	through	micro-level	violence	(Hudson	 and	 Den	 Boer	 2002;	 Hudson	 et	 al.	 2012)	 and	 women’s	 legal	 rights.	Accordingly,	 I	use	Sabrina	Karim	and	Danny	Hill’s	scale	 for	women’s	 inclusion	as	my	 main	 explanatory	 variable,	 while	 including	 women’s	 rights	 and	 women’s	security	 as	 control	 variables	 (2018).	 Karim	 and	Hill	 construct	 these	 three	 scales	using	Bayesian	mixed	factor	analytical	models,	which	allows	for	missing	values	in	the	component	indicators.	“Mixed”	means	that	the	models	can	combine	indicators	with	 different	 levels	 of	 measurement	 (continuous	 and	 binary)	 ‘by	 assuming	different	functional	forms	for	the	relationships	between	the	latent	variable	and	the	observed	indicators’	(Karim	and	Hill	2018,	22).	The	inclusion	scale	is	constructed	using	37	different	 indicators	 including	 female	participation	 in	 the	 legislature	and	executive,	 female	 labor	force	participation,	 female	participation	in	education	(see	Appendix	A	 for	all	37	 indicators).	The	values	of	women’s	 inclusion	 in	my	sample	range	from	-5.90	on	the	low	end	to	2.62	on	the	high	end,	with	a	mean	of	-0.38	and	a	standard	deviation	of	0.93	(see	Table	II).			
Control	Variables	The	 physical	 security	 of	 women	 in	 society	 may	 influence	 states’	 behavior	 in	conflict.	The	general	idea	is	that	higher	levels	of	micro-level	violence	increase	the	
Negotiation	 Frequency	 Percent	0	 1,456	 73	1	 533	 27	Total	 1,989	 100	
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likelihood	of	macro-level	violence	(Hudson	et	al.	2012).	If	society	tolerates	or	even	encourages	men	(or	women)	to	commit	violence	against	women,	for	example	their	wives	 or	 daughters,	 then	 committing	 violence	 against	 strangers	 will	 be	 much	easier.	Thus,	negotiations	might	be	less	likely	because	violence	is	the	‘natural’	way	of	managing	conflicts.	To	control	for	this	possibility	I	include	Karim	and	Hill’s	scale	on	women’s	security.			 Women’s	 rights	 might	 also	 influence	 conflict	 management.	 The	implementation	of	laws	relating	to	women’s	rights	(even	if	only	partially	enforced)	sends	 a	 signal	 that	 the	 state	 recognizes	 the	 concept	 of	 women’s	 rights,	 which	places	 it	 among	countries	 that	are	 in	 theory	moving	 toward	adherence	 to	 liberal	norms	 such	 as	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	 (Karim	 and	 Hill	 2018).	 Thus	 the	state’s	 institutionalization	 of	 women’s	 rights	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 adopting	democratic	ideals	and	norms	of	non-violence.	The	underlying	mechanism	is	similar	to	 the	 democratic	 peace	 theory	 (Maoz	 and	 Russett	 1993)	 that	 suggests	 that	 the	adoption	 of	 democratic	 norms	 and	 practices	 reduces	 conflict.	 Accordingly,	 I	include	 Karim	 and	 Hill’s	 scale	 for	 women’s	 rights	 and	 use	 the	 V-Dem	 data	 to	control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 any	 observed	 relationship	 is	 actually	 driven	 by	either	 the	 pacifying	 effect	 of	 women’s	 rights	 or	 democracy	 more	 generally	(Coppedge	et	al.	2017).	Table	II	displays	the	range,	mean,	and	standard	deviations	for	women’s	inclusion,	security,	and	rights.				Table	II.	Descriptive	statistics	women’s	inclusion,	rights,	security	
	 Observations	 Min	 Max	 Mean	 Standard	Deviation	Women’s	inclusion	 1,955	 -5.897	 2.615	 -0.380	 0.932	Women’s	rights	 1,957	 -3.085	 1.793	 -0.217	 0.762	Women’s	security	 1,979	 -3.056	 1.401	 -0.155	 0.897			 Table	 III	 shows	 bivariate	 correlations	 for	 the	 three	 scales.	 There	 are	moderate	 correlations	between	 two	 sets	 of	 variables,	 security	 and	 inclusion	 (r	 =	0.65)	as	well	as	security	and	rights	(r	=	0.62).	This	indicates	that	there	is	a	positive	relationship	 between	 security	 and	 inclusion	 —	 on	 average	 higher	 scores	 for	
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security	 is	 associated	with	higher	 levels	of	 inclusion	–	and	between	security	and	rights	 –	 higher	 scores	 for	 security	 is	 associated	 with	 higher	 scores	 for	 rights.	However,	 the	 correlation	 between	 inclusion	 and	 rights	 is	 only	 r	 =	 0.34.	 This	indicates	 that	 the	 three	 dimensions—women’s	 inclusion,	 women’s	 rights,	 and	women’s	security—capture	distinct	concepts.			Table	III.	Bivariate	correlation	matrix	-	women’s	inclusion,	rights,	security			 Inclusion	 Rights	 Security	Inclusion	 1.000	 	 	Rights	 0.338	 1.000	 	Security	 0.646	 0.616	 1.000		 I	 also	 control	 for	 conflict	 characteristics	 previously	 identified	 to	 influence	the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiations.	 Conflict	 intensity	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 a	 key	 factor	 in	shaping	conflict	parties’	decision	to	accept	talks	(Melin	and	Svensson	2009).	Thus,	the	model	includes	a	measure	for	intensity.	Based	on	UCDP	data,	for	each	conflict	year	the	intensity	level	is	coded	either	0	for	inactive	years,	1	for	conflict	resulting	in	25	-	999	battle-related	deaths,	or	2	for	a	war	with	more	than	1,000	casualties.		The	rationalist	framework	points	to	the	importance	of	duration	in	terms	of	collecting	information	about	the	other	side’s	resolve	and	capabilities.	The	longer	a	conflict	 goes	 on	 the	 costlier	 it	 becomes	 (Filson	 and	Werner	 2007;	 Greig	 2001).	Increased	 costs	 should	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiations.	 Accordingly,	 I	include	 the	 natural	 log	 of	 the	 dyad	 duration	 to	 control	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 conflict	duration	on	negotiation	occurrence	within	a	dyad.			 Previous	studies	show	that	relative	rebel	strength	influences	the	likelihood	of	 mediated	 peace	 talks	 (Clayton	 2013,	 2016;	 Clayton	 and	 Gleditsch	 2014).	 A	similar	dynamic	might	influence	the	occurrence	of	negotiations.	To	account	for	this	I	 include	a	measure	of	 relative	rebel	 strength	 from	the	Non-State	Actor	database	(Cunningham,	Gleditsch,	and	Salehyan	2013).	I	use	a	binary	variable	indicating	that	takes	on	the	value	of	1	if	rebels	are	weaker	or	much	weaker	than	the	government	and	0	if	at	parity	with	the	government	or	stronger	than	the	government.			 Thomas	 (2014)	 finds	 that	 on	 the	African	 continent	 negotiations	 are	more	likely	 to	 take	 place	 in	 ethnic	 conflicts.	 To	 control	 for	 the	 potential	 influence	 of	ethnicity	on	negotiation	occurrence,	I	 include	a	binary	variable	based	on	(Vogt	et	
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al.	 2015)	 that	 indicates	 if	 the	 non-state	 actor	 in	 the	 conflict	 dyad	 represents	 an	ethnic	group.		 Parallel	 conflicts	 can	 have	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	likelihood	 of	 peace	 talks.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 multiple	 conflicts	 require	 the	government	 to	 divide	 attention	 and	 resources	 thus	 improving	 rebel’s	 relative	position	and	increasing	the	likelihood	of	talks.	On	the	other	hand,	multiple	conflicts	increase	 the	 recognition	 costs	 associated	 with	 accepting	 negotiations	 thus	reducing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiation	 onset.	 Furthermore,	 more	 conflicts	 mean	more	 potential	 spoilers	 (Cunningham	 2006).	 To	 account	 for	 both	 possibilities	 I	include	a	variable	indicating	the	number	of	active	groups	in	a	country	in	each	year.			 Lastly,	research	indicates	that	high	economic	development	fosters	peace	by	helping	reduce	resource	scarcity	and	 improving	 institutional	 stability	 (Doyle	and	Sambanis	2000).	Therefore,	I	include	the	natural	logs	of	GDP	per	capita	as	well	as	the	natural	log	of	the	population	size	as	controls.		
2.6	Results	All	 other	 things	 being	 equal,	 women’s	 inclusion	 shows	 a	 positive,	 statistically	significant	relationship	with	negotiation	occurrence,	i.e.	greater	levels	of	inclusion	are	 associated	with	 a	 higher	 likelihood	 of	 negotiation.	 The	 statistical	 results	 are	reported	 in	 Table	 IV	 (parameters	 presented	 are	 the	 logistic	 regression	coefficients).	 As	 the	 introduction	 of	 control	 variables	 can	 also	 introduce	 bias	(Clarke	 2005)	 I	 limit	 Model	 1.1	 to	 just	 the	 independent	 variable	 without	 any	controls.	The	results	of	the	logistic	regression	model	are	significant	at	the	p	<	0.001	level	 in	 the	expected	direction.	Model	1.2	 introduces	 the	conflict	 related	controls	such	 as	 dyad	 duration,	 intensity,	 whether	 it	 is	 an	 ethnic	 conflict,	 and	 rebels’	relative	 strength.	Women’s	 inclusion	 remains	 statistically	 significant.	 The	 results	indicate	 that	 years	 of	 intense	 conflict	 (>1,000	deaths)	 are	more	 likely	 to	 feature	negotiations.	Additionally,	the	variable	for	relative	group	strength	also	shows	the	anticipated	 negative	 relationship	 (p	 <	 0.001),	 i.e.	 weak	 rebels	 are	 less	 likely	 to	engage	 in	 negotiations.	 However,	 none	 of	 the	 other	 control	 variables	 show	 a	significant	relationship	with	negotiations.		In	model	1.3	I	 include	variables	to	account	for	country	characteristics	that	might	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiation	 occurrence,	 such	 as	 level	 of	democracy,	GDP	per	capita,	population	size,	and	number	of	active	non-state	groups	
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in	 the	 country.	 Furthermore	 I	 introduce	 the	 controls	 for	 women’s	 security	 and	women’s	 rights.	 Women’s	 inclusion	 and	 rebels’	 relative	 strength	 continue	 to	 be	statistically	significant.	In	this	model	dyad	duration	is	also	statistically	significant,	the	positive	 coefficient	 indicating	 that	 negotiations	become	more	 likely	 as	 dyads	last	longer.	Higher	scores	on	democracy	are	also	associated	with	higher	chances	of	negotiations,	 while	 both	 higher	 levels	 of	 GDP	 per	 capita	 and	 bigger	 populations	decrease	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiations.	 The	 number	 of	 active	 groups	 does	 not	influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 negotiations.	 Neither	 women’s	 security	 nor	 women’s	rights	have	a	significant	relationship	with	negotiations.		In	contrast,	Karim	and	Hill	(2018)	find	that	women’s	security	is	a	significant	predictor	of	conflict	onset.	One	potential	explanation	is	the	argument	that	women’s	inclusion,	women’s	security,	and	women’s	rights	are	distinct	concepts	that	need	to	be	 disaggregated	 because	 there	 are	 different	 mechanisms	 connecting	 them	 to	conflict	depending	on	the	stage	of	the	conflict	cycle.	Micro-level	violence	(women’s	security)	normalizes	violence	thereby	making	macro-level	violence	(conflict	onset)	more	likely,	but	once	conflict	is	ongoing	this	no	longer	influences	how	the	conflict	is	 managed	 and	 instead	 patriarchal	 practices	 reflecting	 the	 idealization	 of	masculinity	 influence	 conflict	management.	Another	potential	 explanation	 is	 that	this	is	a	selection	effect.	Countries	with	relatively	low	women’s	security	scores	are	more	 likely	 to	 experience	 conflict,	 which	 subsequently	 reduces	 the	 variation	 of	women’s	security	scores	in	my	sample.	The	descriptive	statistics	offer	support	for	this	as	women’s	security	has	a	smaller	range	of	variation	than	women’s	inclusion	(see	Table	II).	In	model	1.4,	I	introduce	cubic	polynomials	based	on	the	time	since	the	last	negotiation	 to	 control	 for	 potential	 temporal	 dependence	 (Carter	 and	 Signorino	2010).	 The	 main	 results	 remain	 unchanged,	 meaning	 higher	 levels	 of	 women’s	inclusion	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 chances	 of	 negotiations.	 Rebels’	 relative	strength	 also	 remains	 significant	 and	 ethnic	 conflict	 becomes	 significant	 (p	 =	0.091),	while	neither	 conflict	 intensity	nor	democracy	are	 any	 longer	 significant.	Thus	these	results	lend	strong	support	to	the	hypothesis	that	the	greater	the	level	of	women’s	inclusion	increases	the	likelihood	of	negotiations.					
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Table	IV.	Logistic	regression	models	1.1	–	1.4	(95%	confidence	interval	in	parentheses)			 (1.1)	 (1.2)	 (1.3)	 (1.4)	Women’s	inclusion	 0.406***	 0.516***	 0.580***	 0.385***		 [0.169,0.642]	 [0.237,0.795]	 [0.268,0.893]	 [0.176,0.595]	Dyad	duration	(ln)	 	 0.063	 0.263*	 0.604***		 	 [-0.165,0.291]	 [0.027,0.499]	 [0.428,0.780]	Conflict	 	 0.331	 0.199	 -0.111		 	 [-0.215,0.876]	 [-0.306,0.704]	 [-0.553,0.331]	War	 	 0.753*	 0.574	 0.125		 	 [0.108,1.397]	 [-0.096,1.245]	 [-0.503,0.753]	Ethnic	 	 0.272	 0.323	 0.303t		 	 [-0.270,0.815]	 [-0.242,0.887]	 [-0.049,0.655]	Weak	rebels	 	 -2.081***	 -1.341**	 -1.201**		 	 [-3.186,-0.976]	 [-2.318,-0.365]	 [-1.939,-0.464]	Active	groups	 	 	 -0.099	 0.013		 	 	 [-0.384,0.187]	 [-0.190,0.216]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 	 	 -0.861***	 -0.546***		 	 	 [-1.250,-0.472]	 [-0.809,-0.284]	Population	(ln)	 	 	 -0.409***	 -0.204**		 	 	 [-0.616,-0.202]	 [-0.347,-0.061]	Democracy	 	 	 2.024*	 0.963		 	 	 [0.341,3.708]	 [-0.441,2.367]	Women’s	security	 	 	 0.133	 0.13		 	 	 [-0.262,0.528]	 [-0.165,0.425]	Women’s	rights	 	 	 0.054	 0.018		 	 	 [-0.573,0.680]	 [-0.470,0.505]	Time	since	last	negotiation	 	 	 	 -0.791***		 	 	 	 [-0.991,-0.591]	Time	since	last	negotiation2	 	 	 	 0.051***		 	 	 	 [0.021,0.081]	Time	since	last	negotiation3	 	 	 	 -0.001*		 	 	 	 [-0.002,-0.000]	Constant	 -0.892***	 0.544	 9.974***	 6.229***		 [-1.206,-0.577]	 [-0.499,1.588]	 [5.923,14.02]	 [3.555,8.902]	AIC	 2225.824	 1989.189	 1771.161	 1437.328	Area	under	ROC	 0.602	 0.693	 0.757	 0.862	Wald-chi2	 11.30(1)	 31.80(6)	 	80.21(10)	 369.54(15)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -1110.912	 -987.594	 -874.580	 -702.664	N	 1,955	 1,817	 1,755	 1,755	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001	 			
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	 Besides	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 coefficient	 indicating	 the	 direction	 of	 the	relationship,	 logistic	 regression	 coefficients	 are	difficult	 to	 interpret	 in	 their	 raw	form.	 Consequently,	 I	 also	 provide	 the	 marginal	 effects.	 These	 illustrate	 the	substantive	 effects	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 women’s	 inclusion	 and	 the	likelihood	 of	 negotiations.	 The	 effect	 of	 women’s	 inclusion	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	negotiation	 is	 best	 observed	 when	 comparing	 two	 scenarios	 in	 which	 women’s	inclusion	 presents	 the	 only	 significant	 difference.	 The	 hypothetical	 conflict	conditions	 I	 propose	 are:	 a	 minor	 conflict	 (25-999	 battle-related	 deaths),	 weak	rebels,	and	one	other	active	group.	I	hold	dyad	duration,	population	size,	GDP	per	capita,	women’s	security,	women’s	rights,	and	democracy	level	at	the	sample	mean.	Using	 predicted	 values	 I	 compute	 the	 probability	 of	 negotiation	 occurring	 in	 a	conflict	year	in	a	country	where	women	are	largely	excluded	(women’s	inclusion	at	the	10th	percentile	=	-1.662)	and	a	country	where	women	are	comparatively	well	included	 (women’s	 inclusion	 at	 the	 75th	 percentile	 =	 0.559)	 under	 conditions	 of	holding	 all	 other	 covariates	 constant.	 In	 the	 former	 scenario	 there	 is	 a	 9.30%	probability	 of	 negotiation	 occurring.	 In	 the	 latter	 scenario	 there	 is	 a	 19.43%	probability	 of	 negotiation	 occurring.	 To	 further	 show	 how	 the	 likelihood	 of	negotiation	 changes	with	 the	 level	 of	 women’s	 inclusion	 Figure	 1	 illustrates	 the	predicted	probabilities	based	on	Model	1.4.	The	hypothetical	conflict	dyad	year	is	set	in	the	same	conditions	as	above.	The	marginal	effects	show	a	steady	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	negotiations	as	women’s	inclusion	increases.													




Robustness	checks	For	 the	 first	 robustness	 check	 I	 limit	 the	 sample	 to	 active	 conflict	 years.	 This	reduces	 the	 sample	 size	 to	 1,204	 observations.	 When	 running	 Model	 1.4	 the	substantial	 results,	 however,	 remain	 unchanged.	 Women’s	 inclusion	 still	 has	 a	positive,	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 negotiation	 occurrence	 (p	 =	0.015).	In	a	second	robustness	check	I	replace	the	conflict	 intensity	variable	with	the	natural	 log	of	battle-related	deaths,	which	 further	restricts	 the	sample	 to	 the	time	period	between	1989	and	2014,	resulting	 in	828	observations.	Nonetheless,	women’s	inclusion	continues	to	have	a	positive	statistically	significant	relationship	with	negotiation	occurrence	(p	=	0.048).			 To	 test	 the	 argument’s	 validity	 in	 terms	 of	 other	 conflict	 management	methods	 I	use	yearly	mediation	data	on	 the	conflict	 level	based	on	 the	Civil	War	Mediation	dataset	(Clayton,	2013;	DeRouen,	Bercovitch	&	Pospieszna,	2011).	I	run	a	model	using	a	binary	mediation	variable	and	a	model	using	a	binary	variable	that	combines	 negotiation	 and	 mediation.	 In	 both	 models	 women’s	 inclusion	 is	
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statistically	 significant,	 offering	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 argument	 that	patriarchal	gender	relations	influence	the	likelihood	of	nonviolent	conflict	management.			 To	ensure	 that	women’s	 inclusion	 in	public	 life	does	not	merely	capture	a	strong	civil	society	I	include	the	core	civil	society	index	from	the	V-Dem	dataset	as	a	 control	 variable.	 The	 results	 remain	 virtually	 unchanged.	 To	 account	 for	 the	possibility	 that	 levels	of	women’s	 inclusion	or	 the	occurrence	of	negotiations	are	shaped	 by	 geographical	 regions	 I	 run	 Model	 1.4	 including	 a	 control	 for	geographical	 regions.	 In	 comparison	 to	 the	 reference	 category,	 conflict	 dyads	 in	Europe,	only	conflict	dyads	in	the	Middle	East	are	less	likely	to	see	negotiations.	To	further	 probe	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	 findings	 I	 run	 Model	 1.4	 with	 dyad-fixed	effects,	 which	 produces	 the	 same	 results	 concerning	 women’s	 inclusion:	 higher	levels	of	women’s	inclusion	are	associated	with	a	higher	likelihood	of	negotiations	(p	=	0.003).	 Interestingly,	when	 including	dyad-fixed	 effects	women’s	 rights	 also	have	a	positive,	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	with	negotiation	 (p	=	0.009).	This	suggests	that	increasing	women’s	rights	can	also	have	positive	effects	for	the	likelihood	of	negotiations	in	intrastate	conflicts	and	merits	further	investigation	in	the	 future.	 Women’s	 security	 remains	 statistically	 insignificant	 throughout	 all	model	specifications.		Overall,	 these	 robustness	 checks	 consolidate	 the	 strong	empirical	 support	for	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 low	 levels	 of	women’s	 inclusion	 are	 associated	with	 low	chances	 of	 negotiation	 occurrence.	 The	 consistently	 significant	 results	 across	different	model	 specifications	speak	 to	 the	robustness	and	validity	of	 the	 finding	and	offer	strong	support	to	the	argument	that	societies’	idealization	of	masculinity	as	expressed	through	the	exclusion	of	women	from	public	life	has	negative	effects	on	how	states	manage	intrastate	conflicts.	
	
2.7	Discussion	This	 study	 adds	 to	 a	 burgeoning	 gender-conflict	 literature	 by	 examining	 how	patriarchal	 gender	 relations	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 nonviolent	 conflict	management.	By	focusing	on	negotiations	this	study	sheds	light	on	an	aspect	of	the	gender-conflict	 nexus	 that	 had	 so	 far	 received	 very	 little	 systematic	 attention.	 It	provides	 robust	 statistical	 support	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 countries	 that	marginalize	 women’s	 participation	 in	 public	 life	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 engage	 in	nonviolent	conflict	management.		
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This	 study	 also	 adds	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 negotiations	 in	 civil	 wars	 by	offering	a	theoretical	innovation	through	the	introduction	of	a	societal	factor	as	a	factor	 for	 negotiation	 occurrence.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 shift	 from	 traditional	conflict	aspects	such	as	intensity	and	duration.	The	theoretical	shift	complements	previous	studies	on	the	pacifying	effects	of	sex	equality	(Caprioli	2000,	2003,	2005;	Caprioli	 and	Boyer	2001;	Gizelis	2009;	Melander	2005b;	Regan	and	Paskeviciute	2003).			 The	 paper	 contributes	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 underpinning	 the	majority	of	work	on	 the	gender-conflict	nexus.	 It	develops	 the	general	 argument	and	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 practices	 offers	 an	 innovative	 step	 towards	delineating	the	causal	mechanism	at	work.	The	introduction	of	practices	also	helps	bridge	the	perceived	gap	between	a	feminist	IR	theory	and	systematic	analysis,	as	practices	are	both	intangible	norms	and	tangible	experiences	that	are	measurable.	This	study	is	the	first	to	identify	the	gender	power	imbalance	as	expressed	through	patriarchal	 practices	 of	 women’s	 exclusion	 as	 a	 causal	 factor	 for	 conflict	management	and	empirically	capture	this	relationship.			 The	 findings	 are	 also	 policy	 relevant.	 Negotiations	 are	 often	 crucial	 in	ending	 armed	 conflicts	 peacefully,	 thus	 gaining	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 when	negotiations	are	 likely	to	occur	 is	crucial.	The	decision	to	engage	 in	talks	 is	often	considered	from	a	perspective	of	ripeness	(Greig	2001;	Zartman	1995)	in	terms	of	conflict	 characteristics	 such	as	duration,	 casualties	 (Filson	and	Werner	2007),	or	capabilities	 (Clayton	2013,	2016).	This	study	suggests	 that	 in	addition	 to	conflict	characteristics	 societal	 factors	 are	 also	 influential.	 It	 particularly	 points	 to	 the	importance	of	practices	that	lead	to	the	subordination	and	exclusion	of	others.	In	line	with	 the	 theoretical	 argument	 the	 results	 indicate	 that	 conflicts	 in	 countries	that	exclude	women	 from	public	 life	are	 less	amenable	 to	negotiations.	Although	these	norms	and	practices	are	susceptible	to	outside	manipulation	and	do	change	over	time	(Finnemore	and	Sikkink	1998),	they	are	an	unlikely	lever	for	third	party	influence	 within	 an	 ongoing	 conflict,	 particularly	 in	 comparison	 to	 conflict	characteristics	such	as	intensity	or	parties’	strength,	which	are	more	susceptible	to	outside	influence.	The	changing	of	a	society’s	practices	is	not	a	quick	fix	for	third	party	 actors	 looking	 to	 end	 a	 armed	 conflict,	 but	 should	 be	 a	 long-term	 process	underpinning	a	 comprehensive	 feminist	 strategy	of	bolstering	values	of	 equality,	care,	 empathy,	 nonviolence,	 and	 respect.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 ensuring	 women’s	
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inclusion	needs	 to	be	seen	as	an	 intrinsic	and	 fundamental	human	right	 that	has	positive	side	effects,	 rather	 than	 through	an	 instrumental	 lens	as	a	potential	 tool	for	peace.			 	
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2.8	Appendix	A	
Indicators	in	women’s	inclusion	scale	1. Female	chief	justice	2. Expected	years	of	schooling,	ratio	3. Graduation	rate	at	lower	secondary,	ratio	4. Secondary	enrollment	rate,	ratio	5. Primary	enrollment	rate,	ratio	6. Female	share	of	graduates	in	health,	tertiary	7. Female	share	of	graduates	in	education,	tertiary	8. Female	share	of	graduates	in	social	sciences/business/law,	tertiary	9. Female	share	of	graduates	in	humanities	and	arts,	tertiary	10. Female	share	of	professional	and	technical	workers	11. Wage	and	salaried	workers	(of	employed),	ratio	12. Completed	bachelor’s	degree	(25	yrs+),	ratio	13. Female	share	of	graduates	in	agriculture,	tertiary	14. Used	an	account	to	receive	wages,	ratio	15. Tertiary	enrollment	rate,	ratio	16. Female	share	of	graduates	in	engineering/manufacturing/construction,	tertiary	17. Completed	masters	degree,	ratio	18. Proportion	of	female	high	court	justices	19. Completed	upper	secondary,	ratio	20. Completed	tertiary,	ratio	21. Female	share	of	graduates	in	science,	tertiary	22. Proportion	of	firms	with	female	participation	in	ownership	23. Proportion	of	female	legislators	24. Proportion	of	female	cabinet	members	25. Completed	primary,	ratio	26. Female	head	of	government	27. Female	share	of	graduates	in	services,	tertiary	28. Completed	lower	secondary,	ratio	29. Completed	doctoral	degree,	ratio	30. Ratio	of	female	to	male	labor	force	participation	rate	31. Employers	(of	employed),	ratio	
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32. Avg.	hours	spend	on	unpaid	domestic	work,	ratio	33. Children	out	of	primary	school,	ratio	34. Proportion	that	do	not	own	land	(15-49	yrs),	ratio	35. Completed	no	schooling,	ratio	36. Contributing	family	workers	(of	employed),	ratio	37. Child	employment	rate	(7-14	yrs),	ratio		
Indicators	in	women’s	security	scale	1. Participation	rate	in	decisions	about	own	health	care	(15-49	yrs)	2. Participation	rate	in	decisions	about	major	household	purchases	(15-49	yrs)	3. Participation	rate	in	decisions	about	visits	to	family/friends	(15-49	yrs)	4. Participation	rate	in	decisions	about	daily	purchases	(15-49	yrs)	5. Contraceptive	prevalence	(15-49	yrs)	6. Literacy	rate,	ratio	7. Demand	for	family	planning	satisfied	(of	married	women)	8. Pregnant	women	w/	≥	4	antenatal	visits	9. Decisions	about	woman’s	own	healthcare	made	mainly	by	her	(15-49	yrs)	10. Births	attended	by	skilled	health	staff	(of	total	births)	11. Participation	rate	in	decisions	about	what	food	to	cook	daily	(15-49	yrs)	12. Legal	age	of	marriage,	ratio	13. Pregnant	women	receiving	prenatal	care	14. Debit	card	in	own	name,	ratio	15. Male	to	female	births,	ratio	16. Smoking	prevalence,	ratio	17. Account	at	a	financial	institution,	ratio	18. Life	expectancy,	ratio	19. Decisions	about	a	woman’s	visits	to	family/relatives	made	mainly	by	her	(15-49	yrs)	20. Maternity	leave,	days	paid	21. Paternity	leave,	days	paid	22. Mothers	guaranteed	equivalent	position	after	maternity	leave		23. Saved	money	in	past	year,	ratio	24. Prevalence	of	severe	wasting,	ratio	
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25. Access	to	antiretroviral	drugs,	ratio	26. Cannot	come	up	with	emergency	funds,	ratio		27. Prevalence	of	underweight,	ratio		28. Unemployment	rate,	ratio		29. Prevalence	of	Female	Genital	Cutting	30. Wage	gap	(median	wage)	31. Long-term	unemployment	ratio	32. Received	loan	in	past	year,	ratio	33. Prevalence	of	stunting,	ratio	34. Maternity	leave,	pct.	wages	paid	35. Child	mortality	ratio	(1	yr)	36. Proportion	that	do	not	own	house,	ratio		37. Vulnerable	employment	(of	employed),	ratio		38. Self	employed	(of	employed),	ratio		39. Infant	mortality	rate,	ratio	40. Prevalence	of	HIV,	ratio	41. Under	5	mortality	rate,	ratio	42. Women	subjected	to	physical/sexual	violence	in	last	12	months	(15-49	yrs)		43. Prevalence	of	obesity,	ratio		44. Unmet	need	for	contraception,	married	women	(15-49	yrs)		45. Adolescent	fertility	rate	(15-19	yrs)	46. Maternal	mortality	rate	47. Fertility	rate		48. Decisions	about	major	household	purchases	made	mainly	by	husband	(15-49	yrs)		
	
Indicators	in	women’s	rights	scale	1. Married	women	can	travel	outside	their	home	2. Protection	orders	for	domestic	violence	exist	3. Married	women	can	travel	outside	the	country	in	same	way	as	men		4. Domestic	violence	legislation	protects	unmarried	partners	5. Protection	orders	provide	for	removal	of	perpetrator	from	the	home		6. Woman’s	testimony	carries	the	same	evidentiary	weight	in	court	as	a	man’s		7. Domestic	violence	legislation	covers	emotional	violence	
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8. Legislation	on	domestic	violence	protects	family	members	9. Female	and	male	surviving	spouses	have	equal	rights	to	inherit	assets	10. Domestic	violence	legislation	covers	physical	violence	11. Unmarried	women	can	be	head	of	household	in	same	way	as	men	12. Protection	orders	prohibit/limit	contact	with	survivor	13. Sons	and	daughters	have	equal	rights	to	inherit	assets	14. Married	couples	share	legal	responsibility	for	maintaining	family	expenses	15. Domestic	violence	legislation	protects	former	spouses	16. Unmarried	women	can	confer	citizenship	on	her	children	in	same	way	as	men	17. Unmarried	women	can	apply	for	passport	in	same	way	as	men	18. Married	women	can	confer	citizenship	on	her	children	in	same.way	as	men	19. Specialized	court	or	procedure	exists	for	domestic	violence	20. Married	women	can	choose	where	to	live	in	same	way	as	men	21. Unmarried	women	can	obtain	national	ID	card	in	same	way	as	men	22. Married	women	can	get	a	job/pursue	a	trade/profession	in	same	way	as	men	23. Domestic	violence	legislation	exists	24. Married	women	can	confer	citizenship	to	a	non-national	spouse	in	same	way	as	men	25. Legislation	on	sexual	harassment	in	employment	exists	26. Civil	remedies	for	sexual	harassment	in	employment	exist	27. Married	women	can	be	head	of	household	in	same	way	as	men	28. Domestic	violence	legislation	covers	sexual	violence	29. Civil	remedies	for	sexual	harassment	exist	30. Law	provides	for	the	valuation	of	non-monetary	contributions	31. Dismissal	of	pregnant	workers	is	prohibited	32. Nonpregnant/nonnursing	women	can	work	in	jobs	deemed	morally/socially	inappropriate	in	same	way	as	men		33. Legislation	on	sexual	harassment	in	education	exists	34. Married	women	can	sign	a	contract	in	same	way	as	a	man	35. Nonpregnant/nonnursing	women	can	work	in	jobs	deemed	arduous	in	same	way	as	men	36. Nonpregnant/nonnursing	women	can	do	the	same	jobs	as	men	
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37. Nonpregnant/nonnursing	women	can	work	the	same	night	hours	as	men	38. Married	women	can	open	bank	account	in	same	way	as	men	39. Legislation	explicitly	criminalizes	marital	rape	40. Clear	criminal	penalties	for	domestic	violence	exist	41. Domestic	violence	legislation	covers	economic	violence	42. Legislation	specifically	addresses	sexual	harassment	43. Law	mandates	nondiscrimination	based	on	gender	in	hiring	44. Married	women	can	register	a	business	in	same	way	as	men	45. Married	women	can	obtain	national	ID	card	in	same	way	as	men	46. Married	men	and	women	have	equal	ownership	rights	to	property	47. Unmarried	men	and	women	have	equal	ownership	rights	to	property	48. Law	mandates	equal	remuneration	for	females	and	males	for	work	of	equal	value		49. Property	rights	index		50. Women’s	access	to	justice	index	51. Unmarried	women	can	travel	outside	her	home	in	same	way	as	men		52. Criminal	penalties	for	sexual	harassment	in	employment	exist	53. Unmarried	women	can	open	a	bank	account	in	same	way	as	men		54. Unmarried	women	can	register	business	in	same	way	as	men	55. Law	prohibits/invalidates	child	or	early	marriage	56. Unmarried	woman	can	choose	where	to	live	in	same	way	as	men	57. Unmarried	women	can	sign	a	contract	in	same	way	as	men	58. Penalties	exist	for	authorizing/knowingly	entering	into	child/early	marriage	59. Women	have	equal	voting	rights	to	men	60. Legal	age	of	marriage,	ratio	61. Criminal	penalties	for	sexual	harassment	exist	62. Employers	required	to	provide	break	for	nursing	mothers	63. Constitutional	clause	on	gender	nondiscrimination	in	the	constitution		64. Legislation	on	sexual	harassment	in	public	places	exist	65. Married	women	are	required	by	law	to	obey	their	husbands		
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Robustness	checks	Model	1.5	–	same	as	Model	1.4	but	restricted	to	active	conflict	years		Model	1.6	–	battle-related	deaths	instead	of	binary	intensity	measure			 (1.5)	 (1.6)	Women’s	inclusion	 0.271*	 0.237*		 [0.054,0.489]	 [0.002,0.473]	Dyad	duration	(ln)	 0.659***	 0.553***		 [0.472,0.846]	 [0.358,0.748]	War	 0.183	 		 [-0.350,0.717]	 	Battle-related	deaths	(ln)	 	 0.170t		 	 [-0.017,0.356]	Ethnic	 0.387*	 0.357t		 [0.056,0.718]	 [-0.022,0.736]	Weak	rebels	 -1.364***	 -1.108***		 [-1.956,-0.772]	 [-1.724,-0.491]	Active	groups	 -0.035	 0.104		 [-0.253,0.183]	 [-0.130,0.337]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 -0.380**	 -0.167		 [-0.628,-0.132]	 [-0.468,0.134]	Population	(ln)	 -0.250***	 -0.262**		 [-0.388,-0.112]	 [-0.420,-0.104]	Democracy	 0.698	 0.738		 [-0.735,2.131]	 [-0.890,2.365]	Women’s	security	 0.130	 0.101		 [-0.132,0.393]	 [-0.214,0.416]	Women’s	rights	 -0.103	 -0.306		 [-0.564,0.357]	 [-0.810,0.199]	Time	since	last	negotiation	 -0.816***	 -0.713***		 [-1.019,-0.613]	 [-0.975,-0.452]	Time	since	last	negotiation2	 0.073***	 0.0640**		 [0.042,0.104]	 [0.017,0.112]	Time	since	last	negotiation3	 -0.002***	 -0.002*		 [-0.003,-0.001]	 [-0.004,-0.000]	Constant	 5.333***	 2.610t		 [2.914,7.751]	 [-0.296,5.516]	AIC	 1105.595	 834.82	Area	under	ROC	 0.828	 0.820	Wald-chi2	 249.69(14)	 256.03(14)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -537.797	 -402.410	N	 1,204	 828	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	
t	p<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001			 	
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Model	1.7	–	DV:	Mediation	Model	1.8	–	DV:	Conflict	management	(negotiation	and	mediation)		 	 (1.7)	 (1.8)	Women’s	inclusion	 0.437**	 0.395***		 [0.135,0.739]	 [0.208,0.582]	Dyad	duration	(ln)	 0.156	 0.510***		 [-0.159,0.472]	 [0.354,0.667]	Conflict	 0.798**	 0.035		 [0.256,1.340]	 [-0.418,0.488]	War	 1.131**	 0.432		 [0.282,1.981]	 [-0.218,1.083]	Ethnic	 0.656*	 0.544**		 [0.048,1.264]	 [0.220,0.868]	Weak	rebels	 -1.093**	 -1.301**		 [-1.863,-0.322]	 [-2.129,-0.474]	Active	groups	 0.0517	 0.086		 [-0.109,0.213]	 [-0.036,0.209]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 -0.031	 -0.588***		 [-0.547,0.485]	 [-0.833,-0.342]	Population	(ln)	 -0.207	 -0.213***		 [-0.468,0.054]	 [-0.335,-0.091]	Democracy	 0.104	 1.092		 [-2.349,2.557]	 [-0.100,2.284]	Women’s	security	 -0.269	 0.101		 [-0.803,0.264]	 [-0.187,0.390]	Women’s	rights	 0.411	 0.278		 [-0.328,1.151]	 [-0.154,0.711]	Time	since	last	negotiation	 	 -0.705***		 	 [-0.838,-0.571]	Time	since	last	negotiation2	 	 0.059***		 	 [0.035,0.064]	Time	since	last	negotiation3	 	 -0.001***		 	 [-0.001,-0.001]	Mediation	previous	year	 3.952***	 2.575***		 [2.934,4.971]	 [1.528,3.622]	Constant	 -0.749	 6.457***		 [-5.030,3.532]	 [3.931,8.984]	AIC	 842.131	 1558.527	Area	under	ROC	 0.832	 0.851	Wald-chi2	 136.82(13)	 388.28(16)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -407.065	 -762.263	N	 1,761	 1,761	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001							
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Model	1.9	–	same	as	Model	1.4	+	controls	for	region		 	 (1.9)	Women’s	inclusion	 0.374***		 [0.158,0.589]	Dyad	duration	(ln)	 0.637***		 [0.467,0.806]	Conflict	 -0.073		 [-0.553,0.408]	War	 0.117		 [-0.498,0.731]	Ethnic	 0.241		 [-0.099,0.582]	Weak	rebels	 -1.218***		 [-1.827,-0.609]	Active	groups	 0.009		 [-0.211,0.230]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 -0.431**		 [-0.723,-0.138]	Population	(ln)	 -0.211**		 [-0.360,-0.061]	Democracy	 0.850		 [-0.681,2.382]	Women’s	security	 0.038		 [-0.250,0.327]	Women’s	rights	 -0.081		 [-0.564,0.401]	Time	since	last	negotiation	 -0.787***		 [-0.976,-0.597]	Time	since	last	negotiation2	 0.050***		 [0.022,0.079]	Time	since	last	negotiation3	 -0.001*		 [-0.002,-0.000]	Middle	East	 -1.211**		 [-2.032,-0.390]	Asia	 -0.355		 [-1.255,0.546]	Africa	 -0.543		 [-1.532,0.447]	Americas	 -0.744		 [-1.674,0.186]	Constant	 5.863***		 [3.082,8.644]	AIC	 1431.831	Area	under	ROC	 0.866	Wald-chi2	 558.41(19)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -695.916	N	 1,761	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	
t	p	<	0.1,	*	p	<	0.05,	**	p	<	0.01,	***	p	<	0.001					
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Model	1.10	–	fixed	effects			 	 (1.10)	Women’s	inclusion	 0.636**		 [0.216,1.057]	Dyad	duration	(ln)	 1.109***		 [0.749,1.469]	Conflict	 0.299		 [-0.208,0.806]	War	 0.559		 [-0.151,1.270]	Weak	rebels	 -1.859*		 [-3.475,-0.243]	Active	groups	 0.225		 [-0.024,0.474]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 -1.416***		 [-2.221,-0.610]	Population	(ln)	 -1.395		 [-3.769,0.980]	Democracy	 1.499		 [-0.862,3.859]	Women’s	security	 -0.756		 [-1.729,0.218]	Women’s	rights	 1.090**		 [0.266,1.914]	Time	since	last	negotiation	 -0.471***		 [-0.628,-0.313]	Time	since	last	negotiation2	 0.036***		 [0.018,0.053]	Time	since	last	negotiation3	 -0.001*		 [-0.001,-0.000]	AIC	 813.73	Wald-chi2	 155.65(14)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -392.865	N	 1,107	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	
t	p<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001				 	
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3.	Talking	with	the	shameless?	Sexual	violence	and	conflict	
management	in	intrastate	conflicts			
3.1	Abstract	To	 what	 extent	 does	 sexual	 violence	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	management	 in	 intrastate	 conflicts?	 Despite	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 research	 that	explores	conflict-related	sexual	violence,	the	literature	presents	little	insight	on	its	effects	 on	 conflict	 resolution.	 Extending	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 to	 intrastate	 conflicts	and	applying	a	gender	lens	to	the	power	to	hurt	argument,	I	argue	that	when	rebel	sexual	 violence	 is	 public	 knowledge	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	 management	increases	 because	 the	 state	 perceives	 it	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 its	 masculinity.	 I	systematically	test	this	argument	on	all	intrastate	conflict	years	from	1990	to	2009	using	 the	 Sexual	Violence	 in	Armed	Conflict	 (SVAC)	 and	 the	Civil	War	Mediation	(CWM)	 dataset.	 The	 results	 provide	 robust	 support	 for	 the	 argument.	 This	presents	 an	 important	 refinement	 of	 traditional	 rationalist	 conflict	 bargaining	theories	 and	 opens	 new	 avenues	 for	 the	 research	 and	 practice	 of	 conflict	management.				
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3.2	Introduction	In	 2010	 the	 government	 of	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo	 (DRC)	 agreed	 to	peace	 talks	with	 a	 local	militia	 called	Mai	Mai	 Sheka	 after	 the	 group	 reportedly	perpetrated	mass	rapes.	In	the	span	of	three	days	the	group	reportedly	raped	387	civilians,	but	did	not	kill	or	 loot	 (Autesserre	2012,	217).	Faced	with	 this	massive	sexual	 violence	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 militia.	 These	negotiations,	however,	did	not	settle	the	conflict	and	violence	continued	to	plague	the	country	 in	the	following	years.	Some	suggest	that	the	DRC	government	 is	not	an	 outlier,	 but	 that	 governments	 are	 generally	more	 likely	 to	 accept	 peace	 talks	when	 rebels	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 that	 attracts	 international	 attention	(Autesserre	 2012).	 Why	 would	 any	 government	 agree	 to	 talks	 under	 such	circumstances?	 The	 example	 of	 the	 DRC	 and	 the	 suggested	 pattern	 of	 other	governments	agreeing	 to	peace	 talks	when	rebels	perpetrate	 sexual	violence	call	for	 a	 systematic	 investigation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 and	conflict	 management.	 Accordingly,	 this	 article	 explores	 the	 question:	 to	 what	extent	does	sexual	violence	influence	conflict	management?	Sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict	 is	 now	 widely	 recognized	 as	 a	 threat	 to	international	security	and	an	increasing	number	of	studies	explore	its	causes	and	its	variation	(Alison	2007;	Leiby	2009;	Wood	2006b,	2009;	Cohen	2013a,	2013b,	2016;	 Cohen	 and	 Nordås	 2014,	 2015;	 Nordås	 and	 Rustad	 2013;	 Karim	 and	Beardsley	2016).	Although	sexual	violence	has	often	been	described	as	strategic10	and	 ‘rape	 as	 a	 weapon	 of	 war’	 is	 a	 dominant	 narrative	 (Crawford	 2017),	 this	argument	 does	 not	 withstand	 scrutiny	 and	 there	 is	 a	 robust	 literature	 on	 the	diverse	 reasons	 behind	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence.11	At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	know	very	little	about	the	effects	of	sexual	violence	on	conflict	processes.	Only	one	recent	 study	starts	 to	 shed	some	 light	on	 the	 consequences	of	 sexual	violence	 in	conflict	 by	 examining	 the	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 and	 conflict	outcomes	 started	 (Chu	 and	 Braithwaite	 2018).	 Chu	 and	 Braithwaite	 argue	 that	conflicts	involving	sexual	violence	are	more	likely	to	end	in	negotiate	agreements																																																									
10	For	example,	in	2012	former	foreign	secretary	of	the	UK	William	Hague	claimed	that	“more	often	than	not	[rape]	is	carried	out	not	by	invading	armies	but	by	one	group	 against	 another:	 deliberately	 to	 destroy,	 degrade,	 humiliate	 and	 scar	political	opponents	or	entire	ethnic	and	religious	groups”	(Cohen,	2016:	20).	
11	For	a	comprehensive	critique	of	 the	 ‘strategic	argument’	 see	Wood	(2015)	and	Cohen	(2016)		
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because	 actors	 perpetrating	 this	 type	 of	 violence	 are	 organizationally	weak,	 less	likely	to	secure	military	victory,	and	thus	more	likely	to	agree	on	a	deal	to	salvage	anything	from	the	conflict.	This	illustrates	that	the	effects	of	sexual	violence	can	be	distinct	 from	 perpetrators’	 motivations	 and	 thus	 should	 be	 examined	 without	conflating	observed	outcome	with	underlying	 intent.	 In	 line	with	 this,	 I	 focus	 on	the	 effect	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 without	 assuming	 strategic	 intent.	 Besides	contributing	 to	 the	nascent	 literature	on	 the	effects	of	sexual	violence,	 this	study	more	broadly	adds	an	innovative	argument	to	the	body	of	literature	examining	the	effects	 of	 civilian	 victimization	 on	 conflict	 processes	 and	 outcomes	 (Wood	 and	Kathman	2014;	Thomas	2014;	Fortna	2015).		In	 drawing	 on	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 and	 bringing	 together	 disparate	literatures	 on	 sexual	 violence,	 gender,	 and	 conflict	 management	 I	 argue	 that	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence	increase	the	likelihood	of	mediation	because	they	emasculate	 the	 state.	 This	 emasculation	 has	 two	 components	 to	 it:	 first,	 rebel	sexual	violence	demonstrates	 the	 state’s	 failure	 to	 fulfill	 its	masculine	protection	responsibility,	 and	 second,	 when	 it	 is	 reported	 this	 failure	 becomes	 a	 public	humiliation.	This	 two-fold	humiliation	presents	a	conflict	cost	 that	outweighs	the	costs	of	accepting	mediation.	Thus	rebel	sexual	violence	increases	the	likelihood	of	mediation.	 Applying	 a	 gender	 lens	 constitutes	 a	 crucial	 refinement	 of	 traditional	rationalist	 bargaining	 theories.	 In	 drawing	 on	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 and	 positivist	methodology	this	article	contributes	to	the	emerging	literature	bridging	these	two	fields	(Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).			 A	 mediation	 process	 offers	 benefits	 such	 as	 increased	 legitimacy	 to	 non-state	 actors,	 while	 primarily	 presenting	 costs	 to	 states.	 Thus	 a	 state	 is	 likely	 to	resist	the	inclusion	of	an	intermediary	until	the	associated	costs	are	outweighed	by	the	 expected	 costs	 of	 continued	 fighting.	 Insurgents	 hoping	 to	 overcome	 the	inherent	power	asymmetry	of	civil	war	usually	welcome	third	party	involvement.	I	contend	 that	 when	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 is	 public	 knowledge	 the	 incumbent	government	perceives	it	as	particularly	costly	because	it	threatens	its	masculinity	by	exposing	its	lack	of	territorial	control	and	inability	to	protect	its	citizens.	Sexual	violence	 exposes	 a	 state’s	 inability	 to	 protect	 its	 constituents,	 which	 presents	 a	conflict	 cost	 that	 outweighs	 the	 costs	 associated	 with	 accepting	 mediation.	Mediation	 accordingly	 should	 be	 more	 likely	 when	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 rebels	perpetrating	 sexual	 violence.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 asymmetric	 relationship	
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between	belligerents	in	civil	war	essentially	grants	the	state	a	veto	player	function	and	denies	rebels	the	possibility	of	initiating	a	mediation	process.	This	means	that	if	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 state	 sexual	 violence	 and	 rebels	 call	 for	 mediation	 in	response	 to	 it,	 the	 decision	 to	 enter	 into	 mediation	 rests	 with	 the	 government.	Thus	I	expect	that	if	there	are	reports	of	state	sexual	violence	it	will	not	affect	the	likelihood	of	mediation.		 I	 begin	 by	 discussing	 what	 factors	 contribute	 to	 mediation	 onset	 in	 civil	wars.	 Then	 I	 examine	 the	 gendered	 dynamics	 underpinning	 the	 power	 to	 hurt	logic,	 and	 argue	 that	 reports	 of	 sexual	 violence	 emasculate	 the	 government.	 I	quantitatively	test	my	argument	using	 logistic	regression	models	 to	examine	118	intrastate	 conflicts	 drawn	 from	 the	 Uppsala/PRIO	 Armed	 Conflict	 dataset	(Gleditsch	et	al.	2002).	The	dataset	includes	746	conflict	years	between	1990	and	2009,	of	 these	222	 feature	a	mediation	event.	Mediation	data	are	drawn	from	an	updated	 version	 of	 the	 Civil	 War	 Mediation	 dataset	 (DeRouen,	 Bercovitch,	 and	Pospieszna	2011).	The	Sexual	Violence	in	Armed	Conflict	(SVAC)	dataset	is	used	to	capture	reports	of	sexual	violence	perpetrated	by	the	two	opposing	sides	(Cohen	and	Nordås	 2014).	 The	 analysis	 indicates	 that	 conflict	 years	 in	which	 rebels	 are	reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 see	 the	 onset	 of	mediation,	 while	 reports	 of	 sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 state	 have	 no	 significant	influence.	 Following	 the	 quantitative	 analysis	 I	 discuss	 Sierra	 Leone	 as	 a	 crucial	case	to	test	the	theory.		
	
3.3	Conflict	management	-	mediation	onset	
Why	do	conflict	parties	start	to	talk?	Peace	 talks	 entail	 costs	 and	 benefits	 for	 all	 parties.	 Potential	 costs	 shared	 by	 all	disputants	are	signaling	weakness	and	concerns	of	alienating	key	external	and/or	internal	 constituents	 (Kaplow	 2016).	 This	 applies	 to	 both	 inter-	 and	 intrastate	conflicts.	A	key	difference	between	inter-	and	intrastate	conflicts,	however,	 is	 the	concern	of	bestowing	legitimacy	upon	non-state	actors.	In	interstate	disputes	this	is	 of	 no	 concern	 as	 both	 states	 are	 legitimate	 actors.	 In	 civil	wars,	 however,	 the	government	 is	the	de	facto	sole	 legitimate	power	supposedly	with	a	monopoly	of	force.	 Thus	 the	 legitimacy	 costs	 of	 engaging	 in	 a	 dialogue	 fall	 solely	 on	 the	government,	which	aligns	with	an	asymmetry	in	disputants’	motivation	to	engage	in	 a	 dialogue	 (Zartman	 1995).	 Opening	 a	 dialogue	 recognizes	 insurgents	 and	
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grants	 them	 legitimacy,	which	 is	difficult	 to	obtain	on	 the	battlefield	 alone.	Thus	they	stand	to	gain	significant	benefits	by	participating	in	an	official	peace	process,	while	 the	 government	 suffers	 the	 cost	 of	 losing	 its	 position	 of	 being	 the	 sole	legitimate	power	(Greig	and	Regan	2008;	Melin	and	Svensson	2009).			 When	an	 intrastate	conflict	erupts	 the	government	should	have	a	military	and	economic	advantage	(Gent	2011).	Comparing	rebel	strength	to	governments’	capabilities	shows	that	in	204	intrastate	conflicts	only	approximately	13%	of	rebel	groups	 are	 stronger	 than	 the	 government	 or	 at	 least	 match	 the	 government’s	capabilities	 (Cunningham,	 Gleditsch,	 and	 Salehyan	 2013).	 This	 capability	asymmetry	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 only	 9%	 of	 conflict	 episodes	 end	 with	 a	rebel	 victory	 (Kreutz	 2010).	 Consequently,	 insurgents	 generally	 have	 a	 much	stronger	incentive	to	engage	in	peace	talks	than	the	government.	This	also	means	that	if	rebels	are	stronger	and	have	access	to	resources,	mediation	can	become	less	likely	 (Clayton	 2013,	 2016).	 Based	 on	 this	 presumed	 structural	 advantage,	governments	are	likely	to	reject	insurgent	claims	and	pursue	a	military	rather	than	a	 diplomatic	 solution.	 This	 presumed	 advantage	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 a	disadvantage	 for	 the	 government	 as	 opening	 talks	 with	 insurgents	 can	 be	interpreted	 by	 them	 and	 others	 as	 an	 admission	 that	 the	 government	 has	 lost	control	over	its	territory	and	lacks	either	the	resolve	or	the	capabilities,	or	both,	to	win	 the	 conflict	militarily	 (Kaplow	 2016;	Melin	 and	 Svensson	 2009).	 In	 effect	 it	signals	weakness.	 This	 can	 hurt	 the	 government’s	 reputation	with	 key	 domestic	constituents	and	international	partners	as	well	as	weaken	its	bargaining	position	versa	 the	 insurgents.	Consequently,	 the	government	will	only	open	peace	 talks	 if	the	potential	benefits	of	resolving	the	conflict	outweigh	the	associated	costs	of	the	process	(Melin	and	Svensson	2009).			 Theoretically,	engaging	in	talks	with	the	government	can	present	a	cost	to	insurgents	as	 it	might	alienate	 foreign	donors,	or,	more	 importantly,	might	cause	internal	splits	weakening	the	group.	Empirically,	however,	there	is	no	evidence	to	support	 this.	 External	 support	 for	 rebels	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 talks	 and	domestic	 hardliners	 seem	 to	 have	 no	 effect	 (Kaplow	 2016).	 The	 immense	asymmetry	 in	terms	of	 legitimacy	and	military	capability	enables	rebels	 to	 frame	talks	with	the	government	as	a	success.	Put	differently,	 insurgents	are	not	bound	by	audience	costs	the	same	way	the	government	 is	because	rebels	can	claim	that	
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their	 actions	 have	 forced	 the	 government	 to	 the	 table.	 Hence	 rebels	 generally	welcome	the	opening	of	talks	as	for	them	the	benefits	greatly	outweigh	the	costs.			 	
Why	do	civil	war	parties	use	mediation?		Mediation	is	a	voluntary	form	of	conflict	management	in	which	both	sides	grant	an	intermediary	 control	 over	 some	 feature(s)	 of	 the	 peace	 process.	 Mediation	highlights	both	benefits	and	costs	of	bilateral	dialogue.	Rebels	receive	a	significant	boost	in	domestic	and	international	legitimacy	through	the	introduction	of	a	third	party,	 while	 generally	 experiencing	 little	 to	 no	 costs.	 For	 the	 state,	 however,	 it	illustrates	 both	 its	 inability	 to	 control	 its	 territory	 and	 its	 inability	 to	withstand	rebel	 pressure	 (Melin	 and	 Svensson	2009).	 Consequently,	 rebels	might	 interpret	acceptance	 of	 mediation	 as	 a	 signal	 that	 hard	 bargaining	 or	 continued	 fighting	might	lead	to	further	concessions,	resulting	in	increased	support	for	rebels	or	even	encouraging	 new	 challengers	 (Toft	 2003;	 Walter	 2006a).	 Admission	 of	 an	intermediary	 implies	 a	 loss	 of	 decisional	 autonomy	 for	 both	 conflict	 parties.	However,	 for	 the	 incumbent	 who	 stands	 to	 lose	 his	 exclusive	 grip	 on	 political,	economic,	and/or	territorial	control,	this	presents	a	far	more	substantial	cost	than	for	 the	 challenger.	 It	 harbors	 the	 chance	 that	 mediation	 results	 in	 a	 flawed	agreement	 for	 the	state.	These	costs	present	strong	disincentives	 for	 the	state	 to	engage	in	mediation.			 Nonetheless	 mediation	 also	 offers	 benefits	 to	 governments.	 Foremost	 it	presents	an	effective	tool	to	get	out	of	violent	conflict	(Zartman	1995;	Bercovitch	and	Gartner	2006;	Beardsley	et	al.	2006;	Beardsley	2011).	Of	course	the	majority	of	states	intend	to	defeat	rebels,	however,	when	defeating	insurgents	becomes	less	likely,	mediation	frequently	presents	the	most	effective	way	of	ending	the	fighting.	Yet,	 this	might	not	be	 the	 state’s	 genuine	 intention.	Governments	might	 accept	 a	mediation	 offer	 to	 re-group,	 collect	 information,	 or	 strike	 an	 unsuspecting	adversary	 (Richmond	1998;	Beardsley	 2010).	 As	 conflict	 parties	weigh	 expected	costs	against	expected	benefits	of	winning,	the	likelihood	of	mediation	increases	as	a	 conflict	 becomes	 costlier	 (Clayton	 and	 Gleditsch	 2014).	 Accordingly,	 studies	show	 that	 when	 governments	 face	 a	 serious	 threat	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	participate	 in	mediations	 (Clayton	2013,	 2016;	 Clayton	 and	Gleditsch	2014).	 Put	differently,	 mediation	 is	 more	 likely	 when	 the	 desire	 to	 end	 violent	 conflict	outweighs	the	costs	of	mediation.	In	civil	wars	the	onset	of	mediation	thus	depends	
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on	 the	 government’s	 desire	 for	 peace	 balanced	 against	 the	 costs	 of	 admitting	 a	third	party.	For	rebels	on	the	other	hand	the	benefits	of	mediation	almost	always	outweigh	 the	 costs.	 Put	 differently,	 the	 state	 essentially	 holds	 veto	 power	 in	deciding	the	onset	of	mediation.			
3.4	Power	to	hurt	and	sexual	violence	
Power	to	hurt	is	power	to	bargain	Civil	 war	 constitutes	 an	 extreme,	 violent	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 an	insurgent	 group.	 To	 understand	 conflict	 dynamics	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 analyze	 these	dyadic	interactions	(Cunningham,	Skrede	Gleditsch,	and	Salehyan	2009).	Studies	of	dyadic	 interactions	 in	conflict	 frequently	draw	on	 the	notion	of	power	 to	hurt	as	power	 to	 bargain	 (Hultman	 2007;	Wood	 2010;	Wood,	 Kathman,	 and	Gent	 2012;	Wood	and	Kathman	2014;	Thomas	2014).	This	argument	posits	that	the	costs	one	disputant	can	impose	on	the	other	can	be	understood	as	leverage	in	the	bargaining	process.	 The	 power	 to	 hurt	 argument	 implies	 that	 rebels	 do	 not	 need	 to	 win	militarily	to	achieve	their	objectives;	it	can	be	enough	to	impose	high	enough	costs	to	 force	 the	 incumbent	 to	 accept	 an	 intermediary.	The	underpinning	 idea	 is	 that	the	rebels	change	the	state’s	cost/benefit	analysis	of	continuing	the	armed	conflict.	In	applying	a	gender	lens	I	take	it	one	step	further.	I	argue	that	not	even	do	rebels	do	not	need	to	win,	it	is	enough	to	publicly	expose	the	state’s	inability	to	protect	its	citizens	 from	 sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 rebels.	 The	 inherent	 asymmetry	 between	belligerents	 in	 civil	 war	 with	 the	 incumbent	 as	 the	 de-facto	 legitimate	 power	entails	 that	 the	 power	 to	 hurt	 is	 a	 uni-directional	 mechanism.	 Put	 differently,	rebels	 can	 employ	 hurtful	 tactics	 to	 force	 concessions	 (i.e.	 mediation)	 from	 the	state,	but	the	state	cannot	do	the	same	to	rebels.		 Recent	 research	 corroborates	 the	 power	 to	 hurt	 argument	 by	 illustrating	that	 relatively	 stronger	 rebels	 presenting	 a	 serious	 challenge	 to	 the	 government	are	more	 likely	 to	 force	 it	 to	 engage	 in	mediations	 (Clayton	2013,	2016;	Clayton	and	Gleditsch	 2014).	 Yet,	 studies	 also	 show	 that	 even	weak	 rebels	 can	 force	 the	government	to	the	negotiating	table	by	targeting	civilians	and	employing	terrorist	tactics	 (Thomas	 2014;	 Wood	 and	 Kathman	 2014).	 This	 is	 successful	 because	targeting	 civilians	 improves	 insurgents’	 bargaining	 position	 by	 signaling	 to	 the	incumbent	 information	 about	 resolve	 and	 future	 conflict	 costs	 (Wood	 and	Kathman	2014,	686).	Yet,	not	all	states	are	equally	cost	sensitive,	a	government’s	
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level	of	accountability	influences	to	what	extent	it	 is	susceptible	to	hurtful	tactics	(Thomas	2014).	Put	differently,	the	more	democratic	a	state	is,	the	more	likely	the	targeting	of	civilians	leads	to	talks.	What	has	not	been	addressed	is	the	question	if	this	is	also	true	for	sexual	violence.	One	might	ask	how	hurtful	is	sexual	violence	to	a	government?			
Power	to	hurt	through	a	gender	lens	Traditional	 power	 to	 hurt	 reasoning	 is	 gender	 blind	 and	 neglects	 the	 bodily	experiences	 of	 people	 in	 war,	 particularly	 women	 who	 are	 persistently	marginalized	by	the	strategic	lingo	despite	their	central	role	in	strategic	planning	(Sylvester	2013,	81).	Thus	extending	feminist	international	relations	theory	to	civil	conflicts	 offers	 unique	 insights	 on	 how	 and	 why	 reports	 of	 rebels	 targeting	civilians	and	particularly	women	are	perceived	as	hurtful	 to	 the	state.	 In	 fact	 the	gendered	 nature	 of	 sexual	 violence	 requires	 feminist	 IR	 theory,	 which	 is	 also	crucial	in	illuminating	the	apparent	contradiction	of	the	state	perceiving	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence	as	hurtful	while	perpetrating	it	itself.			 Applying	 a	 gender	 lens	 to	 intrastate	 conflict	 draws	 on	 well-established	feminist	 IR	 theory	 that	 argues	 that	 states	 are	 gendered	 (Peterson	1992;	 Tickner	1992,	2001;	Sjoberg	2013).	Formal	institutions	such	as	states	are	gendered	when	they	 ‘are	 symbolically	 and	 ideologically	 described	 and	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 a	discourse	that	draws	on	masculinities	and	femininities’	(Britton	2000,	420).	States	fit	 this	 pattern	 as	 they	 take	 on,	 apply,	 and	 propagate	 masculine	 behavior	 and	characteristics	 in	 defending	 themselves,	 their	 citizens,	 territory,	 and	 identity	(Sjoberg	 2013).	 Importantly,	 a	 state’s	 masculinity	 is	 not	 uniform,	 but	 may	 take	different	 forms	 such	 as	 ‘warrior’,	 ‘protector’,	 or	 ‘emancipator’	 depending	 on	 the	context	(Sjoberg	2013;	Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).			 Fundamental	 to	 the	 state’s	 masculinity	 is	 the	 gendered	 protection	 norm	based	 on	 the	 separation	 of	 combatants	 and	 civilians	 along	 gendered	 lines	(Carpenter	2003,	2005;	Sjoberg	2013;	Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).	Men	are	seen	as	natural	protectors	that	ought	to	protect	supposedly	innocent	civilians,	i.e.	women	and	 children	 who	 are	 beautiful	 souls	 (Elshtain	 1987).	 In	 line	 with	 this	 states	frequently	 (consciously	 or	 not)	 perceive	 women	 as	 both	 biological	 and	 cultural	reproducers	 rendering	 women	 their	 center	 of	 gravity	 (Peterson	 1999).	Consequently,	 states	prioritize	 the	protection	of	women	and	 children	 (Carpenter	
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2003,	 2005)	 and	 their	 protection	 is	 fundamental	 to	 a	 state’s	masculine	 identity.	Accordingly	 ‘civilian	 victimization	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 “women,”	 not	 as	
women	 per	 se	 but	 in	 their	 roles	 as	 the	 (gendered	 feminine)	 symbolic	 center’	(Sjoberg	2013,	201	emphasis	in	the	original).	Targeting	civilians	in	conflict	to	hurt	the	 other	 side	 as	 encapsulated	 by	 the	 power	 to	 hurt	 argument	 thus	 is	fundamentally	gendered.		 At	 the	 same	 time,	however,	 this	does	not	 imply	 that	 all	 victims	of	 civilian	victimization	have	to	be	female	or	that	the	perpetrating	agents	intend	to	kill	only	women	(Sjoberg	2013,	202).	Equally,	or	even	more	important	than	the	victim	and	the	 victim’s	 sex,	 is	 the	 actor	 who	 fails	 to	 protect	 the	 victim.	 The	 intentional	targeting	of	civilians	(read	women)	is	primarily	employed	to	symbolically	hurt	the	presumed	 protector.	 A	 gendered	 understanding	 of	 the	 power	 to	 hurt	 argument	thus	posits	that	victimizing	civilians	targets	the	masculinity	of	one’s	opponent.	Put	differently,	a	failure	to	protect	its	women	emasculates	the	state.	As	Laura	Sjoberg	puts	 it,	 ‘intentional	 civilian	 victimization	 is,	 consciously	 or	 not,	 an	 attack	 on	 the	masculinity	 (and	 therefore	 will	 to	 fight)	 of	 the	 enemy,	 carried	 out	 by	 the	destruction	of	the	feminine’	(2013,	202).			 Sexual	violence	takes	on	a	particular	role	 in	embodying	the	power	to	hurt	mechanism	for	 two	reasons:	 (1)	Unlike	 the	killing	of	civilians,	which	can	be	both	intentional	and	unintentional,	sexual	violence	is	always	committed	intentionally,	it	cannot	 happen	 by	 accident	 (Mitchell	 2004,	 50;	 Anderson	 2010,	 247),	 (2)	 sexual	violence	is	inherently	gendered	as	it	draws	on	the	gendered	protection	norm	that	renders	women	the	fundamental	center	of	gravity	(Carpenter	2003,	2005;	Sjoberg	2013;	Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).	The	silencing	of	men	as	victims	and	survivors	of	sexual	 violence	 contributes	 to	 this	 gendered	 framing.	 Sexual	 violence	 thus	establishes	 both	 the	 literal	 and	 symbolic	 domination	 and	 subordination	 of	 the	other	 in	disarming	and	 feminizing	both	 the	direct	victim	and	 the	 state	 (Eriksson	Baaz	and	Stern	2009).	Benard	describes	how	Serbian	 fighters	 raped	women	and	children	 in	Bosnia	 to	shame	and	demoralize	Bosnians	by	 ‘demonstrating	them	to	be	incapable	of	fulfilling	their	responsibility	to	protect	vulnerable	group	members’	(1994,	 40).	 To	 a	 state	 this	 emasculation	presents	 a	 substantial	 conflict	 cost	 as	 it	fundamentally	questions	its	ability	to	protect.	I	contend	that	sexual	violence	is	so	hurtful	because	it	 invokes	the	gendered	protection	norm	to	a	greater	extent	than	other	 forms	 of	 violence	 and	 thereby	 challenges	 a	 core	 aspect	 of	 a	 state’s	
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masculinity.	 Whereas	 violence	 and	 death	 is	 generally	 expected	 in	 war,	 sexual	violence	 against	 women	 and	 children	 is	 not,	 which	 makes	 it	 so	 effective	 in	emasculating	governments.		 This	 emasculation	 of	 the	 state	 is	 exacerbated	 when	 the	 state’s	 failure	 to	protect	 its	 women	 becomes	 public	 knowledge.	 This	 sends	 a	 powerful	 signal	because	 it	 exposes	 the	 state’s	 lack	 of	 territorial	 control	 and	 inability	 to	 protect	civilians.	 Although	 governments	 (read	 elites)	 might	 not	 care	 about	 their	 people	being	 victimized,	 they	 do	 care	 about	 having	 control,	 their	 reputation,	 and	projecting	 strength	 (Walter	 2006b). 12 	Rebel	 sexual	 violence	 fundamentally	questions	 the	 state’s	 power.	 Thus	 it	 is	 not	 a	 concern	 for	 citizens	 that	 drives	government	 reaction,	 but	 it	 is	 the	 perception	 that	 the	 state	 is	 ‘outmanned’	 that	hurts	 its	 pride.	 This	 connects	 to	 the	 fundamental	 self-conception	 of	 states	 that	‘[lay]	 claim	 to	 the	 monopoly	 of	 legitimate	 physical	 violence	 within	 a	 particular	territory’	 (Weber	2004,	 33).	 A	 feminist	 lens	 highlights	 that	 power,	 strength,	 and	control	are	inherently	tied	to	the	gendered	protection	norm	and	the	masculinity	of	the	state,	as	masculinity	is	what	defends	the	nation	(Sjoberg	2013,	199;	Karim	and	Beardsley	2017).	Constituents	frequently	select	 for	masculine	 leadership	because	they	want	and	expect	protection,	strength,	and	power	and	they	challenge	leaders	if	they	 fail	 to	meet	 these	 expectations	 (Sjoberg	2013,	 162).	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	fact	 that	 the	 executive	 branch	 and	 particularly	 the	 defense	 ministries	 remain	overwhelmingly	 male-dominated	 (Barnes	 and	 O’Brien	 2018).	 Thus	 reports	 of	sexual	 violence	 are	 deeply	 problematic	 for	 the	 state	 as	 they	 amplify	 its	emasculation.	 Reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 expose	 the	 state	 as	 weak	 and	challenge	 its	 legitimacy	as	protector	 in	demonstrating	 its	 ‘incapacity	 to	 fulfill	 the	fundamental	 masculine	 function	 of	 protection’	 (Sjoberg	 2013,	 239).	 Thus	 it	 is	 a	two-step	process	that	emasculates	the	state:	(1)	the	failure	to	protect	 its	women,	(2)	the	public	knowledge	of	its	failure.		The	conflict	 in	the	Côte	d’Ivoire	that	erupted	in	2002	illustrates	important	aspects	of	this	argument	including	that	military	and	civilian	leadership	might	differ																																																									
12	I	 acknowledge	 that	 it	may	matter	which	 civilians	 are	 targeted.	 Sexual	 violence	against	ethnic	minority	civilians	may	not	matter	to	the	incumbent	(if	he	is	himself	not	of	the	same	ethnicity).	That	is,	the	government’s	masculinity	is	not	necessarily	undermined	by	public	knowledge	of	a	failure	to	protect	those	civilians.	I	contend,	however,	that	the	state’s	masculinity	is	bound	to	its	ability	to	maintain	territorial	integrity,	 its	 protective	 role,	 and	 sole	 control	 over	 the	 means	 of	 violence.	Empirically,	the	data	also	do	not	permit	such	a	fine-grained	analysis.		
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in	 their	 responses	 to	 sexual	 violence.	 On	 19	 September,	 the	 rebellion	 led	 by	 the	Mouvement	 Patriotique	 de	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 (MPCI)	 assaulted	 three	 major	 cities	Bouaké,	 Korhogo,	 and	 the	 capital	 Abidjan.	 While	 the	 government	 quashed	 the	rebellion	 in	 Abidjan	 the	 same	 day,	 the	 rebels	 successfully	 captured	 Bouaké	 and	Korhogo.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 this,	 MCPI	 fighters	 perpetrated	 rapes	 and	 abducted	women	 into	 sexual	 slavery	 (Amnesty	 International	 2007).	 The	 Defense	Minister	initially	 ruled	 out	 negotiations,	which	 illustrates	 that	militaries’	 reaction	 to	 such	public	humiliations	might	be	a	desire	to	fight	even	harder	and	to	defeat	the	rebels	–	 to	 prove	 their	 strength	 and	 virility	 –	 rather	 than	 engage	 in	 talks,	 i.e.	 backing	down,	 which	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 being	 weak,	 as	 a	 further	 feminization.	 However,	Prime	 Minister	 N'Guessan	 offered	 talks	 pledging	 to	 protect	 his	 citizens:	 “Ivory	Coast	 has	 not	 forgotten	 them,	 Ivory	 Coast	 has	 not	 abandoned	 them”	 (Rousseau	2002).	 On	 14	 October,	 President	 Gbagbo	 condemned	 rape	 in	 the	 rebel-held	territory	calling	for	the	international	community	to	send	observer	missions	to	the	rebel	 zones	 and	 offering	 full	 cooperation	 and	 the	 opening	 of	 a	 dialogue	(Peytermann	 2002).	 The	 talks	 mediated	 by	 the	 foreign	 ministers	 from	 the	Economic	 Community	 of	West	 African	 States	 (ECOWAS)	 contact	 group	 officially	began	on	17	October	in	Lomé,	Togo	(McCathie	2002).		A	 similar	 gendered	dynamic	 is	 at	 play	when	governments	do	not	want	 to	negotiate	 with	 terrorists	 for	 fears	 of	 appearing	 weak	 (Abrahms	 2006;	 Fortna	2015).	So	why	would	emasculation	prompt	talks?	I	contend	that	there	are	multiple	factors	 shaping	 this	 decision.	 Firstly,	 the	 inherently	 gendered	 nature	 of	 sexual	violence	 triggers	 the	 gendered	 protection	 norm,	 which	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	masculine	 state	 identity,	 to	a	greater	extent	 than	 for	example	one-sided	violence	because	 sexual	 violence	 invokes	 the	 image	 of	 women	 and	 children	 in	 need	 of	protection	 (Carpenter	 2003,	 2005).	 As	 a	 result	 their	 protection,	 i.e.	 cessation	 of	hostilities	and	thereby	an	end	of	the	state’s	ongoing	emasculation,	becomes	more	important	 than	 retaliating.	 Secondly,	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 does	 not	 occur	 in	 a	vacuum,	 but	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 already	 costly	 conflict.	 Thus	 reports	 of	 sexual	violence	 present	 an	 additional	 conflict	 cost,	 rather	 than	 the	 only	 conflict	 cost.	Thirdly,	 the	ongoing	conflict	 itself	 illustrates	 that	 the	state	at	 this	point	has	been	unable	 to	 win	 militarily.	 Moreover	 as	 descriptive	 data	 show	 states	 are	 actually	more	likely	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	than	rebels	 in	a	given	conflict	year	(see	Table	 VI).	 Put	 differently,	 states	 often	 try	 and	 fail	 to	 demonstrate	 strength	 and	
	 68	
virility	 through	 fighting.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 Nepalese	 civil	 war	 that	 erupted	 in	1996,	 a	 succession	 of	 governments	 did	 not	 attempt	 peace	 talks	with	 the	Maoist	rebels	 until	 2001,	 the	 first	 year	 the	Maoists	were	 reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	violence.	 In	 the	 three	 years	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 2006	 Comprehensive	 Peace	Agreement	 that	 ended	 the	 armed	 conflict,	 the	 Maoists	 were	 reported	 to	 have	perpetrated	 sexual	 violence	 (Lanz	 and	 von	 Burg	 2017).	 Fourthly,	 the	 feminine	response	 of	 accepting	 talks	 is	 short-lived	 while	 the	 conflict	 and	 sexual	 violence	otherwise	could	drag	on	for	months	or	years.	Thus	the	current	and	potential	future	costs	 of	 a	 prolonged	 emasculation	 outweigh	 the	 limited	 costs	 of	 a	 feminine	response	 in	 accepting	 talks.	 Although	 the	 government	will	 have	 to	 live	with	 the	legacy	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence,	 a	 successful	 mediation	 process	 would	 allow	 the	government	 to	 shape	 the	 narrative	 to	 its	 favor.	 Put	 differently,	 the	 government	could	 portray	 itself	 as	 the	 one	 who	 brought	 peace,	 stability,	 and	 possibly	 even	reconciliation,	which	would	mitigate	 the	 legacy	of	 violence.	Accordingly,	my	 first	hypothesis	is:		
Hypothesis	1:	Mediation	is	more	likely	when	there	are	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence.		 		 Although	states	and	rebels	are	equally	likely	to	perceive	it	as	hurtful	when	it	is	known	that	the	other	side	victimizes	their	constituents,	the	asymmetry	between	the	two	sides	leads	to	different	effects	on	conflict	management.	Mediation	requires	the	 consent	 of	 both	 conflict	 sides,	 yet	 the	 asymmetry	 in	 terms	 of	 political	legitimacy	 affords	 the	 government	 veto	power	 regarding	 the	onset	 of	mediation,	meaning	 if	 it	 is	 not	 willing	 to	 talk,	 there	 will	 be	 no	 talks.	 Rebels	 might	 call	 for	mediation	when	the	government	perpetrates	sexual	violence	against	civilians	that	expect	 protection	 from	 rebels,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 political	 legitimacy	 or	authority	 to	 actually	 initiate	 a	 mediation	 process	 without	 the	 government’s	consent.	The	power	to	accept	an	external	mediation	offer	 lies	 in	the	hands	of	the	government.	Related	to	the	state’s	role	as	the	sole	legitimate	political	power	is	not	only	the	implicit	belief	that	it	needs	to	fulfill	a	protective	function,	but	importantly	also	the	belief	that	it	has	a	monopoly	of	force	and	only	it	is	entitled	to	use	violence.	Sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 state	 thus	 ought	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 context	 of	 social	 and	structural	power	relations	(Meger	2016).	This	also	means	that	sexual	violence	by	
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the	 state	 itself	 can	 be	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 state’s	 understanding	 of	 existing	power	relations	and	in	fact	expresses	them.	Violence	is	the	state’s	prerogative	and	its	use	is	contingent	on	the	state’s	approval	(Weber	2004,	33).	Put	differently,	part	of	the	state’s	masculinity	is	a	sense	of	entitlement	to	do	as	it	pleases:	to	rape,	loot,	and	 pillage.	 Accordingly,	 I	 do	 not	 expect	 that	 reports	 of	 state	 sexual	 violence	increase	the	likelihood	of	mediation.		 	 	
Hypothesis	2:	Reports	of	state	sexual	violence	do	not	affect	the	likelihood	of	mediation.	
	 Masculinity	 is	 not	 uniform	 and	 some	 governments	 adhere	 to	 more	militarized	masculinities	than	others.	Hence	not	every	government	will	respond	to	a	 perceived	 emasculation	 by	 engaging	 in	mediation	 to	 end	 the	 conflict.	 A	 highly	masculinized	state	such	as	for	example	a	military	regime	would	be	more	likely	to	see	 violence	 as	 the	 appropriate	 response	 and	 seek	 retaliation,	 especially	 as	 the	conflict	 became	 more	 gendered	 and	 violent.	 The	 reaction	 of	 the	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	Defence	Minister	 ruling	 out	 talks	with	 the	 rebels	 highlights	 the	 diverging	 effects	that	 sexual	 violence	 might	 have	 on	 different	 types	 of	 leadership.	 Accordingly,	 I	expect	mediation	 to	be	 less	 likely	when	 rebels	are	 reported	 to	perpetrate	 sexual	violence	in	conflicts	against	military	regimes.			
Hypothesis	3:	Mediation	is	less	likely	when	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	in	conflicts	against	military	regimes.	
	
3.5	Methodology	To	 test	 these	 hypotheses	 I	 draw	 on	 a	 mixed	 method	 approach	 using	 both	systematic	 analysis	 and	 a	 crucial	 case	 study	 of	 Sierra	 Leone.	 For	 the	 systematic	analysis	 I	 use	 the	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Armed	 Conflict	 (SVAC)	 dataset	 (Cohen	 and	Nordås	2014),	and	the	Civil	War	Mediation	(CWM)	dataset	(DeRouen,	Bercovitch,	and	 Pospieszna	 2011).	 Originally	 the	 unit	 of	 analysis	 of	 the	 CWM	 is	 conflict	episode,	whereas	the	SVAC	dataset	contains	data	on	all	conflict	years	from	1989	to	2009.	To	combine	these	datasets	with	their	different	units	of	analysis	I	manipulate	both	datasets.	I	split	each	conflict	episode	in	the	CWM	into	conflict	years	and	coded	the	missing	years	(2005-2009)	and	I	aggregate	the	SVAC	data	to	conflict	side	per	
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year,	 meaning	 that	 the	 incumbent	 government,	 pro-government	 militias,	 and	supporting	 states	 comprise	 side	 A,	 ‘the	 state’,	 and	 that	 the	 rebel	 group(s)	 and	supporting	states	comprise	side	B,	‘the	rebels’.			 After	matching	 the	datasets	 the	unit	of	analysis	 is	conflict	year.	 I	 limit	 the	analysis	 to	 the	 post-Cold	 War	 period	 from	 1990	 to	 2009,	 which	 includes	 746	observations.	Besides	compatibility,	a	further	benefit	of	using	conflict	years	rather	than	conflict	episodes	 is	 that	 it	enables	me	 to	account	 for	 the	variation	 in	sexual	violence	over	the	course	of	a	conflict	and	its	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	mediation	onset.	Mediation	onset,	 the	dependent	variable,	 is	binary.	Therefore	I	use	 logistic	regression	models	 to	estimate	 the	 likelihood	of	a	mediation	attempt	 in	a	 conflict	year.	 To	 account	 for	 a	 potential	 lack	 of	 independence	 of	 observations	 from	 the	same	country	I	cluster	the	standard	errors	by	country.	
	
Dependent	variable		I	adopt	the	definition	proposed	by	the	CWM	of	mediation	as	‘a	process	of	conflict	management	where	 disputants	 seek	 the	 assistance	 of,	 or	 accept	 an	 offer	 of	 help	from,	 an	 individual,	 group,	 or	 state,	 or	 organization	 to	 settle	 their	 conflict	 or	resolve	 their	 differences	 without	 resorting	 to	 physical	 force	 or	 invoking	 the	authority	 of	 law’	 (Bercovitch,	 Anagnoson,	 and	 Wille	 1991,	 8).	 The	 dependent	variable	is	a	dichotomous	variable	that	captures	if	a	mediation	process	started	in	a	conflict	 year	 (0	 =	 no	 mediation	 1	 =	 mediation).	 Adhering	 to	 common	 practice	mediation	is	only	coded	1	for	the	year	of	the	onset	and	as	missing	for	subsequent	calendar	years	if	the	process	continues	(Clayton	2013).	This	prevents	counting	one	process	multiple	 times	and	 the	analysis	 is	 confined	 to	 the	onset	of	mediation.	Of	the	 746	 conflict	 years	 included,	 222	 featured	 mediation.	 I	 do	 not	 include	 a	measurement	 if	 the	 mediation	 process	 was	 concluded.	 Generally,	 mediation	efficacy	 is	 difficult	 to	 define	 relying	 only	 on	 a	 binary	 measure	 of	 whether	 a	settlement	is	reached	or	not	(DeRouen,	Bercovitch,	and	Pospieszna	2011).							
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Table	V.	Mediation	onset	Mediation	 Frequency	 Percentage	0	 524	 70.24	1	 222	 29.76	Total	 746	 100			
Independent	variables	Sexual	violence	can	take	any	of	seven	distinct	 forms	(rape,	sexual	slavery,	 forced	prostitution,	 forced	 pregnancy,	 forced	 sterilization/abortion,	 sexual	 mutilation,	and	 sexual	 torture)	 and	 is	 coded	 for	 every	 actor	 in	 a	 conflict	 year.	 The	 SVAC	dataset	 includes	 three	 prevalence	 scores	 based	 on	 the	 three	 sources,	 State	Department	 reports	 (SD),	Amnesty	 International	 reports	 (AI),	 and	Human	Rights	Watch	 reports	 (HRW)	 for	 each	 observation.	 For	 my	 analysis	 I	 aggregate	 these	three	prevalence	scores	to	one	score	that	takes	on	the	value	of	1	if	there	was	any	sexual	violence	reported	for	any	of	the	three	sources	(prevalence	scores	1,	2,	and	3)	 and	 0	 if	 there	 was	 none	 in	Model	 2.1	 and	Model	 2.2.	 Combining	 these	 three	measures	allows	me	to	establish	that	sexual	violence	by	either	side	is	in	fact	public	knowledge,	 while	 guarding	 against	 potential	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 reported	prevalence.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 reliably	 identify	 the	 prevalence	 of	 sexual	 violence	 in	conflicts.	 Hence	 researchers	 caution	 against	 using	 SD,	 AI,	 and	 HRW	 reports	 for	quantitative	analysis	(Davies	and	True	2015,	2017).	The	binary	variable	therefore	indicates	if	the	failure	to	protect	was	public	knowledge,	rather	than	simply	if	either	side	failed	to	protect	its	constituents.	For	Model	2.2	I	nonetheless	disaggregate	the	measure	 to	 distinguish	 between	 reports	 of	 some	 sexual	 violence	 and	 reports	 of	widespread	 or	 systematic	 sexual	 violence.	 This	 analysis	 allows	me	 to	 examine	 if	the	hypothesized	relationship	holds	across	reported	levels	of	sexual	violence.	Data	are	available	for	716	out	of	746	conflict	years.	There	is	a	pronounced	asymmetry	 between	 reported	 sexual	 violence	 by	 states	 and	 rebels	 (Table	 VI).	States	are	reported	to	use	at	least	some	sexual	violence	in	318	(44.5%)	out	of	716	conflict	years.	Rebels	on	the	other	hand	are	reported	to	use	sexual	violence	in	less	than	20%	of	all	included	conflict	years,	133	out	of	716.					
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Table	VI.	Reports	of	sexual	violence	by	states	and	rebels	(%	in	parentheses)		 	 	 States	 		 	 0	 1	 Total	Rebels	 0	 362	(50.56)	 221	(30.87)	 583	(81.42)		 1	 36	(5.03)	 97	(13.55)	 133	(18.58)		 Total	 398	(55.59)	 318	(44.41)	 716	(100)				 For	 H3,	 to	 determine	 if	 a	 government	 is	 a	 military	 regime,	 I	 draw	 on	autocratic	 regime	 data	 (Geddes,	 Wright,	 and	 Frantz	 2014).	 This	 enables	 me	 to	distinguish	 between	 four	 different	 types	 of	 autocratic	 regimes:	 party	 regime,	monarchy,	 personalist	 regime,	 and	 military	 regime.	 My	 sample	 includes	 113	conflict	years	in	12	different	military	regimes	ranging	from	Algeria	to	Myanmar.	To	examine	 this	 hypothesis	 I	 construct	 an	 interaction	 term	multiplying	 rebel	 sexual	
violence	 with	 military	 regime.	 When	 testing	 for	 the	 effect	 I	 thus	 include	 both	component	variables	as	well	as	the	interaction	term	Rebel	sexual	violence	x	Military	
Regime	as	is	standard	practice.		
Controls	Sexual	 violence	 in	 conflict	 now	 frequently	 attracts	 international	 attention.	 States	and	advocacy	groups	might	bring	to	bear	their	normative	and	material	influence	to	force	 the	 government	 into	 mediated	 talks.	 One	 potential	 avenue	 of	 influence	 is	foreign	aid	(Carey,	Colaresi,	and	Mitchell	2015).	Democratic	donor	countries	might	attempt	 to	 hold	 receiving	 countries	 accountable	 for	 human	 rights	 abuses,	 while	autocratic	 regimes	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 care	 about	 human	 rights	 abuses	 (Carey,	Colaresi,	 and	Mitchell	 2015).	The	onset	 of	mediation	might	not	 be	driven	by	 the	government’s	own	desire	to	end	the	conflict	(and	thereby	sexual	violence),	but	by	the	 extent	 of	 the	 government’s	 sensitivity	 to	 democratic	 donors.	 As	 reports	 of	sexual	 violence	are	 the	 crucial	 factor	 for	donor	 states	 rather	 than	 the	 identity	of	the	perpetrator,	 this	 implies	 that	 substantial	 foreign	aid	 from	democratic	donors	might	 prompt	 mediation	 if	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 sexual	 violence	 perpetrated	regardless	 of	 the	 perpetrator’s	 identity.	 Hence	 I	 control	 for	 the	 sensitivity	 to	foreign	democratic	aid.	To	assess	this	I	use	Carey,	Colaresi	&	Mitchell’s	measure	for	
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democratic	aid	dependency:	 ‘the	natural	 log	of	 the	sum	total	of	aid	received	as	a	proportion	of	the	recipient’s	gross	domestic	product’	(2015,	858).		 I	 also	 control	 for	 factors	 that	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 influence	 the	 onset	 of	mediation.	Conflict	duration	presents	one	way	of	conceptualizing	costs	of	fighting	and	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 the	 onset	 of	 mediation	 (Filson	 and	Werner	 2007;	 Greig	2001).	Accordingly,	I	include	duration	measured	in	years	and	duration	squared	to	account	for	potential	effects	of	conflicts’	 longevity	on	the	likelihood	of	mediation.	Besides	 conflict	 duration,	 studies	 show	 that	 conflict	 intensity	 can	 shape	 conflict	parties’	choice	of	accepting	mediation	(Melin	and	Svensson	2009).	Hence,	I	include	the	 UCDP	 measure	 for	 intensity	 (0	 =	 conflict	 years	 resulting	 in	 25-999	 battle-related	deaths;	1	=	at	least	1,000	casualties).			 Parallel	 conflicts	 can	 influence	 the	 likelihood	of	mediation	both	positively	and	 negatively.	 Multiple	 conflicts	 demand	 the	 state	 to	 divide	 its	 attention	 and	resources,	 which	 should	 improve	 the	 rebels’	 relative	 position	 and	 increase	 the	likelihood	of	mediation.	Or,	multiple	conflicts	might	enlarge	the	recognition	costs	connected	 to	 accepting	 mediation,	 which	 should	 reduce	 the	 likelihood	 of	mediation.	To	 account	 for	both	options	 I	 include	a	binary	variable	 that	 indicates	whether	 there	 are	 parallel	 conflicts	 in	 a	 country	 conflict	 year	 (0	 =	 no	 parallel	conflict;	1	=	parallel	conflicts).		 Civil	 conflicts	 that	 draw	 in	 neighboring	 countries	 threaten	 to	 destabilize	regional	security	and	present	a	particular	concern	to	the	international	community.	As	a	result	 internationalization	of	conflict	 frequently	 leads	to	attempts	to	contain	or	manage	the	conflict	through	mediated	talks.	Accordingly,	I	account	for	the	type	of	conflict	(0	=	civil	war;	1	=	internationalized	civil	war).			 Similarly,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 conflict	 in	 a	 neighboring	 country	 the	 international	community	might	place	greater	emphasis	on	conflict	management	to	stop	a	further	destabilization	of	the	region.	Hence	I	include	Carey,	Colaresi	and	Mitchell’s	(2015)	dichotomous	variable	 (0	=	no	conflict	 in	neighboring	countries;	1	=	 conflict	 in	at	least	 one	 neighboring	 country)	 to	 account	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 conflict	 in	 a	neighboring	country	on	the	likelihood	of	mediation.			 Studies	 show	 that	 when	 governments	 face	 strong	 rebels	 capable	 of	challenging	 core	 government	 interests	 mediation	 becomes	 more	 likely	 (Clayton	2013,	 2016;	 Clayton	 and	Gleditsch	 2014).	 To	 control	 for	 this	 I	 use	 a	measure	 of	relative	rebel	strength	from	the	Non-State	Actor	Database	(Cunningham,	Gleditsch,	
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and	 Salehyan	 2013).	 I	 convert	 the	 five-point	 scale	 to	 a	 binary	 measure	 that	estimates	a	 rebel	 group’s	 strength	 in	 relation	 to	 the	government	 (0	weaker	 than	the	government,	1	=	at	parity	with	or	stronger	than	the	government).			 To	account	for	the	possibility	that	mediation	onset	is	forced	through	civilian	victimization	 via	 lethal	 force	 rather	 than	 sexual	 violence	 I	 include	 a	 control	 for	non-combatant	 deaths.	 With	 rebel	 and	 state	 one-sided	 violence	 respectively,	 I	measure	 the	 impact	 of	 lethal	 violence	 against	 civilians	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	mediation	using	 the	natural	 logarithm	of	number	of	 civilian	deaths	based	on	 the	UCDP	One-sided	Violence	dataset	1.4-2016	(Eck	and	Hultman	2007).			 As	democracies	tend	to	be	more	peaceful	than	other	forms	of	government	I	use	the	Polity	IV	data	to	include	a	democracy	dummy	(0	for	a	PolityIV	score	<	6;	1	for	 a	 Polity	 IV	 score	 ≥	 6)	 to	 control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	whether	 a	 state	 is	 a	democracy	influences	the	chances	of	mediation.	Lastly,	research	indicates	that	high	economic	 development	 fosters	 peace	 by	 helping	 reduce	 resource	 scarcity	 and	improving	 institutional	 stability	 (Doyle	and	Sambanis	2000).	Hence	 I	 include	 the	natural	logarithms	of	GDP	per	capita	and	population	size	as	controls.			
3.6	Results	The	logistic	regression	model	results	are	reported	in	Table	VII	(parameters	shown	are	 logistic	 regression	 coefficients).	 The	 results	 offer	 support	 for	 all	 three	hypotheses.	All	other	things	being	equal,	mediation	is	more	likely	when	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	compared	to	when	there	are	no	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence;	government	sexual	violence	shows	no	significant	association	with	 mediation	 onset;	 and	 mediation	 is	 less	 likely	 when	 rebels	 are	 reported	perpetrating	sexual	violence	against	a	military	regime.				 Amongst	 the	 control	 variables	 relative	 rebel	 strength	 has	 a	 significant	impact	on	the	chances	of	mediation.	 In	 line	with	my	theoretical	expectations	and	previous	 studies	 rebel	 strength	 is	 a	 significant	predictor	 for	mediation	onset,	 i.e.	when	rebels	are	at	parity	with	or	stronger	than	the	government,	mediation	is	more	likely	 (Clayton	 2013,	 2016).	 One-sided	 violence,	 regardless	 of	 which	 side	 is	perpetrating	it,	does	not	show	a	significant	association	with	mediation	onset.	This	supports	the	notion	that	rebel	sexual	violence	is	particularly	hurtful	and	thus	has	a	unique	effect	on	a	government’s	inclination	of	accepting	mediation.			
	 75	
	 I	also	control	for	democracy,	population	size,	GDP	per	capita,	and	sensitivity	to	international	pressure	via	democratic	foreign	aid.	The	natural	 logarithm	of	the	population	size	shows	a	negative	association	with	the	onset	of	mediation,	meaning	the	bigger	 a	 country’s	population	 the	 less	 likely	mediation.	Of	 the	 country-based	control	 variables	 only	democratic	 aid	has	 a	positive	 and	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	likelihood	 of	 conflict	 management.	 This	 offers	 support	 to	 the	 notion	 that	international	 pressure	 increases	 the	 likelihood	of	mediation.	 To	 further	 examine	the	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 and	 international	 pressure	 I	 run	interaction	analyses.	The	interaction	terms	are	all	insignificant	indicating	that	the	effect	 of	 foreign	 aid	 on	mediation	 onset	 is	 not	 connected	 to	 sexual	 violence	 and	that	 the	 influence	 of	 international	 pressure	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 rebel	 sexual	violence	 on	mediation	 onset	 are	 independent	 of	 each	 other	 (see	 Appendix	 B	 for	tables).			 In	Model	2.2	 I	disaggregate	 the	measures	of	 sexual	 violence	 to	 examine	 if	the	 effect	 persists	 across	 reported	 levels	 of	 sexual	 violence.	 In	 this	 model	 I	distinguish	 between	 reports	 of	 some	 sexual	 violence	 and	 reports	 of	widespread/systematic	 sexual	 violence	 by	 the	 rebels	 or	 the	 government.	 The	results	 show	 that	 the	 effect	 indeed	 holds	 for	 both	 reported	 levels	 of	 sexual	violence.	This	also	indicates	that	the	results	are	neither	driven	by	the	majority	of	cases	(83)	in	which	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	some	sexual	violence	nor	the	minority	of	 cases	 (50)	 in	which	 rebels	are	 reported	 to	perpetrate	widespread	or	systematic	 sexual	 violence.	 Similarly,	 reports	 of	 government	 sexual	 violence	remain	insignificant	regardless	of	the	reported	scale.			 Examining	H3	Model	2.3	shows	that	rebel	sexual	violence	generally	has	the	expected	 positive,	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 mediation	 onset.	Whereas	 military	 regimes	 show	 no	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	mediation	 onset,	 i.e.	 they	 are	 not	 significantly	 less	 or	 more	 likely	 than	 other	governments	 to	engage	 in	mediation.	 Importantly,	however,	 the	 interaction	 term	
Rebel	 sexual	 violence	 x	 Military	 regime	 shows	 a	 negative,	 statistically	 significant	association	with	mediation	onset.	This	offers	supports	for	H3	that	mediation	is	less	likely	when	rebels	perpetrate	sexual	violence	in	conflicts	against	military	regimes.							
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Table	VII.	Logistic	regression	models	2.1	-	2.3	(DV	=	mediation	onset)		 (2.1)	 (2.2)	 (2.3)	Rebel	SV	 0.754**	 	 1.031***		 [0.200,1.308]	 	 [0.441,1.622]	Gov’t	SV	 0.130	 	 0.151		 [-0.393,0.654]	 	 [-0.383,0.685]	Some	rebel	SV	 	 0.706*	 		 	 [0.135,1.276]	 	Widespread	rebel	SV	 	 0.908*	 		 	 [0.131,1.685]	 	Some	gov’t	SV	 	 0.139	 		 	 [-0.379,0.657]	 	Widespread	gov’t	SV	 	 0.068	 		 	 [-0.781,0.916]	 	Military	regime	 	 	 0.355		 	 	 [-1.008,1.718]	Rebel	SV	x	Military	regime	 	 	 -3.586*		 	 	 [-6.355,-0.817]	Duration	 0.058	 0.058	 0.052		 [-0.059,0.176]	 [-0.061,0.177]	 [-0.064,0.168]	Duration2	 -0.001	 -0.001	 -0.001		 [-0.005,0.002]	 [-0.005,0.002]	 [-0.005,0.002]	Intensity	 -0.100	 -0.095	 -0.066		 [-0.753,0.553]	 [-0.748,0.558]	 [-0.696,0.565]	Parallel	conflict	 0.510	 0.510	 0.477		 [-0.306,1.326]	 [-0.310,1.331]	 [-0.366,1.320]	Type	of	conflict	 0.530	 0.493	 0.316		 [-0.336,1.397]	 [-0.407,1.394]	 [-0.473,1.104]	Neighbor	civil	war	 -0.152	 -0.148	 -0.269		 [-0.835,0.532]	 [-0.836,0.541]	 [-0.957,0.419]	Rebel	strength	 1.506**	 1.511**	 1.465**		 [0.376,2.635]	 [0.392,2.631]	 [0.385,2.545]	Rebel	one-sided	violence	 0.001	 -0.003	 -0.009		 [-0.113,0.115]	 [-0.120,0.113]	 [-0.118,0.100]	Gov’t	one-sided	violence	 0.030	 0.035	 0.035		 [-0.088,0.149]	 [-0.0784,0.149]	 [-0.081,0.151]	Democracy	 0.645	 0.658	 0.839*		 [-0.208,1.497]	 [-0.200,1.516]	 [0.019,1.659]	Democratic	aid	 0.175*	 0.175*	 0.134t		 [0.020,0.331]	 [0.0208,0.330]	 [-0.008,0.276]	Autocratic	aid	 -0.044	 -0.044	 -0.051		 [-0.134,0.046]	 [-0.134,0.047]	 [-0.143,0.040]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 0.332	 0.336	 0.155		 [-0.132,0.795]	 [-0.134,0.806]	 [-0.324,0.633]	Population	(ln)	 -0.628***	 -0.625***	 -0.666***		 [-0.970,-0.286]	 [-0.962,-0.288]	 [-1.008,-0.324]	Constant	 7.975**	 7.922**	 8.811***		 [2.822,13.13]	 [2.859,12.99]	 [3.675,13.95]	AIC	 620.378	 624.121	 600.321	Area	under	ROC	 0.759	 0.759	 0.778	Wald-chi2	 75.48(16)	 75.51(18)	 85.16(18)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -293.189	 -293.060	 -281.160	N	 564	 564	 554	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	 	
*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 	 	
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Logistic	 regression	coefficients	 in	raw	 form	are	difficult	 to	 interpret.	They	only	 provide	 substantial	 information	 on	 the	 direction	 and	 significance	 of	 the	relationship,	which	in	line	with	my	argument	is	positive	and	significant,	i.e.	reports	of	 sexual	 violence	 by	 rebels	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 mediation.	 To	 provide	further	 insight	 I	 present	 quantities	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 form	 of	 first	 differences	 as	substantive	effects	based	on	Model	2.1	(Figure	2).	The	first	difference	plot	shows	changes	 in	 the	 predicted	 probability	 for	mediation	 as	 the	 predictors	move	 from	minimum	 to	 maximum,	 while	 holding	 all	 else	 equal.	 In	 Model	 2.1	 rebel	 sexual	violence	 is	 a	 dichotomous	 variable,	 i.e.	 it	 shows	 the	 change	 in	 the	 predicted	likelihood	between	no	reports	of	rebels	perpetrating	sexual	violence	and	reports	of	rebels	perpetrating	sexual	violence.	The	likelihood	of	mediation	increases	by	13%	when	 rebels	 are	 reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence.	 The	 results	 strongly	support	 the	argument	 that	public	knowledge	of	 the	state’s	 inability	 to	protect	 its	citizens	from	sexual	violence	by	rebels	increases	the	likelihood	of	mediation	as	the	government	seeks	a	way	out	of	the	hurtful	conflict.	In	line	with	this,	the	plot	also	shows	the	substantive	effect	that	rebel	strength	has.	Conflict	years	in	which	rebels	are	at	least	at	parity	with	the	government	are	30%	more	likely	to	see	the	onset	of	mediation.	Democratic	aid	also	has	a	substantive	effect;	a	change	from	the	lowest	amount	of	foreign	aid	from	a	democratic	country	to	the	highest	amount	increases	the	likelihood	of	mediation	by	22%.		
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Figure	2.	First	difference	plot	for	change	in	likelihood	of	mediation	onset	–	Model	2.1	(95%	confidence	intervals)	




Robustness	checks	To	ensure	the	robustness	of	my	findings,	I	run	the	principal	models	with	different	specifications	 and	 controls	 (see	 Appendix	 B	 for	 all	 tables).	 The	 introduction	 of	control	 variables	 could	 insert	 a	 bias	 (Clarke	2005),	 therefore	 I	 run	 first	 a	model	limited	 to	 the	 independent	 variables	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 and	 state	 sexual	violence.	 This	 presents	 the	 same	 pattern	 as	 the	 principal	 models,	 positive	 and	significant	 coefficient	 for	 reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 (p	 <	 0.001)	 and	 an	insignificant	coefficient	for	reports	of	state	sexual	violence.		 Theoretically,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 when	 a	 government	 accepts	 mediation,	thereby	 appearing	weak,	 it	 reduces	 its	 ability	 to	 deter	 rebels	 from	 perpetrating	sexual	 violence.	 I	 address	 this	 potential	 endogeneity	 by	 running	 models	 with	lagged	 independent	variables.	The	analysis	shows	 the	same	pattern,	positive	and	statistically	 significant	 coefficient	 for	 reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 (p	 <	 0.05)	and	an	insignificant	coefficient	for	reports	of	government	sexual	violence.		 To	control	for	further	endogenous	effects	of	mediation,	i.e.	mediation	while	not	succeeding	in	ending	the	conflict	prompting	a	new	mediation	in	the	following	
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year,	I	include	a	dichotomous	variable	indicating	whether	there	was	mediation	in	the	previous	year	 (0	=	no	mediation	 in	previous	year,	1	=	mediation	 in	previous	year).	I	run	models	using	the	same	specifications	as	in	Model	2.1	and	Model	2.2.	As	expected	 mediation	 in	 the	 previous	 year	 is	 a	 significant	 predictor	 of	 mediation	onset	 (p	 <	 0.001),	 the	 binary	 measure	 of	 reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 is	significant	at	the	0.1-level	(p	=	0.089).	The	analysis	of	the	disaggregated	measure	of	 rebel	 sexual	violence	shows	 that	 if	mediation	occurred	 in	 the	previous	year,	 a	renewed	 mediation	 onset	 is	 more	 likely	 when	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 widespread	rebel	 sexual	 violence	 (p	 <	 0.05),	 but	 not	 for	 lower	 levels	 of	 reported	 sexual	violence.	This	is	in	line	with	the	costly	nature	of	mediation	and	the	power	to	hurt	argument.	Once	mediation	has	failed	in	the	previous	year,	it	takes	a	bigger	cost,	i.e.	reports	of	widespread	sexual	violence,	for	the	state	to	agree	to	mediation	again.			 The	descriptive	analysis	shows	rebel	sexual	violence	is	reported	in	less	than	20%	 of	 all	 conflict	 years	 under	 investigation.	 This	 implies	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	small	 number	 of	 conflicts	 in	 which	 rebels	 are	 reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	violence	 might	 bias	 the	 results.	 Thus	 I	 run	 the	 models	 after	 excluding	 the	 five	conflicts	with	 the	highest	number	of	 years	 featuring	 reports	of	 sexual	 violence.13	The	main	results	remain	robust	(p	<	0.01).		 Military	 interventions	 can	 substantially	 alter	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 and	conflict	costs.	This	can	influence	the	type	and	level	of	violence,	for	example,	biased	interventions	are	 associated	with	 increasing	 levels	of	 sexual	 violence	 (Johansson	and	Sarwari	2017)	as	well	as	the	duration	and	outcome	(Linebarger	and	Enterline	2016).	Hence	 I	 run	a	 robustness	check	controlling	 for	biased	 interventions	using	data	from	Johansson	and	Sarwari	(2017).	Interventions	do	not	show	a	statistically	significant	 relationship	with	mediation	 onset	 and	 the	 association	 between	 rebel	sexual	violence	and	mediation	remains	unchanged.			 Previous	 work	 on	 civilian	 victimization	 shows	 that	 terrorist	 attacks	increase	the	likelihood	of	peace	talks	(Thomas	2014).	To	further	examine	this	logic	I	replace	rebel	one-sided	violence	with	measures	of	terrorist	attacks	in	civil	wars	(Polo	and	Gleditsch	2016).	Terrorist	attacks	do	not	show	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	the	onset	of	mediation.	However,	results	for	rebel	sexual	violence	remain	virtually	unchanged.	This	offers	further	support	to	the	argument	that	rebel																																																									
13	The	 five	 excluded	 conflicts	 exhibiting	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 years	 featuring	reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 are:	 Burundi,	 Sudan,	 Uganda,	 India’s	 Kashmir	conflict,	and	Sierra	Leone.	
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sexual	 violence	 is	 uniquely	 costly	 and	 thereby	 facilitates	 the	 onset	 of	mediation	compared	to	other	forms	of	civilian	violence	that	could	be	hurtful	to	the	state.		In	line	with	previous	work	(Thomas	2014),	the	main	results	show	that	the	type	of	government	matters	for	the	onset	of	talks.	To	ensure	that	this	is	not	simply	a	 matter	 of	 autocratic	 governments	 being	 less	 cost	 sensitive	 and	 that	 military	regimes	 are	 different	 to	 other	 autocratic	 regime	 types,	 I	 also	 run	 models	interacting	rebel	sexual	violence	with	democracy	and	replace	military	regime	with	
personalist	regime.	The	democracy	interaction	term	is	insignificant	suggesting	that	democratic	 accountability	 does	 not	 influence	 if	 reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	lead	 to	 mediation.	 In	 a	 personalist	 regime	 the	 dictator’s	 reputation	 is	 directly	bound	to	his/her	ability	 to	offer	protection	and	guarantee	safety,	meaning	public	reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 are	personal	 humiliations.	As	 a	 result	 I	 expect	 a	personalist	regime	 to	be	more	 susceptible	 to	 the	emasculation	effect	of	 reported	rebel	sexual	violence.	The	interaction	term	is	positive	and	statistically	significant	at	the	0.1-level	(p	=	0.08),	suggesting	that	mediation	is	more	 likely	when	rebels	are	reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 conflicts	 against	 personalist	 regimes.	Taken	together	these	results	strongly	support	the	emasculation	argument.		
3.7	Evidence	from	the	Sierra	Leone	civil	war	(1991-2002)	The	civil	war	in	Sierra	Leone	is	a	crucial	case	for	the	proposed	theory	because	the	rebels’	widespread	perpetration	of	 rape	makes	 it	 the	most	 likely	case	 to	observe	the	 causal	 link	 between	 sexual	 violence	 and	 mediation	 onset.	 The	 evidence	illustrates	that	the	civilian	government	explicitly	drew	on	the	gendered	notion	of	protecting	vulnerable	groups	to	justify	its	decision	to	hold	peace	talks	with	rebels,	although	they	had	brutalized	civilians,	unlike	the	temporary	military	regime,	which	hired	 a	 mercenary	 company	 to	 fight	 the	 rebels.	 A	 close	 examination	 of	 the	temporal	 variation	 in	 sexual	 violence	 also	 helps	 address	 potential	 problems	 of	reverse	 causality	 in	 the	 statistical	 analysis.	 The	 case	 study	 relies	 on	 data	 from	 a	multitude	of	sources,	including	speeches	by	the	President	of	Sierra	Leone,	data	of	violations	 reported	 by	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	(Gohdes	and	Ball	2010),	memoires,	international	a	organization	and	NGO	reports.		
	
Summary	of	the	war	The	 civil	 war	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 erupted	 in	 1991	 when	 the	 Revolutionary	 United	
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Front	 (RUF)	 supported	 by	 Liberian	 rebel-leader	 Charles	 Taylor	 attacked	 areas	around	the	eastern	border	with	the	goal	of	overthrowing	the	one-party	state	and	holding	 multiparty	 elections.	 In	 1992	 disaffected	 soldiers	 staged	 a	 coup	 that	overthrew	 the	 government	 and	 installed	 the	National	 Provisional	Ruling	 Council	(NPRC)	 led	 by	 Captain	 Valentine	 Strasser	with	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	 stopping	 the	rebels.	The	military	regime	of	 the	NPRC	 failed	 to	stop	 the	rebels	and	 in	 the	mid-1990s	 the	RUF	started	controlling	diamond-rich	 regions	as	 they	closed	 in	on	 the	capital	Freetown.	 In	response	 the	NPRC	hired	 the	mercenary	company	Executive	Outcomes	 to	 fight	 the	 RUF.	 In	 1995,	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Women’s	 Movement	 for	Peace	emerged	as	a	crucial	civil	society	actor	that	helped	create	the	conditions	for	democratic	 elections	 (Kaldor	 and	 Vincent	 2006).	 In	 1996,	 relying	 on	 Executive	Outcomes	 the	NPRC	 established	 enough	 stability	 to	 hold	 elections	 that	 elected	 a	civilian	 government,	 which	 signed	 an	 ECOWAS-mediated	 peace	 agreement	 in	Abidjan	 in	 November	 1996.	 In	 1997,	 however,	 the	 side-lined	 military	 staged	another	coup	exiling	President	Ahmad	Tejan	Kabbah	to	establish	the	Armed	Forces	Revolutionary	 Council	 (AFRC)	 and	 inviting	 the	 RUF	 to	 join	 them	 under	 the	leadership	 of	 Johnny	 Paul	 Koroma.	 The	 same	 year	 an	 ECOMOG	 peacekeeping	mission	 liberated	 Freetown	 and	 re-established	 President	 Kabbah’s	 civilian	government.	 In	 January	 1999,	 still	 controlling	 large	 portions	 of	 the	 country	 the	RUF	 launched	 what	 is	 now	 remembered	 as	 the	 6	 January	 invasion.	 The	 Civil	Defence	Forces	and	ECOMOG	troops	ultimately	repelled	 the	assault,	but	 the	 two-week	siege	resulted	 in	 the	highest	numbers	of	 reported	rapes	of	 the	conflict	and	thousands	 of	 deaths.	 In	 July	 1999,	 the	 government	 and	 the	 RUF	 signed	 a	 peace	agreement	 mediated	 by	 ECOWAS	 leaders	 in	 Lomé,	 Togo.	 Despite	 continued	instability	over	the	next	two	years,	this	proved	to	be	a	fundamental	step	towards	the	official	end	of	the	war	in	2002.		
	
Wartime	sexual	violence	and	mediation	Analysis	 of	 data	 obtained	 from	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	Commission	 demonstrates	 that	 while	 lethal	 and	 sexual	 violence	 seem	 to	 be	correlated,	the	highest	number	of	killings	was	reported	in	the	first	year	of	the	war	1991,	 and	 the	 peak	 in	 reported	 rapes	 in	 1999	 (Figure	 4).14	This	 difference	 of																																																									
14 	Data	 obtained	 from	 Anita	 Gohdes	 and	 Patrick	 Ball	 (2010)	 Benetech/ABA-CEELI/Human	Rights	Data	Analysis	Group	database	of	violations	reported	by	the	
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incident	numbers	suggests	that	the	effects	of	lethal	and	sexual	violence	might	also	differ.	While	 sexual	 violence	was	 reported	 in	 every	 year	 of	 the	 conflict,	 analysis	shows	two	distinct	peaks	with	large	increases	during	two	of	the	most	intense	years	of	 the	 conflict:	 1995	 and	 1999.	 In	 both	 cases	 the	 civilian	 government	 initiated	mediation	processes	 following	peaks	of	 rebel	 sexual	violence	 (Figure	5).	 In	1995	intensive	 civil	 society	 mobilization,	 especially	 from	 women,	 was	 influential	 in	creating	 conditions	 for	 democratic	 elections	 and	 impressing	 upon	 the	 NPRC	 the	need	 to	engage	 in	a	mediation	process	 (Hayner	2007;	Kaldor	and	Vincent	2006).	Whereas	 the	NPRC	 sought	 to	win	by	all	means	 including	hiring	mercenaries,	 the	democratically	 elected	 government	 in	 1996	 signed	 the	 ECOWAS-mediated	agreement,	which	nonetheless	failed	to	stabilize	the	country.		Throughout	 1998	 the	 government	 attempted	 to	 defeat	 the	 rebels	 on	 the	battlefield,	rejecting	the	notion	of	peace	talks.	This	abruptly	changed	after	the	RUF	offensive	in	January	1999,	in	which	rebels	raped	and	abducted	thousands	of	girls	and	 women	 (Hayner	 2007).	 The	 offensive	 was	 widely	 regarded	 as	 the	 ‘most	intensive	 and	 concentrated	 period	 of	 human	 rights	 violations’	 in	 the	 civil	 war	(HRW	 1999).	 Throughout	 the	 offensive	 rebels	 perpetrated	 widespread	 sexual	violence	including	individual	and	gang	rape,	sexual	assault	with	objects,	and	sexual	slavery.	 This	 sparked	 a	 strong	 response	 from	 international	 organizations	 (HRW	2001).	 Under	 pressure	 from	 the	 international	 community,	 faced	 with	 relatively	strong	 rebels,	 and	 its	 weakness	 exposed,	 the	 government	 renewed	 its	 peace	efforts.			 	






		Two	weeks	 after	RUF	 invasion	of	 Freetown	and	 throughout	 the	 following	months	President	Kabbah	repeatedly	addressed	the	nation	and	the	RUF	calling	for	peace	talks.	His	speeches	reminded	citizens	of	the	 ‘heinous	barbarity’	of	the	RUF,	explicitly	 addressing	 the	 traumatizing	 rapes	 and	 the	 calls	 for	 surrender	 from	government	supporters.	Carefully	treading	the	line	justifying	both	use	of	force	and	peace	talks,	the	President	above	all	stressed	the	importance	of	protecting	citizens	and	 finding	 a	 long-term	 solution:	 “Let	 me	 reassure	 you	 that	 while	 security	 and	protection	 of	 our	 citizens	 have	 been	 and	 continue	 to	 be	 our	 primary	 concern,	especially	during	the	past	few	weeks,	Government	has	never,	ever	abandoned	the	search	 for	 a	peaceful	 settlement	of	 the	 conflict”	 (Kabbah	1999a).	He	appealed	 to	the	RUF	to	 free	abducted	children,	emphasizing	their	status	as	 innocent	civilians.	Such	 calls	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 vulnerable	 groups,	 i.e.	 women	 and	 children,	 are	deeply	 gendered	 (Carpenter	2005)	 and	 serve	 to	 reinforce	 the	paternal	 protector	position	 of	 the	 government	 (Young	 2003).	 In	 these	 speeches	 the	 invasion	 of	Freetown	was	a	constant	reminder	of	how	the	RUF	had	exposed	the	government’s	weakness	and	inability	to	protect	its	citizens:			
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“This	 is	why	we	 appeal	 to	 the	 RUF,	 their	 allies,	 arms	 suppliers,	 and	supporters,	 to	 immediately	 release	 our	 children,	 including	 those	whom	 they	 abducted	 during	 their	 invasion	 of	 our	 capital	 in	 January	this	year.	We	say	to	them:	PLEASE,	LET	OUR	CHILDREN	GO!	RELEASE	THEM	IMMEDIATELY!”	(emphasis	in	the	original	Kabbah	1999b)		The	 widespread	 sexual	 violence	 during	 the	 two-week	 siege	 intensified	international	 pressure	 for	 a	 peaceful	 resolution.	 Starting	 in	 late	 January	 1999,	regional,	 international	 actors	 such	 as	 the	 Special	 Representative	 of	 the	 UN	Secretary-General	 for	 Sierra	 Leone,	 and	 civil	 society	 actors	 including	 the	 Inter-Religious	 Council	 and	 Women’s	 Movement	 lobbied	 both	 President	 Kabbah	 and	RUF	leader	Sankoh	to	negotiate	(Okai	et	al.	2014).	In	May,	ECOWAS-mediated	talks	began	 in	Lomé,	Togo,	which	ended	 in	 the	 July	agreement.	President	Kabbah	took	an	 8-year	 old	 girl	 whose	 mother	 had	 been	 murdered	 and	 who	 had	 an	 arm	amputated	by	 rebels	with	him	 to	 the	 signing	 ceremony,	 a	 gesture	 that	 reminded	the	 people	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 of	 the	 horrors	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 and	 his	 role	 as	 their	protector	in	ending	the	atrocities	(Penfold	2012,	151).	Observers	deemed	Kabbah	sincere	and	righteous,	but	politically	inexperienced	and	weak	(sic!)	for	relenting	to	international	 pressure	 to	 accommodate	 RUF	 demands	 (Penfold	 2012).	 Human	Rights	 Watch	 held	 the	 lenient	 amnesty	 provisions	 in	 the	 Lomé	 agreement	responsible	for	creating	an	atmosphere	of	impunity	(2001).	Importantly,	however,	the	 timeline	 clearly	 shows	 that	 neither	 the	mediation	nor	 the	 agreement	 caused	the	sexual	violence.			
3.8	Discussion	This	 study	 contributes	 to	 both	 the	 expanding	 body	 of	 literature	 focusing	 on	mediation	 in	 civil	wars	 and	 sexual	 violence	 in	 armed	 conflict.	 It	 provides	 robust	evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 principal	 theoretical	 argument	 and	 the	 hypotheses	derived	 from	 it.	Mediation	 is	more	 likely	when	rebels	are	reported	 to	perpetrate	sexual	 violence	 because	 public	 knowledge	 of	 this	 victimization	 threatens	 the	state’s	 masculinity	 by	 exposing	 the	 government’s	 lack	 of	 control	 and	 power.	Accordingly,	the	state	seeks	to	stop	the	conflict	and	thereby	the	sexual	violence	via	mediation.	 This	 finding	 supports	 preceding	 work	 that	 shows	 that	 governments	respond	to	 the	victimization	of	 their	citizens	(Thomas	2014;	Wood	and	Kathman	2014).	 This	 study	 provides	 more	 evidence	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 analyzing	 the	
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Independent	Variables		The	SVAC	dataset	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014)	defines	sexual	violence	as	(1)	rape,	(2)	sexual	 slavery,	 (3)	 forced	 prostitution,	 (4)	 forced	 pregnancy,	 (5)	 forced	sterilization/abortion,	(6)	sexual	mutilation,	and	(7)	sexual	torture.	This	does	not	exclude	 the	 existence	 of	 female	 perpetrators	 and/or	male	 victims.	 Excluded	 are	acts	 that	do	not	go	beyond	verbal	sexual	harassment,	abuse	or	 threats,	 including	sexualized	 insults,	 forced	 nudity,	 or	 verbal	 humiliation.	 A	 descriptive	 analysis	shows	that	there	are	only	13	observations	for	rebels	perpetrating	massive	sexual	violence,	 hence	 I	 merge	 categories	 2	 and	 3,	 making	 it	 a	 three-point	 ordinal	measure	 (0	 -	no	 sexual	 violence	 reported,	1	 -	 some	sexual	 violence	 reported,	2	 -	widespread/massive	sexual	violence	reported).	
	
Frequency	table	for	different	sexual	violence	variables	values		 Rebel	SV	dummy	 State	SV	dummy	 Rebel	SV	3-pt	ordinal		 State	SV	3-pt	ordinal		 Rebel	SV	4-pt	ordinal	 State	SV	4-pt	ordinal		0	 584	 398	 584	 398	 584	 398	1	 133	 318	 83	 232	 83	 232	2	 -	 -	 50	 86	 37	 66	3	 -	 -	 	 -	 13	 20	-99	 284	 284	 284	 284	 284	 284	
		
Dependent	Variables		
Mediation.	 This	 variable	 is	 dichotomous,	 indicating	 for	 each	 conflict	 year	 if	 a	mediation	effort	started:	0	=	no	mediation,	1	=	onset	of	mediation.			The	Civil	War	Mediation	dataset	(DeRouen,	Bercovitch	&	Pospiezna,	2011)	defines	mediation	 as	 ‘a	 process	 of	 conflict	 management	 where	 disputants	 seek	 the	assistance	 of,	 or	 accept	 an	 offer	 of	 help	 from,	 an	 individual,	 group,	 or	 state,	 or	organization	to	settle	their	conflict	or	resolve	their	differences	without	resorting	to	physical	 force	 or	 invoking	 the	 authority	 of	 law’	 (Bercovitch,	 Anagnoson	&	Wille,	
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1991:	8).	I	coded	the	missing	years	(2005-2009)	based	on	a	Lexis-Nexis	search	for	each	 country	 conflict	 year.	 Search	 words	 included:	 mediation,	 peace	 talks,	negotiation,	and	ceasefire	talks.	
	
Robustness	Checks	Model	2.3	–	Logistic	regression	without	controls		 	 (2.3)	Rebel	sexual	violence	 1.077***		 [0.605,1.548]	Government	sexual	violence	 -0.038		 [-0.462,0.386]	Constant	 -1.064***		 [-1.545,-0.583]	AIC	 850.29	Area	under	ROC	 0.580	Wald-chi2	 20.30(2)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -422.45	
N	 716	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	
*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001			Model	2.4	–	Lagged	independent	variables	Model	2.5	–	Logistic	regression	including	control	for	mediation	in	previous	year		Model	2.6	–	Logistic	regression	including	ordinal	measure	of	sexual	violence,	control	for	mediation	in	previous	year			 	 (2.4)	 (2.5)	 (2.6)	Rebel	SV	(lag)	 0.984*	 	 		 [0.199,1.769]	 	 	Gov’t	SV	(lag)	 -0.336	 	 		 [-0.928,0.256]	 	 	Rebel	SV	 	 0.496t	 		 	 [-0.075,1.067]	 	Gov’t	SV	 	 0.224	 		 	 [-0.330,0.778]	 	Some	rebel	SV	 	 	 0.460		 	 	 [-0.100,1.021]	Widespread	rebel	SV	 	 	 0.976*		 	 	 [0.094,1.858]	Some	gov’t	SV	 	 	 0.343		 	 	 [-0.245,0.930]	Widespread	gov’t	SV	 	 	 -0.301		 	 	 [-1.154,0.552]	
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Duration	 0.051	 -0.007	 -0.006		 [-0.086,0.187]	 [-0.113,0.100]	 [-0.114,0.102]	Duration2	 -0.001	 0.000	 0.000		 [-0.005,0.003]	 [-0.003,0.003]	 [-0.003,0.003]	Intensity	 -0.046	 0.093	 0.113		 [-0.791,0.700]	 [-0.551,0.736]	 [-0.549,0.775]	Parallel	conflict	 0.710	 0.375	 0.353		 [-0.189,1.609]	 [-0.401,1.152]	 [-0.430,1.136]	Type	of	conflict	 0.545	 0.936*	 0.893*		 [-0.532,1.623]	 [0.117,1.754]	 [0.011,1.774]	Neighbor	civil	war	 0.019	 -0.044	 -0.013		 [-0.770,0.808]	 [-0.705,0.616]	 [-0.681,0.654]	Rebel	strength	 2.028*	 0.950t	 0.918t		 [0.428,3.628]	 [-0.042,1.942]	 [-0.068,1.904]	Rebel	one-sided	violence	 -0.010	 -0.070	 -0.087		 [-0.133,0.113]	 [-0.186,0.045]	 [-0.204,0.030]	Gov’t	one-sided	violence	 0.040	 -0.007	 0.019		 [-0.109,0.190]	 [-0.121,0.107]	 [-0.095,0.134]	Democracy	 1.153*	 0.473	 0.496		 [0.034,2.272]	 [-0.299,1.245]	 [-0.257,1.248]	Democratic	aid	 0.229*	 0.161t	 0.163t		 [0.022,0.437]	 [-0.020,0.342]	 [-0.017,0.343]	Autocratic	aid	 -0.092	 -0.036	 -0.032		 [-0.210,0.027]	 [-0.135,0.064]	 [-0.128,0.063]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 0.290	 0.225	 0.226		 [-0.294,0.874]	 [-0.190,0.639]	 [-0.193,0.644]	Population	(ln)	 -0.792***	 -0.462**	 -0.448**		 [-1.180,-0.405]	 [-0.790,-0.134]	 [-0.770,-0.125]	Mediation	previous	year	 	 2.837***	 2.936***		 	 [2.344,3.329]	 [2.421,3.451]	Constant	 10.25***	 5.120*	 4.831*		 [4.155,16.35]	 [0.416,9.824]	 [0.202,9.460]	AIC	 452.379	 508.114	 508.669	Area	under	ROC	 0.790	 0.849	 0.856	Wald-chi2	 86.09(16)	 	329.34(17)	 364.69(19)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -209.189	 -236.057	 -234.334	
N	 413	 564	 564	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 	 				 	
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Model	2.7	–	Logistic	regression,	limited	sample	that	excludes	five	conflicts	featuring	highest	number	of	years	with	reports	of	sexual	violence		Excluded	conflicts		







Burundi	 90	 10	out	of	16	 60	Sudan	 113	 15	out	of	20	 75	Uganda	 118	 14	out	of	18	 78	India	(Kashmir	insurgency)	 169	 12	out	of	20	 60	Sierra	Leone	 187	 8	out	10	 80		
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Area	under	ROC	 0.772	Wald-chi2	 76.60(16)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -245.437	
N	 486	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 				Model	2.9	–	Logistic	regression	including	interaction	of	sexual	violence	and	democratic	aid	Model	2.10	–	Logistic	regression	including	interaction	of	rebel	sexual	violence	and	democratic	aid	Model	2.11	–	Logistic	regression	including	interaction	of	state	sexual	violence	and	democratic	aid		 	 (2.9)	 (2.10)	 (2.11)	Conflict	SV	 0.139	 	 		 [-1.055,1.333]	 	 	Conflict	SV	x	Democratic	aid	 0.150	 	 		 [-0.167,0.467]	 	 	Rebel	SV	 0.560t	 0.928*	 0.668*		 [-0.060,1.180]	 [0.005,1.852]	 [0.131,1.204]	Rebel	SV	x	Democratic	aid	 	 -0.064	 		 	 [-0.365,0.237]	 	Gov’t	SV	 -0.310	 0.139	 -0.561		 [-1.387,0.767]	 [-0.378,0.655]	 [-1.759,0.636]	Gov’t	SV	x	Democratic	aid	 	 	 0.255		 	 	 [-0.163,0.674]	Duration	 0.059	 0.060	 0.058		 [-0.058,0.175]	 [-0.059,0.178]	 [-0.057,0.173]	Duration2	 -0.001	 -0.001	 -0.001		 [-0.005,0.002]	 [-0.005,0.002]	 [-0.005,0.002]	Intensity	 -0.072	 -0.118	 -0.077		 [-0.738,0.594]	 [-0.760,0.524]	 [-0.740,0.586]	Parallel	conflict	 0.525	 0.506	 0.464		 [-0.269,1.320]	 [-0.317,1.328]	 [-0.348,1.276]	Type	of	conflict	 0.569	 0.503	 0.542		 [-0.273,1.412]	 [-0.371,1.377]	 [-0.300,1.384]	Neighbor	civil	war	 -0.140	 -0.133	 -0.130		 [-0.819,0.539]	 [-0.847,0.580]	 [-0.788,0.528]	Rebel	strength	 1.507*	 1.504**	 1.473*		 [0.344,2.670]	 [0.371,2.636]	 [0.337,2.609]	Rebel	one-sided	violence	 -0.005	 0.004	 -0.006		 [-0.122,0.112]	 [-0.111,0.120]	 [-0.119,0.107]	Gov’t	one-sided	violence	 0.030	 0.031	 0.026		 [-0.091,0.152]	 [-0.088,0.150]	 [-0.093,0.146]	Democracy	 0.650	 0.643	 0.677		 [-0.201,1.500]	 [-0.212,1.498]	 [-0.163,1.517]	Democratic	aid	 0.133	 0.189*	 0.136t	
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	 [-0.040,0.305]	 [0.001,0.378]	 [-0.021,0.293]	Autocratic	aid	 -0.039	 -0.044	 -0.041		 [-0.129,0.051]	 [-0.134,0.046]	 [-0.132,0.050]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 0.321	 0.337	 0.336		 [-0.147,0.790]	 [-0.131,0.805]	 [-0.124,0.796]	Population	(ln)	 -0.641***	 -0.630***	 -0.670***		 [-0.967,-0.316]	 [-0.973,-0.286]	 [-0.989,-0.352]	Constant	 8.295***	 7.957**	 8.814***		 [3.404,13.18]	 [2.797,13.12]	 [3.972,13.66]	AIC	 622.155	 622.153	 618.849	Area	under	ROC	 0.764	 0.759	 0.765	Wald-chi2	 80.94(18)	 	76.48(17)	 78.89(17)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -292.077	 -293.077	 -291.425	
N	 564	 564	 564	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 	 				Model	2.12	–	Logistic	regression	including	interaction	of	rebel	sexual	violence	and	democracy			Model	2.13	–	Logistic	regression	including	interaction	of	rebel	sexual	violence	and	personalist	regime			 (2.12)	 (2.13)	Rebel	SV	 0.868*	 0.334		 [0.142,1.594]	 [-0.373,1.041]	Gov’t	SV	 0.125	 0.123		 [-0.401,0.651]	 [-0.421,0.666]	Democracy	 0.702	 0.869		 [-0.232,1.635]	 [-0.047,1.785]	Rebel	SV	x	Democracy		 -0.363	 		 [-1.593,0.867]	 	Personalist	regime	 	 0.027		 	 [-0.948,1.001]	Rebel	SV	x	Personalist	regime	 	 1.096t		 	 [-0.130,2.323]	Duration	 0.057	 0.054		 [-0.061,0.174]	 [-0.067,0.174]	Duration2	 -0.001	 -0.001		 [-0.005,0.002]	 [-0.005,0.002]	Intensity	 -0.097	 -0.015		 [-0.752,0.558]	 [-0.644,0.613]	Parallel	conflict	 0.504	 0.518		 [-0.304,1.313]	 [-0.312,1.348]	Type	of	conflict	 0.494	 0.445		 [-0.408,1.395]	 [-0.312,1.202]	Neighbor	civil	war	 -0.158	 -0.303		 [-0.838,0.522]	 [-0.996,0.390]	
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Rebel	strength	 1.508**	 1.446*		 [0.368,2.648]	 [0.339,2.552]	Rebel	one-sided	violence	 -0.001	 -0.016		 [-0.116,0.114]	 [-0.130,0.100]	Gov’t	one-sided	violence	 0.027	 0.007		 [-0.090,0.144]	 [-0.106,0.120]	Democratic	aid	 0.175*	 0.141*		 [0.021,0.328]	 [0.004,0.278]	Autocratic	aid	 -0.046	 -0.051		 [-0.134,0.043]	 [-0.144,0.042]	GDP	per	capita	(ln)	 0.329	 0.207		 [-0.135,0.794]	 [-0.273,0.686]	Population	(ln)	 -0.623***	 -0.657***		 [-0.959,-0.288]	 [-1.004,-0.310]	Constant	 7.886**	 8.651**		 [2.858,12.91]	 [3.461,13.84]	AIC	 621.923	 609.162	Area	under	ROC	 0.761	 0.770	Wald-chi2	 79.26(17)	 92.82(18)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -292.962	 -285.581	
N	 564	 554	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 			Model	2.14	–	Logistic	regression	including	intervention	control		 	 (2.14)	Rebel	SV	 0.789**		 [0.215,1.363]	Gov’t	SV	 0.113		 [-0.433,0.660]	Duration	 0.056		 [-0.063,0.175]	Duration2	 -0.001		 [-0.005,0.002]	Intensity	 -0.100		 [-0.762,0.561]	Parallel	conflict	 0.533		 [-0.337,1.403]	Type	of	conflict	 0.434		 [-0.519,1.387]	Neighbor	civil	war	 -0.148		 [-0.861,0.564]	Rebel	strength	 1.524**		 [0.387,2.662]	Rebel	one-sided	violence	 0.016		 [-0.097,0.129]	Gov’t	one-sided	violence	 0.039		 [-0.083,0.160]	Democracy	 0.688		 [-0.184,1.560]	Democratic	aid	 0.166*	
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4.1	Abstract	To	what	extent	does	sexual	violence	influence	the	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence?	Despite	 a	 substantive	 body	 of	 research	 that	 explores	 conflict	 recurrence,	 the	literature	has	 largely	neglected	the	role	rebel	group	dynamics.	 I	address	 this	gap	arguing	that	rebel	sexual	violence	in	 inactive	periods	is	associated	with	a	greater	risk	 of	 conflict	 recurrence.	 Specifically,	 building	 on	 research	 that	 shows	 an	association	 between	 recruitment	 and	 rape	 as	 a	 socialization	method	during	 civil	war,	 I	 contend	 that	when	 rebels	perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	periods	 it	indicates	ongoing	mobilization	efforts.	 I	derive	four	observable	implications	from	this	argument,	which	I	systematically	test	on	all	intrastate	post-conflict	years	from	1989	to	2015	using	the	updated	Sexual	Violence	in	Armed	Conflict	dataset	and	the	Armed	 Conflict	 Termination	 dataset.	 The	 results	 provide	 robust	 support	 for	 the	argument	 that	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 escalation	 of	violence	and	conflict	recurrence.	This	presents	an	important	addition	to	the	state-centric	conflict	recurrence	literature	and	opens	new	avenues	for	the	research	and	practice	of	conflict	resolution.	 	
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4.2	Introduction	In	 1990,	 the	 Movement	 of	 the	 Democratic	 Forces	 of	 the	 Casamance	 (MFDC)	pursued	an	armed	struggle	for	an	independent	region	in	Senegal.	At	the	end	of	May	1991	the	group	signed	a	ceasefire	agreement,	however,	the	peace	did	not	last.	The	group	was	fraught	with	internal	rifts	and	substantial	parts	of	the	MFDC	renounced	the	 agreement.	 While	 some	 laid	 down	 their	 arms,	 a	 faction	 of	 the	 MFDC	 called	Front	 Sud	 resumed	 fighting	 in	 September	 1992.	 The	 interim	 ‘peace’	 period,	May	1991	 –	 September	 1992,	 and	 particularly	 the	months	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 conflict	recurrence	were	marked	by	widespread	sexual	violence	by	MFDC	members.	In	its	annual	 country	 report	 on	 human	 rights	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 noted	 that	 the	MFDC	frequently	raped	women	in	attacks	on	villages	in	the	first	half	of	1992.	Why	did	 the	 MFDC	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 this	 ‘peace’	 period?	 Is	 it	 actually	 a	‘peace’	 period	 if	 a	 group	 perpetrates	 sexual	 violence?	 And	 how	 is	 the	 sexual	violence	connected	to	the	return	to	active	conflict?	The	example	of	the	MFDC	raises	a	number	of	questions	and	calls	 for	a	systematic	 investigation	of	 the	relationship	between	sexual	violence	and	conflict	recurrence.	Accordingly,	this	article	explores	the	question	to	what	extent	does	rebel	sexual	violence	in	inactive	periods	influence	the	likelihood	of	returning	to	armed	conflict?			 Conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 is	 a	 critical	 issue	 of	 human	 security	 and	related	 research	 has	 grown	 substantially	 in	 recent	 years.	 Studies	 have	 primarily	focused	 on	 explaining	 causes	 of	 sexual	 violence	 during	 armed	 conflict.	 A	 few	studies	 have	 started	 to	 investigate	 the	 effects	 of	 sexual	 violence	 during	 active	conflicts	 (Chu	 and	 Braithwaite	 2018;	 Hultman	 and	 Johansson	 2017;	 Kreutz	 and	Cardenas	 2017),	 however,	 we	 still	 know	 very	 little	 about	 the	 effects	 of	 sexual	violence	after	the	fighting	officially	stops	and	its	effects	on	the	durability	of	peace.		Conflict	recurrence	presents	a	common	threat	to	human	security,	stability,	and	development	and	has	generated	a	substantial	body	of	literature.	Research	has	focused	 primarily	 on	 structural	 factors	 that	 shape	 the	 likelihood	 of	 renewed	conflicts	such	as	lootable	resources	and	good	governance	(Hegre	and	Nygård	2015;	Rustad	 and	 Binningsbø	 2012;	 Walter	 2004,	 2015).	 Recent	 research	 has	 begun	investigating	 the	 role	 of	 rebel	 group	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 child	soldiers	 and	 group	 fragmentation	 (Haer	 and	Böhmelt	 2016;	 Rudloff	 and	 Findley	2016).	However,	in	comparison	to	the	structural	factors	we	still	know	surprisingly	little	 about	 how	 rebel	 groups’	 organizational	 dynamics	 influence	 conflict	
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recurrence.	Hence	 this	paper	offers	a	significant	contribution	 to	both	 the	conflict	recurrence	 and	 sexual	 violence	 literature	 in	 demonstrating	 that	 rebel	 sexual	violence	in	 inactive	conflict	periods	is	associated	with	a	greater	risk	of	escalating	violence	and	conflict	recurrence.			 Building	on	Dara	Kay	Cohen’s	research	that	shows	an	association	between	recruitment	 and	 rape	 as	 a	 socialization	method	 during	 civil	 war	 (Cohen	 2013a,	2016,	2017),	I	argue	that	rebel	sexual	violence	in	inactive	conflict	years	indicates	that	groups’	continue	to	mobilize	and	recruit	fighters.	Reports	of	sexual	violence	in	inactive	conflict	periods	demonstrate	that	an	identifiable	group	continues	to	exist	and	is	capable	of	perpetrating	violence	at	a	detectable	level.	Additionally,	I	contend	that	 sexual	 violence	 is	 a	 sign	 of	mobilization	 because	 recruits	 perpetrate	 sexual	violence	 to	 build	 trust	 and	 social	 cohesion	 within	 the	 group,	 which	 increases	 a	group’s	capability	and	military	effectiveness.	Hence	I	argue	that	conflicts	are	more	likely	 to	 recur	when	 rebels	maintain	 and	build	 capabilities	 through	perpetrating	sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 conflict	 years.	 Therefore	 I	 expect	 that	 rebel	 sexual	violence	during	inactive	conflict	years	is	associated	with	the	subsequent	escalation	of	lethal	violence	and	conflict	recurrence.			The	rest	of	the	article	proceeds	as	follows.	First,	I	briefly	define	active	and	inactive	 conflict	 and	 review	 the	 literature	 on	 conflict	 recurrence	 and	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence.	 Second,	 I	 develop	 my	 theoretical	 argument	 that	 when	rebels	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 periods	 it	 indicates	 ongoing	mobilization	efforts	and	derive	observable	implications	from	it.	Third,	I	turn	to	an	empirical	test	of	my	argument.	For	this	I	use	categorical	choice	and	count	models	to	 examine	 the	 escalation	 of	 violence	 and	 conflict	 recurrence	 in	 intrastate	 post-conflict	years	in	121	conflicts	across	70	countries	drawn	from	the	2015	version	of	the	 Uppsala/PRIO	 Armed	 Conflict	 Termination	 dataset	 (Kreutz	 2010).	 Data	 on	sexual	 violence	 come	 from	 an	 updated	 version	 of	 the	 Sexual	 Violence	 in	 Armed	Conflict	dataset	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014).	The	results	indicate	that	the	escalation	of	 violence	 and	 return	 to	 active	 conflict	 is	 more	 likely	 when	 rebel	 groups	perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 periods.	 I	 conclude	 by	 discussing	 the	implications	for	policy	and	future	research.				 	
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4.3	Previous	research	
Conflict	recurrence	In	keeping	with	 the	dominant	approach	 in	systematic	conflict	research,	 I	adopt	a	narrow	 violence-based	 definition	 of	 armed	 conflict	 that	 distinguishes	 between	active	and	inactive	(or	post-conflict)	years	based	on	yearly	levels	of	lethal	violence	between	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 (Kreutz	 2010).	 A	 conflict	 is	 deemed	 active	when	 it	 fulfills	 three	 criteria	 ‘(1)	 a	 stated	 incompatibility	 (government	 and/or	territory),	(2)	organized	groups	of	which	at	least	one	is	the	government	of	a	state,	and	 (3)	 armed	 activity	 resulting	 in	 at	 least	 25	 deaths,	 all	 of	 which	 must	 be	observed	in	a	given	calendar	year’	(Kreutz	2010,	244).	According	to	this	definition	a	 conflict	 (temporarily)	 ends	or	 is	 considered	 inactive	when	violence	 falls	below	the	threshold	of	25	battle-related	deaths	in	a	calendar	year.		The	 risk	 factors	 that	 render	 countries	 vulnerable	 to	 armed	 conflict	 in	 the	first	 instance	 are	 also	 associated	with	 recurring	 conflicts	 because	 armed	 conflict	exacerbates	 the	 underlying	 economic	 and	 political	 problems	 (Fearon	 and	 Laitin	2003;	 Rustad	 and	 Binningsbø	 2012;	 Weinstein	 2007;	 Walter	 2004;	 Hegre	 and	Sambanis	2006;	Quinn,	Mason,	and	Gurses	2007).	Accordingly,	the	majority	of	the	conflict	recurrence	 literature	 focus	on	structural	 factors	 that	shape	opportunities	for	conflict	such	as	natural	resources,	geography,	good	governance,	state	size	and	capability	(Hegre	and	Nygård	2015;	Mason	et	al.	2011;	Quinn,	Mason,	and	Gurses	2007;	Rustad	and	Binningsbø	2012;	Walter	2004,	2015).	This	state-centered	focus	on	 the	 flipside	means	 that	 the	 literature	pays	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 role	 of	 rebel	group	capabilities	for	conflict	recurrence.	Only	 recently	 has	 research	 on	 organizational	 legacies	 of	 conflict	 gained	traction	 (Zukerman	 Daly	 2012).	 Research	 shows	 that	 ex-combatants	 often	maintain	close	 ties	 to	each	other	(Humphreys	and	Weinstein	2004,	2007;	Nussio	and	Oppenheim	2014;	Pugel	2007;	Wiegink	2015).	 In	particular	combatants	who	participated	in	more	abusive	acts	accrue	anti-social	capital	that	goes	hand	in	hand	with	greater	 in-group	bonding	and	greater	distrust	of	 the	 state	 (Humphreys	and	Weinstein	2007;	Nussio	and	Oppenheim	2014).	However,	these	close	ties	and	anti-social	 capital	 do	 not	 always	 lead	 to	 the	 resumption	 of	 conflict.	 It	 takes	entrepreneurs	 and	 interlocutors	 who	 offer	 selective	 incentives	 and	 re-activate	networks	 (Themnér	 2013).	 This	 research	 shows	 how	 abusive	 behavior	 creates	lasting	ties	and	highlights	the	importance	of	organizational	dynamics	and	legacies.	
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However,	 so	 far	 there	 has	 not	 been	 a	 systematic	 cross-national	 analysis	 of	 the	relationship	 between	 violent	 organizational	 legacies	 based	 on	 abusive	 behavior	and	conflict	recurrence.	 I	 fill	 this	gap,	arguing	that	when	rebel	groups	perpetrate	sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 conflict	 years,	 it	 indicates	 ongoing	 mobilization	 and	capability	 building	 efforts,	 which	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 escalation	 of	violence	to	levels	of	active	armed	conflict.	This	presents	a	valuable	contribution	to	our	understanding	of	how	organizational	dynamics	can	influence	the	likelihood	of	conflict	 recurrence	 (Kaplan	 and	 Nussio	 2018;	 Nussio	 and	 Oppenheim	 2014;	Themnér	2013;	Zukerman	Daly	2012).		
	
Conflict-related	sexual	violence	Until	 recently,	 rape	 in	 and	 after	 conflict	 has	 been	 overwhelmingly	 treated	 as	 an	unfortunate,	but	expected,	if	not	inevitable,	side	effect	of	war	–	a	means	for	victors	to	 exact	 their	 revenge	 and	 dominance	 over	 the	 other	 side	 (Card	 1996;	 Seifert	1996).	Another	common	narrative	is	the	use	of	sexual	violence	as	a	weapon,	tool,	or	tactic	of	war	(Crawford	2017).	However,	there	is	little	evidence	of	commanders	ordering	 combatants	 to	 rape	 (Cohen	 2016;	 Wood	 forthcoming).	 Put	 differently,	there	 is	 very	 little	 support	 for	 the	 notion	 that	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 during,	 let	alone	after	armed	conflict,	presents	a	coordinated	effort	to	fight	the	state	by	other	means.	It	is	more	plausible	that	combatants	have	more	opportunities	to	perpetrate	sexual	 violence	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 conflict.	War	 causes	 the	 breakdown	of	 social	and	political	order,	the	weakening	of	social	norms,	and	results	in	opportunities	to	literally	 loot,	 rape,	 and	 pillage	 (Goldstein	 2001,	 335;	 Wood	 2008).	 Following	internal	 conflict	 states	 are	 often	 limited	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 enforce	 order	 and	provide	good	governance	(Hegre	and	Nygård	2015;	Walter	2015).	In	other	words,	the	 lawless	nature	of	war	and	 its	 aftermath	exposes	 some	men’s	 latent	desire	 to	rape	and	enables	them	to	pursue	it,	if	there	is	a	lack	of	control,	accountability,	and	norm	 enforcement	 (Butler,	 Gluch,	 and	 Mitchell	 2007).15	However,	 following	 this	argument,	individuals,	not	the	group,	commit	sexual	violence	in	inactive	years	for	personal	motives	without	any	connection	to	the	logic	and	dynamics	of	the	political	conflict.	 Hence,	 according	 to	 this	 argument,	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive																																																									
15	On	the	other	hand,	when	leadership	exerts	significant	influence	on	its	members,	prohibits	 sexual	 violence	 and	 rigorously	 enforces	 punishment	 of	 any	transgressions,	it	can	effectively	curtail	it,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Tamil	Tigers	in	Sri	Lanka	(Wood	2009,	149).	
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periods	 should	 have	 no	 (or	 even	 a	 negative)	 effect	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 violence	returning	to	levels	of	armed	conflict.		In	 contrast,	 recent	 research	 considers	 sexual	 violence	 a	 practice	 resulting	from	 social	 interactions	 rather	 than	 individual	 desires	 or	 organizational	 policy	(Wood	 2014,	 forthcoming).	 As	 a	 practice,	 sexual	 violence	 emerges	 out	 of	 group	dynamics	 of	 combatants	 imitating	 the	 behavior	 of	 other	 group	members	 rather	than	 following	 individual	 impulses	 or	 commanders’	 orders	 (Wood	 2014,	forthcoming).	 Research	 in	 psychology,	 military	 sociology,	 and	 history	 illustrates	that	 social	 pressure	 is	 particularly	 strong	 in	 extreme	 situations	 such	 as	 combat,	which	 facilitates	 the	emergence	of	violent	group	practices	 (Brown	2000;	Muñoz-Rojas	and	Frésard	2004;	Wood	2009).	Based	on	this	understanding	sexual	violence	across	 active	 and	 inactive	 years	 indicates	 that	 the	 group	 not	 only	 continues	 to	exist,	 but	 also	 that	 it	 has	 retained	 combatants	 socialized	 in	 practices	 of	 sexual	violence,	which	 they	 continue	 to	 carry	out	making	 them	part	of	 the	 socialization	process	of	new	recruits.				Groups	 frequently	 use	 violence	 to	 integrate	 new	 recruits,	 to	 provide	structure,	 and	 to	maintain	 social	 order	within	 the	 organization	 (Humphreys	 and	Weinstein	 2008).	 Sexual	 violence	 takes	 on	 a	 particular	 role	 as	 a	 socialization	method	 within	 armed	 organizations’	 repertoire.	 Socializing	 recruits	 frequently	includes	 rituals	 designed	 for	 them	 to	 prove	 their	 masculinity,	 to	 suppress	 their	identity	 and	 emotions,	 as	 well	 as	 feminize	 ‘others’	 (Goldstein	 2001;	 Whitworth	2004).	 For	 example,	 a	 study	of	 the	Canadian	Airborne	Regiment	 found	members	building	 loyalty	 and	 friendships	 through	 participating	 in	 humiliating	 and	sexualized	rituals	(Winslow	1999).			Sexual	 violence	 is	 frequently	 a	 performative	 act.	 Co-perpetrators	 and	 the	family	members	of	victims	are	the	audience	and	the	victim	becomes	a	‘medium’	for	the	 perpetrator’s	 display	 of	 superiority	 and	masculinity	 (Benard	 1994;	 Franklin	2004;	Maedl	 2011;	 Sanday	 2007).	 Such	displays	 bond	perpetrators	 of	 gang	 rape	and	 lead	 to	an	 increase	 in	mutual	 respect	 for	each	other	 (Franklin	2004).	 In	 line	with	 this,	 studies	of	 gang	 rape	 in	peacetime	 in	 South	Africa	 and	Cambodia	 show	that	perpetrators	experience	social	bonding	effects	 (Jewkes	and	Sikweyiya	2013;	Wilkinson,	 Bearup,	 and	 Soprach	 2005).	 Dara	 Kay	 Cohen’s	 systematic	 analysis	 of	rape	during	civil	wars	illustrates	that	groups	that	forcibly	recruit	fighters	and	lack	internal	cohesion	are	more	likely	to	perpetrate	gang	rape	(2013a,	2016,	2017).	The	
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perpetration	as	well	as	the	boasting	afterwards	communicates	idealized	‘norms	of	masculinity,	 virility,	 brutality,	 and	 loyalty’,	 which	 facilitates	 the	 bonding	 among	group	members	 (Cohen	 2017,	 704).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 that	perpetrators	or	commanders	consciously	decide	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	for	the	purpose	of	socialization.	Rather	than	explicitly	hoping	to	forge	social	bonds,	the	perpetration	of	sexual	violence	evolves	from	the	group	dynamics	and	individuals’	need	to	bond	(Cohen	2017;	Wood	forthcoming).				
4.4	Rebels	in	inactive	conflict	periods	When	a	conflict	becomes	inactive	the	armed	group	does	not	immediately	cease	to	exist.		Regardless	of	how	the	conflict	becomes	inactive,	if	it	is	a	temporary	retreat,	a	peace	agreement,	or	even	in	the	case	of	military	defeat,	no	group	simply	vanishes.	The	continued	existence	of	group	structures	and	former	fighters	ensures	that	there	is	 an	 organizational	 legacy	 that	 facilitates	 the	 resurgence	 of	 violence	 (Zukerman	Daly	2012).	Put	differently,	 retaining	organizational	 structures	grants	groups	 the	capacity	to	resume	fighting.	This	is	one	of	the	reasons	negotiated	settlements	are	considered	 less	 stable	 than	military	 victories	 (Wagner	1993,	 255;	Quinn,	Mason,	and	 Gurses	 2007).	 The	 same	 is	 true	 for	 conflicts	 that	 do	 not	 officially	 end	 in	 a	victory	 or	 agreement,	 but	 merely	 fail	 to	 reach	 the	 threshold	 of	 active	 armed	conflict	(Kreutz	2010).	Considering	a	conflict	 inactive	because	violence	has	 fallen	below	 the	 25-battle-related	 death	 threshold,	 implicitly	 acknowledges	 that	 all	actors	are	still	around	(Kecskemeti	1958).	Ex-combatants	 often	maintain	 close	 ties	 with	 each	 other.	 Sexual	 violence	plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 this.	 Ex-combatants,	who	were	 forcibly	 recruited	 and	perpetrated	 widespread	 sexual	 violence,	 such	 as	 fighters	 in	 the	 Revolutionary	United	Front	(RUF)	in	Sierra	Leone,	the	National	Patriotic	Front	of	Liberia	(NPFL)	or	 RENAMO	 in	 Mozambique,	 choose	 not	 to	 return	 to	 their	 home	 communities	because	of	real,	experienced,	perceived,	or	anticipated	stigmatization	and	instead	maintain	 close	 relationships	 with	 other	 former	 fighters	 (Humphreys	 and	Weinstein	 2004;	 Pugel	 2007;	Wiegink	 2015).	 Ex-fighters	 of	 these	 groups	 report	close	friendships	and	choose	to	 live	 in	close	proximity	with	other	each	other	and	former	 commanders,	 which	 provides	 them	 with	 a	 sense	 of	 belonging,	 political	influence,	 as	well	 as	 physical	 and	 economic	 security	 (Humphreys	 and	Weinstein	2004;	 Pugel	 2007;	 Wiegink	 2015).	 In	 line	 with	 Cohen’s	 argument	 of	 rape	 as	 a	
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socialization	method	(2013a,	2016,	2017),	these	examples	illustrate	the	powerful	bonds	that	perpetrators	of	violence,	particularly	sexual	violence,	share.			
Integrating	new	fighters		When	 a	 conflict	 becomes	 inactive,	 whether	 it	 is	 because	 of	 a	 defeat,	 temporary	retreat,	or	a	peace	agreement,	it	is	usually	associated	with	an	attrition	of	fighters,	even	if	ex-combatants	maintain	friendships	and	networks.	Hence,	groups	that	seek	to	resume	fighting	need	to	recruit	and	integrate	new	members.	This	presents	the	challenge	of	having	to	maintain	existing	members	and	ensuring	that	old	and	new	members	form	trust	and	build	social	cohesion.	Building	on	research	that	shows	an	association	 between	 recruitment	 and	 rape	 as	 a	 socialization	method	during	 civil	war	 (Cohen	 2013a,	 2016,	 2017),	 I	 use	 sexual	 violence	 as	 an	 indicator	 for	 rebel	group	 mobilization	 in	 inactive	 conflict	 years.	 Specifically,	 I	 argue	 that	 lethal	violence	is	more	likely	to	reach	levels	of	active	conflict	again	when	rebels	maintain	and	 build	 capabilities	 through	 perpetrating	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 conflict	years.	 Rebels	face	obstacles	recruiting	and	integrating	new	combatants	in	inactive	conflict	 periods.	 Depending	 on	 its	 strength,	 organization,	 and	 resources	 a	 group	might	 attract	 new	 combatants	 using	 incentives	 such	 as	 political	 influence,	 a	community	to	belong	to,	physical	and/or	economic	security	and	benefits,	or	it	has	to	rely	on	coercion	(Eck	2014;	Humphreys	and	Weinstein	2008;	Weinstein	2007).	Irrespective	 of	 how	 members	 are	 recruited,	 the	 influx	 of	 new	 fighters	 requires	efforts	 to	 develop	 social	 cohesion	 to	 ensure	military	 effectiveness.	 Commanders	need	to	find	a	way	to	forge	social	ties	that	enable	old	and	new	members	to	work	together	effectively.	The	conditions	of	inactive	conflict	years	limit	armed	groups	in	their	use	of	traditional	ways	of	building	social	cohesion	and	creating	bonds	among	combatants	 such	 as	 boot	 camp	 drills.	 Group-based	 sexual	 violence	 during	 war	presents	a	possible	alternative	to	traditional	ways	of	producing	social	cohesion	for	a	 group	 of	 strangers	 because	 it	 helps	 perpetrators	 form	 bonds	 of	 loyalty	 that	replace	fear	and	mistrust	(Cohen	2013a,	2016,	2017).	Extending	this	argument	to	inactive	conflict	periods	I	posit	that	rebel	sexual	violence	is	a	socialization	method	that	increases	capability	and	military	effectiveness,	and	thus	indicates	that	a	group	is	mobilizing	fighters	and	building	capabilities.				
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To	function	effectively	armed	groups	require	some	level	of	social	cohesion,	loyalty,	and	trust.	 In	 light	of	 the	potential	sacrifices	required	of	combatants,	 they	need	 to	 trust	 the	 fighter	next	 to	 them	 to	 ‘have	 their	 back’	 (Siebold	2007).	 Social	cohesion	helps	strangers	to	develop	bonds	where	they	are	lacking,	to	develop	trust	between	individuals	who	otherwise	might	be	hostile	to	each	other,	and	to	develop	a	 sense	 of	 common	 purpose	 that	 increases	 loyalty	 to	 the	 group	 (Cohen	 2017).	Studies	identify	three	primary	methods	of	building	cohesion	in	military	units:	(1)	training,	 exercises,	 and	 drills,	 all	 intended	 to	 indoctrinate	 and	 imprint	 the	importance	of	chain	of	command	and	following	orders	(King	2006);	(2)	facing	and	overcoming	shared	threats	(Kenny	2011);	and	(3)	rituals,	including	initiation	rites	and	hazing	that	‘breaks	down	the	individual	and	replaces	it	with	a	commitment	to	and	dependence	on	the	institution	of	which	[one	is]	now	a	part’	(Whitworth	2004,	155).	Non-state	armed	groups	in	inactive	periods,	however,	cannot	rely	on	the	full	range	of	 these	traditional	means	of	building	cohesive	military	units.	 In	particular	the	 first	 two	 options	might	 not	 be	 viable	 for	 groups	 in	 inactive	 conflict	 periods.	There	are	three	primary	reasons	for	this:	(1)	following	a	defeat	or	the	decision	to	reduce	violence,	an	armed	group	most	likely	does	not	have	the	resources	to	engage	in	 time-	 and	 cost-intensive	 training	 exercises;	 (2)	 following	 a	 negotiated	settlement,	 any	 large-scale	mobilization	by	a	 former	 rebel	group	would	arguably	constitute	a	violation	of	the	agreement	and	prompt	a	militarized	response	negating	the	group’s	potential	surprise	advantage;	and	(3)	by	definition	there	is	little	to	no	fighting	 in	 the	 inactive	periods,	 thus	rebel	groups	cannot	build	cohesion	 through	shared	 battle	 experiences.	 Violent	 rituals,	 however,	 remain	 a	 viable	 option	 to	effectively	build	cohesion	for	armed	groups	in	the	context	of	inactive	years.		Public	 and	 stigmatizing	 group-based	 violence,	 i.e.	 sexual	 violence,	 thus	presents	one	method	to	develop	trust	and	loyalty	in	armed	groups	that	cannot	rely	on	 traditional	 means	 of	 building	 cohesion.	 I	 argue	 that	 sexual	 violence	 is	particularly	 useful	 in	 inactive	 periods	 because	 the	 stigma	 associated	 with	 it	regularly	 prevents	 both	 female	 and	 male	 survivors	 to	 come	 forward	 making	 it	easier	 to	 hide	 from	 domestic	 and	 international	 observers	 than	 killings	 or	 other	forms	 of	 violence.	 Former	 rebels	 or	 new	 recruits	 often	 lack	 readily	 identifiable	markers	such	as	uniforms	and	thus	might	be	mistaken	as	criminals	or	bandits.16	In																																																									
16	This	is	also	an	issue	for	data	reliability	in	coding	sexual	violence	by	rebel	group	members	in	the	post-conflict	period	
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other	words,	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 years	 enables	 rebel	 groups	 to	 integrate	new	recruits	and	create	social	cohesion	largely	without	detection	and	importantly	without	eliciting	a	government	response.		
Gearing	up	for	renewed	conflict	Sexual	 violence	 helps	 groups	 integrate	 and	 socialize	 old	 and	 new	members	 into	cohesive	 and	 militarily	 effective	 units.	 I	 argue	 that	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	periods	 indicates,	not	 just	 that	a	group	continuous	 to	exist,	but	 that	 it	 is	actively	recruiting,	mobilizing,	and	building	capabilities,	which	increases	the	risk	of	conflict	recurrence.	Key	here	is	that	sexual	violence	does	not	cause	the	recurrence.	It	is	an	indicator	 that	 a	 rebel	 group	 is	 integrating	 and	 socializing	 new	 fighters,	 i.e.	 rebel	mobilization	and	capabilities	building,	and	it	is	this	increase	in	rebels’	capacity	that	is	 associated	 with	 subsequent	 higher	 levels	 of	 lethal	 violence	 and	 a	 return	 to	armed	conflict.	Based	on	 this	discussion	of	 the	role	of	 sexual	violence	 in	 inactive	conflict	periods	and	its	socialization	effects,	 I	derive	four	observable	 implications	from	the	theoretical	argument:	(1)	conflict	recurrence	is	more	likely	when	sexual	violence	in	the	inactive	period	is	a	continuation	of	rebel	groups’	wartime	practices;	(2)	the	more	recent	rebel	sexual	violence	 is	 the	more	 likely	a	conflict	 is	 to	recur;	(3)	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 years	 increases	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	recurrence;	and	(4)	rebel	sexual	violence	is	associated	with	an	increase	in	fatalities	the	following	year.	The	 subsiding	 of	 violence	 does	 not	 signal	 the	 end	 of	 a	 group.	 Instead	 it	might	 indicate	 ongoing	 negotiations,	 a	 tacit	 agreement	 of	 non-engagement,	dwindling	 rebel	 strength,	 or	 a	 strategic	 retreat	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 superior	 state	apparatus.	 Importantly,	 subsiding	 violence	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 underlying	incompatibility	 is	 resolved;	 it	 might	 actually	 be	 more	 entrenched	 than	 before.	Therefore,	rebels	might	want	to	resume	the	armed	conflict.	Inactive	years	thus	are	a	 time	 when	 rebels	 regroup	 and	 recruit	 new	 members.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	perpetration	 of	 sexual	 violence	 indicates	 such	 recruitment	 and	 mobilization	efforts,	 particularly	 when	 sexual	 violence	 in	 the	 inactive	 conflict	 period	 is	 a	continuation	 of	 rebel	 groups’	 wartime	 practices.	 The	 continuation	 of	 sexual	violence	indicates	a	group’s	efforts	of	building	social	cohesion	among	old	and	new	members,	which	in	turn	increase	the	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence.			
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Hypothesis	1:	The	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence	increases	when	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	during	active	and	subsequent	inactive	conflict	periods.		When	rebels	sign	a	negotiated	agreement	to	terminate	an	active	conflict,	but	refuse	to	 comply	 with	 subsequent	 DDR	 programs,	 they	 effectively	 retain	 both	 group	structure	and	membership.	 If	groups	use	the	ensuing	 inactive	period	to	mobilize,	recruit,	 and	 socialize	 additional	 combatants	 through	 sexual	 violence,	 a	 quick	return	to	levels	of	active	conflict	becomes	more	likely.	Put	differently,	mobilization	efforts	 accelerate	 the	 return	 to	 conflict,	 meaning	 if	 sexual	 violence	 is	 indeed	 a	proxy	 for	 mobilization	 efforts,	 we	 should	 see	 a	 temporal	 relationship	 between	sexual	 violence	 and	 conflict	 recurrence.	 	 The	 example	 of	 the	 rebel	 group	 Forces	Nouvelles	(FN)	in	the	Côte	d’Ivoire	illustrates	the	dynamics	at	play.	After	the	end	of	hostilities	 in	 the	 2000s,	 former	 fighters	 of	 the	 FN	 essentially	 established	themselves	 as	 the	 de-facto	 authority	 in	 the	western	 region	 Dix-Huit	Montagnes.	These	 fighters,	who	 later	 fought	 in	 support	of	Alassane	Ouattara	 in	 the	2010/11	conflict,	 refused	 to	 participate	 in	 UN	 DDR	 programs	 and	 perpetrated	 sexual	violence	throughout	the	inactive	conflict	period	(HRW	2010).	A	2010	HRW	report	released	just	months	before	the	country	relapsed	into	active	conflict	again	detailed	how	 attacks	 including	 group	 rape	 by	 ex-FN	 combatants	 increased	 substantially	from	 2008	 onwards	 (HRW	 2010).	 Survivors	 reported	 that	 armed	men	 raped	 as	many	 as	 20	women	 in	 one	 instance,	 and	 one	 survivor	 of	 a	 gang	 rape	 in	 January	2010	described	a	group	of	ten	attackers:	“They	took	the	women	one	by	one	[off	the	truck]	into	the	bush	and	did	what	they	wanted	with	them—they	raped	them.	There	were	many	 attackers,	 I	 think	 about	 10”	 (HRW	2010,	 32).	 Put	 differently,	 the	 FN	was	able	to	fight	on	behalf	of	Ouattara	at	the	end	of	2010	and	into	2011	because	they	had	not	only	maintained	 the	group	 throughout	 the	 inactive	period,	but	also	had	continued	to	integrate	and	socialize	new	fighters	through	the	perpetration	of	gang	 rapes	 in	 the	buildup	 to	 the	 election	and	 the	 ensuing	 conflict.	 Similar	 to	 the	opening	 example	 of	 the	 MFDC,	 the	 Côte	 d’Ivoire	 case	 highlights	 the	 short	 time	between	 the	 reported	 sexual	 violence	 and	 the	 conflict	 recurrence.	 Accordingly,	 I	hypothesize	 that	 conflict	 recurrence	 is	 more	 likely	 the	 more	 recent	 a	 group	 is	reported	to	have	perpetrated	sexual	violence.			
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Hypothesis	2:	The	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence	increases	the	more	recent	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence	are.		Conflicts	 frequently	 involve	 multiple	 non-state	 actors.	 Groups	 left	 out	 of	 peace	agreements	might	 decide	 to	 spoil	 the	 process	 (Nilsson	 2008;	 Stedman	 1997)	 by	cooperating	 and	merging	with	 other	 groups	 to	 resume	 the	 conflict.	 Alternatively	groups	might	be	 in	talks	with	the	government	and	withdraw	from	the	process	to	merge	with	another	group	wanting	to	continue	fighting.	 In	such	a	context,	sexual	violence	helps	old	and	new	members	to	forge	social	bonds,	creating	units	cohesive	enough	to	be	militarily	effective.	The	example	of	the	Shan	State	Army	–	South	(SSA-S),	the	armed	wing	of	the	Restoration	Council	of	Shan	State	in	Myanmar,	illustrates	how	 this	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 escalation	 of	 violence	 from	 inactive	 to	 active	conflict.	The	SSA-S	conflict	with	the	Myanmar	government	was	deemed	terminated	because	of	low	levels	of	activity	in	2003	and	2004.	Despite	this	apparent	inactivity,	the	group	was	reported	to	have	perpetrated	rapes	and	conscripted	child	soldiers	throughout	the	years	2003	to	2005.	The	conflict	erupted	again	in	December	2005	after	 the	 SSA-S	 had	 incorporated	 troops	 from	 the	 Shan	 State	 National	 Army	(SSNA).	Once	the	conflict	officially	resumed	there	were	no	more	clearly	identified	reports	of	sexual	violence	by	SSA-S	members.	Put	differently,	in	a	period	of	combat	inactivity,	 recruitment,	 and	 integration	 of	 fighters	 from	 another	 group,	 rebels	perpetrated	rape.			 Rebel	groups	often	consist	of	multiple	factions	and	suffer	from	internal	rifts,	which	can	lead	to	splintering	of	groups	(Bakke,	Cunningham,	and	Seymour	2012).	Fragmented	 groups	 become	 a	 danger	 to	 sustaining	 peace	 and	 make	 conflict	recurrence	 more	 likely	 (Rudloff	 and	 Findley	 2016).	 The	 splintering	 of	 a	 group	usually	 means	 that	 the	 hardliner	 faction	 requires	 new	 fighters	 to	 compensate	losing	‘moderates’.	To	be	militarily	effective	enough	to	resume	the	fight,	the	group	needs	to	create	social	cohesion	among	old	and	new	members.	I	argue	that	sexual	violence,	 similar	 to	 when	 groups	 merge,	 can	 help	 splinter	 groups	 forge	 units	cohesive	 enough	 to	 be	militarily	 effective	 out	 of	 old	 and	new	members.	 Another	example	 besides	 the	 MFDC	 in	 Senegal	 is	 the	 rebel	 group	 Union	 of	 Democratic	Forces	for	Unity	(UFDR)	in	the	Central	African	Republic.	In	2006,	after	almost	four	years	 of	 inactivity,	 fighting	 erupted	 again	 when	 former	 supporters	 of	 Francois	Bozize	 broke	 away	 from	 his	 government	 to	 form	 the	 UFDR.	 In	 the	 post-conflict	
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years	 former	 pro-Bozize	 and	 remnants	 of	 other	 insurgency	 groups	 were	repeatedly	 reported	 to	 have	 perpetrated	 sexual	 violence.	 Leading	 up	 to	 the	eruption	 of	 fighting	 in	 the	 fall	 of	 2006,	 the	 US	 State	 Department	 Human	 Rights	report	states	that	‘kidnappings	by	unidentified	armed	groups	increased	during	the	year’	and	that	 ‘unidentified	armed	groups	–	thought	to	be	common	criminals	and	remnants	 of	 insurgency	 groups	 from	 previous	 conflicts,	 including	 former	 pro-Bozize	 combatants	 from	 Chad	 –	 continued	 to	 attack,	 kill,	 rob,	 beat,	 and	 rape	civilians	 and	 loot	 and	 burn	 villages	 in	 the	 north’	 (2007,	 2).	 Similarly,	 the	 rebel	group	the	Convention	of	Patriots	for	Justice	and	Peace	(CPJP)	that	formed	in	2009	to	continue	fighting	the	government	after	the	UFDR	signed	a	peace	agreement	with	the	government	consisted	largely	of	former	UFDR	members.	Again	sexual	violence	persisted	in	the	preceding	inactive	period	between	2006	and	2009.			




Analysis	I	use	the	UCDP	Conflict	Termination	dataset	(Kreutz	2010)	and	an	updated	version	of	the	Sexual	Violence	in	Armed	Conflict	(SVAC)	dataset	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014).	The	Conflict	Termination	dataset	includes	the	start	and	end	dates	as	well	as	means	of	termination	of	armed	conflicts.	Based	on	these	dates	the	dataset	offers	multiple	conflict	 episodes	 for	 a	 conflict	 fought	 over	 the	 same	 incompatibility.	 An	 episode	starts	 when	 a	 dispute	 fulfills	 the	 UCDP	 criteria	 for	 armed	 conflict:	 ‘(1)	 a	 stated	incompatibility,	(2)	organized	groups	of	which	at	least	one	is	the	government	of	a	state,	and	(3)	armed	activity	resulting	 in	at	 least	25	deaths,	all	of	which	must	be	observed	in	a	given	calendar	year’	(Kreutz	2010,	244).	An	episode	ends	when	an	active	conflict	year	is	followed	by	an	inactive	year.	Based	on	this	I	create	a	dataset	that	includes	all	inactive	years	following	an	active	conflict	year	between	1989	and	2015.	Accordingly,	the	unit	of	analysis	is	inactive	conflict	year.	Conflict	recurrence,	the	 dependent	 variable,	 is	 coded	 as	 1	 if	 a	 conflict	 over	 the	 same	 incompatibility	starts	again	after	one	or	multiple	inactive	years	and	0	otherwise.	Consecutive	years	of	 ongoing	 conflict	 are	 dropped	 from	 the	 analysis.	 Because	 of	 the	 dichotomous	nature	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 for	 three	 of	 the	 four	 hypotheses	 I	 use	 logistic	regression	models	in	these	cases	to	estimate	the	likelihood	of	a	conflict	resuming	in	 a	 given	 inactive	 conflict	 year.	 To	 examining	 the	 escalation	 of	 lethal	 violence	hypothesis	 I	 use	 a	 count	model.	 The	 best	 estimate	 of	 conflict	 deaths	 is	 an	 over-dispersed	count	variable,	therefore	I	use	a	negative	binomial	regression	model.17	After	taking	missing	values	for	sexual	violence	in	inactive	years	into	account	(not	missing	values	of	control	variables	though)	the	sample	includes	2,048	inactive	conflict	 years	 and	 144	 peace	 failures	 in	 121	 conflicts	 across	 70	 countries.	 To	control	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 time	 since	 the	 last	 active	 conflict	 year	 I	 include	 cubic	polynomials	 (Carter	 and	 Signorino	 2010).18	To	 account	 for	 a	 potential	 lack	 of	
																																																								
17	There	is	no	theoretical	reason	to	assume	that	certain	observations	will	always	be	zeros,	hence	I	use	a	negative	binomial	regression	model	rather	than	a	zero	inflated	model.	
18 	Cubic	 polynomials	 accommodate	 nonproportional	 hazards	 and	 outperform	traditional	methods	of	accounting	for	temporal	dependence	such	as	time	dummies	while	 performing	 as	 well	 as	 splines	 or	 autosmoothing	 procedures	 (Carter	 and	Signorino	2010).	Other	studies	employ	similar	approaches,	e.g.	Haer	and	Böhmelt	(2016)	and	Kreutz	(2010)		
	 110	
independence	of	observations	from	the	same	country,	I	cluster	the	standard	errors	by	country.			
Independent	variable	To	analyze	 the	 influence	of	 rebel-led	sexual	violence	on	 the	 likelihood	of	 conflict	recurrence	I	use	the	SVAC	dataset	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014),	which	includes	data	on	 all	 active	 conflict	 years	 from	 1989	 to	 2015	 and	 the	 first	 five	 inactive	 years	following	an	active	year.	 In	 the	SVAC	dataset	sexual	violence	encompasses	seven	distinct	 forms:	 rape,	 sexual	 slavery,	 forced	prostitution,	 forced	pregnancy,	 forced	sterilization/abortion,	sexual	mutilation,	and	sexual	torture.		The	 SVAC	 dataset	 presents	 prevalence	 scores	 (0	 =	 no	 sexual	 violence	reported,	1	=	isolated	sexual	violence,	2	=	widespread	sexual	violence,	3	=	massive	sexual	 violence)	 for	 three	 sources,	 State	 Department	 reports	 (SD),	 Amnesty	International	reports	(AI),	and	Human	Rights	Watch	reports	(HRW).	I	combine	the	three	scores	to	create	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	the	value	of	1	if	the	rebel	side	was	 reported	 to	 have	 perpetrated	 sexual	 violence	 for	 any	 of	 the	 three	 sources	(prevalence	scores	1,	2,	and	3)	in	a	given	year.	Based	on	this	I	create	four	dummy	variables	to	 indicate	who	perpetrates	the	sexual	violence	(government	or	rebels)	and	 if	 it	 was	 an	 active	 or	 inactive	 year.	 As	 the	 example	 in	 the	 Central	 African	Republic	 illustrates,	 reliably	 identifying	 perpetrators	 and	 prevalence	 of	 sexual	violence	 in	 conflict	 settings	 is	 difficult.	 Furthermore,	 researchers	 warn	 against	using	SD,	AI,	and	HRW	reports	to	construct	ordinal	scales	for	quantitative	analysis	(Davies	and	True	2015,	2017).	Thus	using	a	binary	variable	to	capture	the	effect	of	sexual	 violence	 avoids	 these	 potential	 problems	 and	 uncertainties	 regarding	 the	scale	of	sexual	violence	and	in	effect	functions	as	the	most	conservative	estimate	of	sexual	violence	in	the	post-conflict	period.	Based	on	the	dummy	variables	indicating	sexual	violence	in	inactive	years	I	create	 a	 variable	 for	 government	 and	 rebels	 to	 indicate	 if	 the	 respective	 side	perpetrated	 sexual	 violence	 during	 any	 of	 the	 inactive	 years	 between	 active	conflict	 years.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 Government	 of	 Comoros	and	the	MPA/Republic	of	Anjouan,	 the	 fighters	belonging	to	 the	 latter	reportedly	perpetrated	 sexual	 violence	 in	 2000,	 three	 years	 after	 hostilities	 had	 officially	ended.	This	means	 the	 explanatory	 variable	 is	 coded	0	 for	 the	 first	 two	years	 of	inactivity	and	1	for	all	inactive	years	starting	in	2000.		
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	 The	descriptive	 statistics	 (see	 Figure	6)	 show	 that	 government	 forces	 are	more	likely	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	in	inactive	periods	than	rebels,	which	is	in	 line	 with	 findings	 of	 reported	 sexual	 violence	 during	 active	 armed	 conflict	(Cohen	and	Nordås	2014).	Overall	rebel	groups	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	in	31	inactive	conflict	periods	in	19	countries	and	20	different	conflicts.	In	the	majority	of	inactive	conflict	periods	neither	the	government	nor	the	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence.19		Figure	6.	Percentage	of	inactive	periods	with	reported	sexual	violence				
		
																																																								
19	The	 low	 number	 of	 instances	 of	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 is	 most	 likely	 an	underestimation.	 This	 is	 a	 result	 of	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 conservative	 coding	rules	 of	 the	 SVAC	 dataset,	 which	 requires	 the	 clear	 identification	 of	 three	components	 (conflict,	 actor,	 and	 year),	 and	 the	 context	 of	 inactive	 conflicts	 in	which	 the	 identification	 of	 (former)	 combatants	 is	 often	 difficult	 because	 they	might	be	perceived	as	‘mere	criminals	and	bandits’.		
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	 To	 alleviate	 concerns	 that	 sexual	 violence	 presents	 the	 continuation	 of	fighting	by	other	means	I	run	bivariate	correlations	between	rebel	sexual	violence	in	inactive	years	and	measures	of	lethal	political	violence	based	on	the	UCDP	GED	data	 (Sundberg	 and	 Melander	 2013).	 The	 results	 (see	 Table	 VIII)	 show	 no	relationship	 between	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 and	 different	 measures	 of	 levels	 of	political	violence	in	inactive	years.			Table	VIII.	Correlational	matrix				 Rebel	sexual	violence	 Best	estimate	of	deaths	 Government	deaths	 Civilian	deaths	Rebel	sexual	violence	 1.000	 	 	 	Best	estimate	of	deaths	 0.099	 1.000	 	 	Government	deaths	 0.092	 0.866	 1.000	 	Civilian	deaths	 0.124	 0.678	 0.652	 1.000	
	
Controls	Inactive	 years,	 particularly	 if	 there	was	no	official	 termination	of	 the	 conflict	 via	military	victory	or	negotiated	agreement,	might	see	continued	violence	below	the	25	battle-related	death	threshold,	which	might	quickly	escalate	to	levels	of	armed	conflict	 again.	 Accordingly,	 I	 include	 the	 yearly	 lagged	 natural	 log	 of	 the	 best	estimate	of	deaths	based	on	the	UCDP	GED	dataset	(Sundberg	and	Melander	2013).		The	 outcome	 of	 a	 conflict	 is	 influential	 for	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	recurrence	 (Mason	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Quinn,	 Mason,	 and	 Gurses	 2007).	 For	 rebel-led	sexual	 violence	 to	 occur	 in	 active	 years,	 an	 identifiable	 group	 has	 to	 exist.	 This	implies	 that	military	victories	 that	effectively	destroy	 insurgencies	are	much	 less	likely	 to	 see	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 after	 the	 cessation	 of	 lethal	 violence.	Different	 conflict	 outcomes	 present	 different	 socio-political	 contexts	 as	 well	 as	different	 structural	 restraints	 and	 opportunities.	 Hence	 I	 include	 a	 nominal	variable	indicating	how	the	previous	active	conflict	period	ended	to	control	for	its	effects	 when	 examining	 the	 relationship	 between	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 and	recurrence.	 Outcome	 has	 three	 categories:	 (0)	 Military	 victory	 is	 the	 reference	category,	 (1)	 negotiated	 agreement,	 (2)	 the	 battle-related	 deaths	 fell	 below	 the	threshold	of	25.			 Previous	 studies	 have	 also	 identified	 conflict	 issues	 such	 as	 ethnic	mobilization	 and	 underlying	 incompatibility	 as	 important	 factors	 in	 the	 onset,	
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duration,	 and	 termination	 of	 conflicts	 (Toft	 2003,	 2010).	 Thus	 I	 include	incompatibility	 to	 control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 underlying	 conflict	 goals	 affect	the	likelihood	of	recurrence	(Quinn,	Mason,	and	Gurses	2007).	Ethnic	conflicts	are	believed	 to	 be	 particular	 brutal,	 hard	 to	 resolve,	 and	 long-lasting	 (Kaufmann	1996).	 To	 control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 ethnicity	 is	 a	 factor	 influencing	 both	conflict-related	sexual	violence	and	renewed	conflict	 I	 include	a	dummy	variable	that	takes	on	the	value	of	1	if	the	conflict	was	considered	an	ethnic	conflict	(Kreutz	2010).			Conflict	 characteristics	 shown	 to	 influence	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	recurrence	 include	 conflict	 costs	 such	 as	 conflict	 duration	 and	 prior	 fatalities	(Walter	2004).	Research	also	shows	that	the	post-conflict	environment	affects	the	likelihood	 of	 conflict	 recurrence.	 For	 example,	 studies	 shows	 that	 peacekeeping	operations	 are	 effective	 in	 prolonging	 the	 duration	 of	 post-conflict	 peace	 and	reducing	one-sided	violence	(Fortna	2003a,	2003b,	2004;	Hultman,	Kathman,	and	Shannon	 2013).	 Thus	 I	 include	 a	 dummy	 variable	 to	 control	 for	 the	 potential	effects	of	a	UN	peacekeeping	operation	with	a	robust	mandate.	The	variable	takes	on	the	value	of	1,	if	there	was	a	UNPKO	with	a	robust	mandate	in	the	country	in	the	year,	and	0	otherwise.		Good	 governance	 and	 government	 capacity	 are	 influential	 in	 regards	 to	conflict	 and	 conflict	 recurrence	 (Hegre	 and	Nygård	2015;	Walter	 2015).	Hence	 I	include	 the	 V-Dem	 polyarchy	 measure	 of	 democracy	 (Coppedge	 et	 al.	 2017),	economic	 performance	 (natural	 log	 of	 GDP	 per	 capita),	 and	 large	 populations	(natural	 of	 log	 population	 size).	 To	 control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 both	 sexual	violence	 and	 conflict	 recurrence	 are	 associated	with	 natural	 resource	 conflicts,	 I	include	 a	 binary	 variable	 based	 on	 Siri	 Rustad	 and	 Helga	 Binningsbø’s	 work	(2012).	I	 also	 control	 for	 group	 characteristics	 that	 might	 relate	 to	 their	organizational	 legacy	 and	 capability	 to	 resume	 fighting.	 Conflicts	 involving	weak	groups	 are	more	 likely	 to	 drop	 below	 the	 threshold	 of	 25	 battle-related	 deaths,	which	also	makes	them	more	likely	to	recur,	because	weak	groups	are	incapable	of	forcing	a	decisive	conflict	outcome.	Hence	I	include	a	binary	strength	measure	that	takes	 the	 value	 of	 1	 if	 the	 group	was	 deemed	weaker	 or	much	weaker	 than	 the	government	 in	 the	preceding	active	conflict	episode	(Cunningham,	Gleditsch,	and	Salehyan	 2013).	 Having	 a	 recognized	 non-armed,	 political	 wing	 might	 indicate	
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strong	 organizational	 networks	 that	 could	 facility	 mobilization	 for	 resumed	fighting.	Similarly,	prior	mobilization	capability	might	indicate	strong	networks	on	which	 groups	 could	 draw	 in	 inactive	 conflict	 periods.	 Thus	 I	 include	 a	 binary	measure	 each	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 legal	 political	 wing	 and	 high	 mobilization	capacity	 during	 the	 last	 active	 conflict	 period	 (Cunningham,	 Gleditsch,	 and	Salehyan	2013).20		
4.7	Results	To	 test	H1	 –	 that	 conflict	 recurrence	 is	more	 likely	when	 rebels	 are	 reported	 to	perpetrate	sexual	violence	during	both	the	active	conflict	episode	and	subsequent	inactive	period	–	 I	combine	the	dummy	variables	 for	active	and	 inactive	years	 to	create	 a	 nominal	 variable	 with	 four	 categories	 for	 each	 side.	 The	 reference	category	(0)	is	when	a	side	perpetrates	sexual	violence	during	the	conflict	period	but	not	 in	the	following	inactive	years;	the	main	category	of	 interest	 is	(1),	when	rebels	 are	 reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 during	 both	 active	 and	subsequent	 inactive	 years.	 The	 other	 two	 categories	 are:	 (2)	 no	 sexual	 violence	reported	 during	 active,	 but	 in	 subsequent	 inactive	 years;	 and	 (3)	 no	 sexual	violence	reported	during	active	or	during	subsequent	inactive	years.		In	 line	 with	 my	 expectations,	 Model	 3.1	 shows	 a	 statistically	 significant	association	between	rebels	continuing	sexual	violence	and	conflict	recurrence	(see	Table	 IX,	 parameters	 presented	 are	 the	 logistic	 regression	 coefficients).	 	 When	rebels	 start	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 the	 inactive	 period	 after	 not	 having	perpetrated	 it	 in	 the	 preceding	 active	 period,	 the	 association	 with	 conflict	recurrence	is	just	above	the	10	percent	level.	In	terms	of	the	control	variables	the	results	 show	 that	 conflict	 terminations	 by	 low	 levels	 of	 activity	 are	 positively	associated	 with	 conflict	 recurrence;	 negotiated	 agreements	 do	 not	 reach	conventional	 thresholds	 of	 statistical	 significance.	 This	 means	 that,	 when	accounting	 for	 the	 perpetration	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence,	 the	 durability	 of	 peace	following	negotiated	agreements	is	not	significantly	different	from	that	of	military	victories.	In	other	words,	only	conflict	episodes	deemed	terminated	when	fighting	drops	 below	 the	 25	 battle-death	 threshold	 are	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	 recurrence.	Government-led	 sexual	 violence	 does	 not	 show	 a	 significant	 relationship	 with																																																									
20	If	there	are	multiple	groups	active	in	the	preceding	conflict	episode	I	adopt	the	highest	measure	for	the	conflict.		
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conflict	recurrence.	The	duration	of	the	previous	conflict	episode	and	the	number	of	 fatalities	 in	 the	 preceding	 year	 show	 no	 significant	 associations	 with	 conflict	recurrence.	 None	 of	 the	 other	 control	 variables	 (ethnic	 conflict,	 incompatibility,	resource	 conflict,	population	 size,	GDP	per	 capita)	 show	a	 statistically	 significant	relationship	 with	 conflict	 recurrence.	 Surprisingly,	 UN	 peacekeeping	 operations	with	a	robust	mandate	also	do	not	show	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	conflict	 recurrence.	 However,	 this	 should	 be	 interpreted	 cautiously	 because	mission	size	or	composition	might	be	important	factors	for	UNPKO	efficacy.21			 To	 test	H2	 –	 that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 conflict	 recurrence	 increases	 the	 more	recent	reports	of	rebel-led	sexual	violence	are	–	I	create	a	variable	that	measures	the	 time	 in	 years	 between	 the	 last	 reported	 sexual	 violence	 and	 the	 conflict	recurrence.	 In	Model	 3.2,	 I	 use	 this	measure	 to	 examine	H2.	 The	 sample	 size	 is	reduced	 because	 the	model	 only	 takes	 active	 and	 inactive	 conflict	 episodes	 into	account	in	which	there	were	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence.22	The	relationship	is	close	to	the	0.05	threshold	of	statistical	significance	(p	=	0.057)	and	is	negative,	i.e.	the	more	recently	rebels	reportedly	perpetrated	sexual	violence	the	more	likely	is	conflict	recurrence.		Table	IX.	Logistic	regression	models	3.1	–	3.3		(DV	=	recurrence)			 3.1	 3.2	 3.3	Continued	rebel	SV	 0.935*	 	 		 [0.047,1.823]	 	 	Onset	rebel	SV	 1.123	 	 		 [-0.241,2.487]	 	 	No	rebel	SV	 0.092	 	 		 [-0.797,0.981]	 	 	Continued	gov’t	SV	 0.195	 	 		 [-0.597,0.988]	 	 	Onset	gov’t	SV	 0.084	 	 		 [-0.755,0.924]	 	 	No	gov’t	SV	 0.156	 	 		 [-0.544,0.857]	 	 	Rebel	SV	in	inactive	period	 	 	 1.015*																																																									
21	Even	 though	 Table	 IX	 does	 not	 show	 the	 coefficients,	 I	 also	 include	 cubic	polynomials	 to	 control	 for	 peace	 duration,	 which	 are	 statistically	 significant	indicating	nonlinear	temporal	dependence		
22	There	is	no	theoretical	reason	to	assume	a	non-linear	relationship	between	the	time	 since	 last	 sexual	 violence	 and	 conflict	 recurrence;	 hence	 I	 do	 not	 include	polynomials	in	this	case.	This	model	suffers	from	selection	bias	because	if	there	are	no	 reports	 of	 sexual	 violence,	 the	 conflict	 episode	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 sample.	Thus	the	results	should	be	interpreted	with	caution.	
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	 	 	 [0.219,1.811]	Gov’t	SV	in	inactive	period	 	 0.041	 0.065		 	 [-1.075,1.157]	 [-0.489,0.619]	Rebel	SV	in	active	period	 	 	 -0.140		 	 	 [-0.799,0.520]	Gov’t	SV	in	active	period	 	 	 -0.039		 	 	 [-0.553,0.476]	Time	since	last	rebel	SV	 	 -0.132t	 		 	 [-0.269,0.004]	 	Negotiated	Agreement	 0.578	 -1.066t	 0.596		 [-0.357,1.513]	 [-2.250,0.118]	 [-0.314,1.506]	Low	level	activity	 1.134*	 -0.807	 1.137*		 [0.243,2.024]	 [-2.419,0.806]	 [0.245,2.029]	Best	estimate	fatalities	(lag	ln)	 -0.012	 -0.091	 -0.014		 [-0.188,0.165]	 [-0.257,0.075]	 [-0.190,0.162]	Conflict	duration	(ln)	 0.110	 0.339	 0.107		 [-0.167,0.386]	 [-0.243,0.920]	 [-0.164,0.377]	Ethnic	 0.032	 1.349*	 0.021		 [-0.484,0.548]	 [0.106,2.593]	 [-0.490,0.532]	Incompatibility	 -0.096	 -0.019	 -0.101		 [-0.680,0.488]	 [-1.321,1.283]	 [-0.677,0.476]	Resource	conflict	 0.157	 0.801	 0.144		 [-0.316,0.631]	 [-0.190,1.791]	 [-0.321,0.609]	Robust	mandate	 -0.037	 -0.208	 -0.038		 [-0.547,0.473]	 [-1.136,0.719]	 [-0.534,0.458]	Population	(ln)	 0.083	 -0.143	 0.084		 [-0.096,0.263]	 [-0.601,0.316]	 [-0.096,0.264]	GDP	(ln)	 -0.119	 -0.046	 -0.117		 [-0.329,0.091]	 [-0.599,0.508]	 [-0.328,0.093]	Democracy	 -0.693	 0.000	 -0.716		 [-1.730,0.344]	 [-2.530,2.531]	 [-1.761,0.329]	Weak	rebels	 0.448	 0.745	 0.422		 [-0.185,1.080]	 [-0.243,1.732]	 [-0.209,1.052]	Legal	political	wing	 0.377	 0.524	 0.375		 [-0.152,0.907]	 [-1.065,2.113]	 [-0.149,0.899]	Mobilization	capacity		 0.053	 -0.154	 0.031		 [-0.297,0.403]	 [-1.018,0.709]	 [-0.297,0.359]	Constant	 -3.968*	 -1.641	 -3.690*		 [-7.343,-0.592]	 [-9.360,6.078]	 [-6.655,-0.725]	AIC	 741.060	 258.225	 737.377	Area	under	ROC	 0.787	 0.767	 0.787	Wald-chi2	 138.24(23)	 21.25(16)	 117.78(21)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.169	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -346.530	 -112.112	 -346.689	Cubic	polynomial	 ✓	 X	 ✓	
N	 1,726	 475	 1,726	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 			 To	test	H3	–	that	conflict	recurrence	is	more	likely	when	rebels	are	reported	to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 in	 the	 inactive	 conflict	 period	 –	 I	 run	 Model	 3.3	(Table	 IX).	 The	 results	 show	 support	 for	 my	 hypothesis.	 Rebel	 SV	 in	 inactive	conflict	 years	 has	 a	 positive	 statistically	 significant	 relationship	 with	 conflict	
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recurrence.	Put	differently,	when	rebels	perpetrate	sexual	violence	after	a	conflict	is	 deemed	 ‘terminated’	 it	 is	 associated	with	 an	 increased	 likelihood	 of	 renewed	active	conflict.		To	better	understand	the	substantive	effects	of	rebel-led	sexual	violence	on	the	change	 from	inactive	 to	active	conflict	 I	present	a	 first	difference	plot	 for	 the	change	in	probability	for	conflict	recurrence	based	on	Model	3.3	(Figure	7).23	The	probability	 of	 relapse	 into	 conflict	 increases	 by	 5%	 if	 there	 are	 reports	 of	 rebel	sexual	violence	in	the	inactive	period.		Figure	7.	First	difference	plot	(90%	confidence	interval)	
	To	 test	H4	 –	 that	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 increase	 in	fatalities	 the	 following	 year	 –	 I	 use	 the	 best	 estimate	 of	 conflict-related	 deaths	based	 on	 the	GED	data	 as	 the	 outcome	 variable.	 The	 analysis	 covers	 both	 active	and	 inactive	 years,	 providing	 a	 robust	 test	 of	 the	 mobilization	 argument	 both	within	and	outside	of	active	conflict.	To	prevent	the	outliers	of	Rwanda	and	Bosnia	from	biasing	my	results,	I	impose	an	upper	limit	of	5,000	yearly	fatalities.	The	results	show	a	statistically	significant	association	between	rebel	sexual-violence	 and	 an	 increase	 in	 overall	 deaths	 in	 the	 following	 year	 even	 when																																																									
23	Figure	7	is	based	on	Model	3.3	but	only	displays	a	selection	of	variables.	
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controlling	for	rebel	strength	and	mobilization	capacity	(p	=	0.98).	Coefficients	in	negative	 binomial	 regression	 models	 are	 difficult	 to	 interpret.	 I	 use	 Long	 and	Freese’s	(2014)	listcoef	command	to	facilitate	the	interpretation.	This	shows	that	the	substantive	effect	of	 rebels	perpetrating	sexual	violence	 is	a	40%	increase	 in	the	expected	overall	death	count	in	the	next	year.	As	one	would	expect	deaths	in	a	year	 show	a	 significant	 relationship	with	deaths	 in	 the	previous	year	and	 robust	UN	PKO	mandates	are	associated	with	conflict	years	that	see	more	deaths,	i.e.	more	severe	 conflicts	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 see	 UNPKO	 deployment.	 Moreover,	 longer	conflicts,	 ethnic	 conflicts,	 territorial	 conflicts,	 and	 resource	 conflicts	 all	 are	associated	 with	 higher	 numbers	 of	 fatalities.	 A	 higher	 democracy	 score	 is	associated	with	 lower	numbers	of	 fatalities.	Weak	groups	as	well	as	groups	with	high	mobilization	capabilities	are	associated	with	more	fatalities.				Table	X.	Negative	binomial	regression	-	Model	3.4	(DV	=	best	estimate	of	deaths)		 	 (3.4)	Rebel	SV	(lag)	 0.338t		 [-0.062,0.739]	Gov’t	SV	(lag)	 -0.079		 [-0.366,0.207]	Best	death	estimate	(lag)	 0.568***		 [0.515,0.621]	Duration	(ln)	 0.311***		 [0.175,0.447]	Ethnic	 0.894***		 [0.567,1.221]	Incompatibility	 0.491**		 [0.170,0.813]	Resource	conflict	 0.332*		 [0.068,0.596]	Robust	mandate	 0.634*		 [0.136,1.133]	Population	(ln)	 0.010		 [-0.078,0.098]	GDP	(ln)	 0.137t		 [-0.018,0.292]	Democracy	 -1.397***		 [-2.067,-0.726]	Weak	rebels	 1.252***		 [0.874,1.631]	Legal	political	wing	 0.011		 [-0.310,0.331]	Mobilization	capacity		 0.351**		 [0.114,0.587]	Constant	 -1.414		 [-3.337,0.509]	lnalpha	 1.576		 [1.495,1.657]	
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Robustness	checks	Control	 variables	 can	 bias	 estimates	 (Clarke	 2005).	 Accordingly,	 the	 first	robustness	 test	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 independent	 and	dependent	variable	without	the	inclusion	of	control	variables.	The	results	show	the	expected	 positive	 relationship	 between	 rebel-led	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	periods	and	conflict	recurrence.	This	relationship	also	holds	when	accounting	for	time	since	last	active	conflict	without	introducing	further	control	variables.			To	 control	 for	 the	 possibilities	 that	 government-led	 sexual	 violence	 is	 a	symptom	 of	 general	 government	 repression	 and	 that	 this	 affects	 conflict	recurrence,	 I	 include	a	variable	 from	the	V-Dem	data	measuring	 the	 level	of	 civil	society	 repression	 (Coppedge	 et	 al.	 2017).	 To	 ameliorate	 potential	 simultaneity	problems	 of	 conflict	 recurrence	 and	 repression,	 I	 run	 Model	 3.3	 with	 lagged	measures	 of	 government	 repression.	 The	 relationship	 between	 rebel-led	 sexual	violence	and	conflict	recurrence	remains	significant.	Similarly,	lagging	the	level	of	democracy	does	not	affect	the	results.		Research	shows	that	 increasing	women’s	political	representation	prolongs	the	peace	after	negotiated	agreements	(Shair-Rosenfield	and	Wood	2017).	Thus	I	run	robustness	checks	that	include	variables	that	control	for	women’s	security	as	well	 as	 societal	 and	 political	 empowerment	 and	 participation.	 The	 inclusion	 of	these	controls	has	no	significant	influence	on	conflict	recurrence.	The	effect	of	the	main	 explanatory	 variable	 remains	 unchanged:	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	periods	 continues	 to	 be	 significant.	When	 including	 these	 additional	 controls	 in	Model	3.4,	rebel	sexual	violence	 is	no	 longer	statistically	significant	 in	relation	to	the	subsequent	escalation	of	lethal	violence.	Instead	the	results	show	a	statistically	significant	 relationship	 between	 number	 of	 fatalities	 and	 women’s	 security	 in	society,	the	more	secure	women	are	the	lower	the	number	of	fatalities.	This	finding	
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is	 in	 line	 with	 earlier	 work	 on	 gendered	 inequality	 and	 intensity	 of	 intrastate	conflicts	 (Caprioli	 2005;	 Melander	 2005b)	 and	 speaks	 to	 the	 importance	 of	patriarchal	practices	discussed	in	chapter	2.		To	 ensure	 that	 the	 results	 are	 not	 driven	 by	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 inactive	period	 is	 long	 and	 conflict	 recurrence	 is	 unlikely,	 I	 run	 Model	 3.3	 limiting	 my	samples	 to	 cases	 with	 an	 inactive	 period	 of	 longer	 than	 15	 years.	 Rebel	 sexual	violence	continues	to	be	statistically	significant	for	conflict	recurrence.	To	control	for	 the	 alternative	 that	 the	 results	 are	 driven	 by	 quickly	 recurring	 conflicts,	 I	exclude	 conflicts	 with	 inactive	 periods	 shorter	 than	 five	 years.	 Rebel	 sexual	violence	 retains	 statistical	 significance	 (p	 =	 0.049),	 but	 preceding	 conflict	termination	through	 low	 level	of	activity	does	not.	Put	differently,	when	violence	subsides	 below	 the	 25	 battle-related	 deaths	 for	 five	 consecutive	 years,	 the	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence	is	statistically	no	different	from	military	victories,	which	are	deemed	the	most	stable	outcomes.		I	also	run	Model	3.3	excluding	the	five	conflicts	with	the	most	inactive	years	featuring	rebel	sexual	violence.24	Rebel	sexual	violence	continues	to	be	statistically	significant	 for	 the	 recurrence	 of	 conflict.	 Similarly,	 I	 run	 a	 robustness	 check	excluding	 conflicts	 with	more	 than	 four	 recurrences.25	In	 this	 model,	 both	 rebel	sexual	 violence	 (p	 =	 0.078)	 and	 low	 level	 activity	 (p	 =	 0.057)	 both	 have	 a	statistically	significant	relationship	at	the	0.1-level.			 To	further	examine	the	temporal	effects	of	rebel	sexual	violence	on	conflict	escalation	 I	 run	Model	 3.4	with	 rebel	 and	 government	 sexual	 violence	 lagged	by	three	 years,	 five	 years,	 and	 seven	 years.	 After	 seven	 years	 there	 is	 no	 longer	 a	statistically	significant	relationship	between	rebel	sexual	violence	and	fatalities	in	the	conflict.				
4.8	Discussion	This	study	contributes	to	both	the	burgeoning	body	of	literature	on	conflict-related	sexual	 violence	 and	 conflict	 recurrence.	 It	 provides	 robust	 support	 of	 the	relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence	 in	 inactive	 years	 and	 subsequent	 conflict	recurrence.	Theoretically	 the	paper	builds	on	 firmly	established	 research	of	how																																																									
24	These	 conflicts	 are	 in	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Congo,	 Liberia,	 Georgia,	 the	Republic	of	Congo,	the	Central	African	Republic,	and	Côte	d’Ivoire	
25	These	conflicts	are	in	Iran,	Senegal,	Angola,	and	India.		
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sexual	violence	functions	as	a	socialization	tool	when	dealing	with	an	influx	of	new	fighters	 (Cohen	 2013a,	 2016,	 2017).	 Accordingly,	 the	 findings	 support	 the	argument	that	rebel	groups	that	mobilize	fighters	and	build	social	cohesion	among	new	recruits	through	the	perpetration	of	sexual	violence	in	inactive	years	are	more	likely	to	resume	fighting.		The	paper	addresses	an	important	gap	in	our	understanding	of	how	sexual	violence	 affects	 conflict	 dynamics.	 I	 show	 that	 sexual	 violence	 increases	 the	expected	death	count	in	the	following	year	by	40%.	This	supports	previous	work	on	conflict-related	sexual	violence	that	argues	that	it	increase	social	cohesion	and	military	 effectiveness	 (Cohen	 2013a,	 2016,	 2017).	 It	 also	 contributes	 to	 the	literature	on	the	effects	of	sexual	violence	on	conflict	dynamics	more	broadly	(Chu	and	 Braithwaite	 2018).	 The	 article	 also	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 remaining	vigilant	 in	 inactive	 conflict	periods	 to	prevent	belligerents’	 human	 rights	 abuses,	particularly	sexual	violence,	that	might	lead	to	greater	violence.	More	 generally,	 this	 article	 challenges	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 ‘post-conflict’	period.	 Explicitly,	 the	 findings	 pose	 larger	 theoretical	 questions:	 should	 we	consider	conflicts	as	‘terminated’,	when	one	or	both	sides	continue	to	mobilize	and	perpetrate	 sexual	 violence,	 or	 human	 rights	 abuses	 more	 generally,	 after	 the	fighting	 stops?	 Can	we	 consider	 a	 country	 at	 peace,	 if	 armed	 actors	 continue	 to	victimize	civilians?	Is	the	absence	of	lethal	violence	enough	to	constitute	a	negative	peace?	How	would	our	approaches	 to	conflict	resolution	and	prevention	differ,	 if	our	 understanding	 of	 what	 constitutes	 ‘post-conflict’	 changed?	 These	 questions	provide	potential	avenues	for	future	research	in	how	we	can	build	lasting	peace.		This	 connects	 to	 the	policy	 relevance	of	 this	 article.	Besides	 the	profound	normative	 argument	 to	 prevent	 sexual	 violence	 during	 and	 after	 conflict,	 this	article	 shows	 that	 both	 states	 and	 the	 international	 community	 have	 strong	security-based	incentives	to	prevent	conflict-related	sexual	violence.	In	linking	the	previously	 separately	 considered	 problems	 of	 conflict	 recurrence	 and	 sexual	violence,	 this	 article	 further	 challenges	 the	 predominant	 narrative	 of	 sexual	violence	as	a	weapon	of	war	and	calls	 for	changes	and	improvements	to	national	and	 international	 prevention	 efforts.	 In	 line	with	 this,	 the	 findings	 call	 for	more	attention	 to	 the	 gendered	 organizational	 dimensions	 of	 violence	 and	 conflict.	Concrete	 steps	 to	 improve	 prevention	 of	 both	 sexual	 violence	 and	 subsequently	conflict	 recurrence	 include	 greater	 use	 of	 gender	 advisors	 in	 peace	 processes,	
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greater	 inclusion	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 women’s	 organizations,	 inclusion	 and	implementation	 of	 gender	 provisions	 in	 peace	 agreements,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 early	warning	systems	that	monitor	human	rights	abuses	in	inactive	conflict	periods.	In	light	 of	 the	 enormous	 humanitarian	 and	 socio-economic	 consequences	 of	 both	sexual	violence	and	recurring	conflicts,	strengthening	local	and	global	observers	to	improve	prevention	and	mitigation	efforts	becomes	crucial.		 	
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4.9	Appendix	C	
Robustness	checks		Model	3.5	–	without	any	controls		 	 (3.5)	Rebel	SV	in	inactive	period	 1.012**		 [0.328,1.696]	Constant	 -2.767***		 [-3.086,-2.448]	AIC	 985.192	Area	under	ROC	 0.551	Wald-chi2	 8.41(1)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.004	Log	likelihood	 -490.596	N	 2,050	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	
*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 			Model	3.6	–	same	as	Model	3.3	with	lagged	controls	for	democracy,	corruption,	and	civil	society	repression		Model	3.7	–	same	as	Model	3.3	with	controls	for	women’s	security,	inclusion,	and	rights		Model	3.8	–	same	as	Model	3.3	excluding	inactive	periods	longer	than	15	years		Model	3.9	–	same	as	Model	3.3	excluding	inactive	periods	shorter	than	5	years			 	 (3.6)	 (3.7)	 (3.8)	 (3.9)	Rebel	SV	in	inactive	period	 1.023*	 1.085*	 1.057*	 1.982*		 [0.198,1.848]	 [0.233,1.937]	 [0.193,1.921]	 [0.009,3.954]	Gov’t	SV	in	inactive	period	 0.057	 -0.034	 -0.026	 0.242		 [-0.513,0.627]	 [-0.638,0.571]	 [-0.557,0.504]	 [-1.337,1.822]	Rebel	SV	in	active	period	 -0.106	 -0.193	 -0.207	 0.620		 [-0.798,0.585]	 [-0.888,0.502]	 [-0.881,0.467]	 [-1.069,2.309]	Gov’t	SV	in	active	period	 0.043	 0.043	 0.069	 -0.790		 [-0.495,0.582]	 [-0.524,0.610]	 [-0.490,0.627]	 [-2.728,1.149]	Negotiated	Agreement	 0.611	 0.747	 0.438	 0.149		 [-0.276,1.499]	 [-0.236,1.729]	 [-0.535,1.412]	 [-2.082,2.380]	Low	level	activity	 1.065*	 1.269**	 1.134*	 1.024		 [0.144,1.987]	 [0.352,2.186]	 [0.229,2.039]	 [-1.072,3.120]	Best	estimate	fatalities	(lag	ln)	 -0.015	 0.018	 0.125	 1.718***		 [-0.196,0.166]	 [-0.167,0.202]	 [-0.048,0.297]	 [0.927,2.508]	Conflict	duration	 0.081	 0.099	 0.066	 0.664*	
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(ln)		 [-0.190,0.352]	 [-0.170,0.367]	 [-0.190,0.321]	 [0.148,1.180]	Ethnic	 -0.032	 0.027	 0.111	 0.148		 [-0.545,0.482]	 [-0.483,0.536]	 [-0.378,0.600]	 [-1.328,1.624]	Incompatibility	 -0.134	 -0.149	 -0.117	 1.549		 [-0.736,0.468]	 [-0.743,0.446]	 [-0.654,0.421]	 [-0.108,3.205]	Resource	conflict	 0.208	 0.130	 0.148	 -0.437		 [-0.313,0.729]	 [-0.385,0.646]	 [-0.350,0.647]	 [-2.238,1.364]	Robust	mandate	 0.025	 0.021	 0.016	 2.546**		 [-0.492,0.541]	 [-0.616,0.657]	 [-0.509,0.542]	 [0.726,4.365]	Population	(ln)	 0.085	 0.082	 0.019	 0.126		 [-0.095,0.266]	 [-0.119,0.282]	 [-0.141,0.179]	 [-0.254,0.506]	GDP	(ln)	 -0.121	 0.097	 -0.139	 0.266		 [-0.321,0.080]	 [-0.191,0.385]	 [-0.360,0.082]	 [-0.310,0.842]	Democracy	 	 -0.352	 -0.611	 -1.279		 	 [-1.863,1.160]	 [-1.654,0.433]	 [-3.502,0.945]	Weak	rebels	 0.382	 0.351	 0.662	 0.030		 [-0.256,1.020]	 [-0.321,1.023]	 [-0.012,1.335]	 [-1.456,1.515]	Legal	political	wing	 0.424	 0.309	 0.457	 -1.133		 [-0.150,0.998]	 [-0.299,0.916]	 [-0.021,0.936]	 [-2.724,0.458]	Mobilization	capability	 0.063	 0.051	 0.099	 0.528		 [-0.270,0.397]	 [-0.308,0.410]	 [-0.243,0.441]	 [-0.300,1.355]	Corruption	index	(lag)	 -0.489	 	 	 		 [-1.866,0.887]	 	 	 	Democracy	(lag)	 -0.305	 	 	 		 [-2.690,2.080]	 	 	 	Civil	society	repression	(lag)	 -0.160	 	 	 		 [-0.552,0.231]	 	 	 	Women’s	security	 	 -0.149	 	 		 	 [-0.589,0.290]	 	 	Women’s	rights	 	 -0.210	 	 		 	 [-0.728,0.307]	 	 	Women’s	inclusion	 	 -0.213	 	 		 	 [-0.677,0.250]	 	 	Constant	 -3.425*	 -5.861**	 -5.385***	 -13.01*		 [-6.278,-0.572]	 [-9.703,-2.019]	 [-8.454,-2.315]	 [-24.23,-1.783]	AIC	 739.764	 708.752	 671.369	 196.680	Area	under	ROC	 0.789	 0.793	 0.788	 0.890	Wald-chi2	 134.70(23)	 148.42(24)	 107.59(21)	 133.99(21)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -345.882	 -329.376	 -313.684	 -76.340	Cubic	polynomial	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	
N	 1,726	 1,611	 1,386	 986	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	
0.001	 	 	 			
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Model	3.10	–	same	as	Model	3.3	excluding	five	conflicts	with	most	inactive	years	that	featuring	rebel	sexual	violence		List	of	conflicts:	DRC	(UCDP	ID	283),	Liberia	(UCDP	ID	341),	Georgia	(UCDP	ID	392),	Congo	(UCDP	408),	Central	African	Republic	(UCDP	ID	416),	Côte	d’Ivoire	(UCDP	ID	419)		Model	3.11	–	same	as	Model	3.3	excluding	conflicts	with	more	than	four	conflict	recurrences			List	of	conflicts:	Iran	(UCDP	ID	338),	Senegal	(UCDP	ID	375),	Angola	(UCDP	ID	387),	India	(UCDP	421)		 	 (3.10)	 (3.11)	Rebel	SV	in	inactive	period	 1.455**	 0.790t		 [0.520,2.389]	 [-0.090,1.671]	Gov’t	SV	in	inactive	period	 0.039	 0.229		 [-0.531,0.609]	 [-0.334,0.793]	Rebel	SV	in	active	period	 -0.554	 -0.180		 [-1.396,0.288]	 [-0.872,0.511]	Gov’t	SV	in	active	period	 0.166	 -0.059		 [-0.389,0.722]	 [-0.669,0.551]	Negotiated	Agreement	 0.733	 0.369		 [-0.231,1.697]	 [-0.598,1.336]	Low	level	activity	 1.203*	 0.929t		 [0.239,2.168]	 [-0.028,1.887]	Best	estimate	fatalities	(lag	ln)	 -0.014	 0.014		 [-0.202,0.174]	 [-0.176,0.203]	Conflict	duration	(ln)	 0.090	 0.195		 [-0.189,0.369]	 [-0.074,0.464]	Ethnic	 0.077	 0.417		 [-0.457,0.610]	 [-0.161,0.995]	Incompatibility	 -0.079	 0.157		 [-0.686,0.529]	 [-0.478,0.792]	Resource	conflict	 0.169	 -0.098		 [-0.345,0.683]	 [-0.596,0.401]	Robust	mandate	 0.588	 0.202		 [-0.237,1.412]	 [-0.332,0.737]	Population	(ln)	 0.080	 0.121		 [-0.116,0.275]	 [-0.0825,0.324]	GDP	(ln)	 -0.080	 -0.058		 [-0.292,0.133]	 [-0.289,0.172]	Democracy	 -0.835	 -0.885		 [-1.877,0.206]	 [-2.057,0.288]	Weak	rebels	 0.368	 0.174		 [-0.404,1.140]	 [-0.445,0.794]	Legal	political	wing	 0.375	 -0.107		 [-0.149,0.899]	 [-0.800,0.585]	Mobilization	capability		 0.026	 -0.102		 [-0.326,0.378]	 [-0.443,0.238]	Constant	 -3.913**	 -4.673**		 [-6.728,-1.097]	 [-7.777,-1.569]	AIC	 681.413	 644.488	Area	under	ROC	 0.796	 0.776	Wald-chi2	 118.23(21)	 108.77(21)	
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Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -318.707	 -300.244	Cubic	polynomial	 ✓	 ✓	
N	 1,633	 1,654	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	
t	p	<	0.1,	*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 			Model	3.12	–	same	as	Model	3.4	with	controls	for	women’s	security,	inclusion,	and	rights	Model	3.13	–	same	as	Model	3.4	with	3	year	lag	Model	3.14	–	same	as	Model	3.4	with	5	year	lag	Model	3.15	–	same	as	Model	3.4	with	7	year	lag		 (3.12)	 (3.13)	 (3.14)	 (3.15)	Rebel	SV	(lag)	 0.256	 	 	 		 [-0.161,0.674]	 	 	 	Gov’t	SV	(lag)	 -0.044	 	 	 		 [-0.334,0.246]	 	 	 	Rebel	SV	(3	yr	lag)	 	 0.561*	 	 		 	 [0.128,0.995]	 	 	Gov’t	SV	(3	yr	lag)	 	 -0.235	 	 		 	 [-0.565,0.095]	 	 	Rebel	SV	(5	yr	lag)	 	 	 0.635**	 		 	 	 [0.158,1.112]	 	Gov’t	SV	(5	yr	lag)	 	 	 -0.198	 		 	 	 [-0.542,0.146]	 	Rebel	SV	(7	yr	lag)	 	 	 	 0.356		 	 	 	 [-0.190,0.901]	Gov’t	SV	(7	yr	lag)	 	 	 	 -0.182		 	 	 	 [-0.548,0.185]	Best	estimate	fatalities	(lag	ln)	 0.593***	 0.591***	 0.651***	 0.743***		 [0.538,0.648]	 [0.532,0.651]	 [0.585,0.717]	 [0.666,0.820]	Conflict	duration	(ln)	 0.304***	 0.503***	 0.651***	 0.714***		 [0.165,0.443]	 [0.346,0.660]	 [0.499,0.803]	 [0.561,0.867]	Ethnic	 0.848***	 1.273***	 0.905***	 1.173***		 [0.503,1.194]	 [0.913,1.632]	 [0.532,1.277]	 [0.751,1.595]	Incompatibility	 0.108	 0.572**	 0.922***	 1.089***		 [-0.247,0.463]	 [0.225,0.918]	 [0.563,1.282]	 [0.717,1.461]	Resource	conflict	 0.004	 0.422**	 0.877***	 0.955***		 [-0.302,0.309]	 [0.131,0.714]	 [0.546,1.208]	 [0.610,1.301]	Robust	mandate	 1.137***	 0.700*	 -0.344	 0.436		 [0.584,1.691]	 [0.160,1.240]	 [-0.979,0.292]	 [-0.248,1.120]	Population	(ln)	 0.056	 0.027	 -0.025	 0.003		 [-0.040,0.152]	 [-0.068,0.122]	 [-0.121,0.072]	 [-0.103,0.110]	GDP	(ln)	 0.426***	 0.303***	 0.135	 0.374***		 [0.213,0.639]	 [0.124,0.482]	 [-0.035,0.306]	 [0.170,0.577]	Democracy	 -1.150*	 -1.861***	 -1.005**	 -1.460***		 [-2.139,-0.162]	 [-2.585,-1.137]	 [-1.763,-0.248]	 [-2.288,-0.632]	Weak	rebels	 1.055***	 1.872***	 1.865***	 2.058***		 [0.657,1.453]	 [1.452,2.292]	 [1.420,2.310]	 [1.561,2.555]	
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Legal	political	wing	 -0.050	 -0.016	 0.097	 0.513*		 [-0.372,0.272]	 [-0.378,0.347]	 [-0.268,0.462]	 [0.113,0.912]	Mobilization	capability		 0.309*	 0.352**	 0.357*	 0.681***		 [0.068,0.550]	 [0.097,0.607]	 [0.082,0.631]	 [0.393,0.970]	Women’s	security	 -0.355**	 	 	 		 [-0.598,-0.111]	 	 	 	Women’s	rights	 -0.273	 	 	 		 [-0.607,0.062]	 	 	 	Women’s	inclusion	 -0.141	 	 	 		 [-0.383,0.102]	 	 	 	Constant	 -3.505**	 -3.981***	 -3.641***	 -6.880***		 [-5.788,-1.222]	 [-6.127,-1.836]	 [-5.736,-1.546]	 [-9.362,-4.398]	lnalpha	 1.549	 1.715	 1.710	 1.796		 [1.465,1.632]	 [1.628,1.802]	 [1.615,1.805]	 [1.695,1.898]	alpha	 4.706	 5.557	 5.530	 6.027		 [4.329,5.116]	 [5.093,6.063]	 [5.030,6.080]	 [5.445,6.671]	chibar2	(01)	 300,000	 280,000	 210,000	 190,000	Prob	>=	chibar2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	LR	chi2	 554.26(17)	 523.56(14)	 580.15(14)	 548.47(14)	Prob	>	chi2	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	Log	likelihood	 -5,511.023	 -5,002.050	 -4,328.155	 -3,786.897	
N	 1,299	 1,314	 1,249	 1,177	95%	confidence	intervals	in	brackets	 	 	 	
*p	<	0.05,	**p	<	0.01,	***p	<	0.001	 	 	 										 	
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5.	Conclusion		
5.1	Summary		One	 overarching	 question	motivates	 this	 research:	 To	 what	 extent	 do	 gendered	aspects	of	society	and	violence	influence	conflict	resolution	in	intrastate	conflicts?	To	 fully	 examine	 this	 question	 I	 divide	 the	 question	 into	 three	 more	 specific	questions:	 First,	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 gender	 relations	 in	 society	 influence	 the	likelihood	of	nonviolent	conflict	management?	Second,	to	what	extent	does	sexual	violence	influence	the	onset	of	mediation	in	intrastate	conflicts?	And	third,	to	what	extent	 does	 sexual	 violence	 influences	 conflict	 recurrence?	 Although	 I	 develop	 a	specific	argument	to	address	each	question,	these	arguments	share	a	gender	lens	that	 combines	different	 strands	of	 feminist	 IR	 theory	and	mainstream	rationalist	theorizing.	 This	 gender	 lens	 foregrounds	 the	 previously	 overlooked	 gendered	dynamics	underpinning	conflict	resolution	in	intrastate	conflicts.			 I	 argue	 and	 find	 that	 negotiations	 are	 less	 likely	 in	 countries	 in	 which	patriarchal	gender	relations	manifest	in	the	violent	marginalization	and	exclusion	of	 women.	 I	 draw	 on	 Bordieu’s	 practices	 to	 explain	 how	 women’s	 exclusion	 in	society	 shape	 state	 behavior	 at	 the	 macro-level,	 which	 presents	 an	 important	theoretical	 contribution	 (Bourdieu	 1977,	 1990).	 Permeating	 all	 levels	 of	 society,	practices	connect	and	shape	both	individuals	and	formal	government	institutions,	thereby	 influencing	 modes	 of	 governing,	 which	 includes	 dealing	 with	 armed	conflict.	Specifically,	I	find	that	the	likelihood	of	negotiations	increases	from	below	5%	when	men	most	severely	exclude	women	from	public	life	to	35%	when	women	participate	 more	 fully	 in	 public	 life.	 These	 figures	 underscore	 the	 substantive	positive	effects	that	increased	women’s	inclusion	could	have	on	conflict	resolution	efforts.			 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 also	 argue	 that	 public	 reports	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	mediation.	 Specifically,	 I	 contend	 that	 reports	 of	 rebel	sexual	violence	expose	the	government’s	inability	to	fulfil	its	masculine	protection	of	vulnerable	populations,	i.e.	women	and	children,	and	that	this	presents	a	conflict	cost	 that	 outweighs	 the	 costs	 of	 accepting	 mediation.	 I	 show	 that	 rebel	 sexual	violence	substantively	increases	the	likelihood	of	mediation	onset	and	draw	on	the	crucial	 case	 of	 the	 Sierra	 Leone	 civil	 war	 to	 test	 the	 theoretical	 argument.	 The	RUF’s	massive	 sexual	violence	 renders	 the	Sierra	Leone	civil	war	 the	most	 likely	
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case	to	observe	the	causal	link	between	sexual	violence	and	mediation	onset.	Using	a	 variety	 of	 sources	 I	 illustrate	 the	 important	 role	 of	 the	 gendered	protection	 in	influencing	government	policies	and	the	onset	of	mediated	talks.			 Lastly,	I	argue	that	rebel	sexual	violence	in	inactive	conflict	years	indicates	mobilization	 efforts	 and	 thus	 is	 associated	 with	 higher	 chances	 of	 conflict	recurrence.	I	draw	on	Dara	Kay	Cohen’s	work,	which	shows	that	rape	during	civil	war	 helps	 groups	 create	 bonds	 of	 trust	 and	 overcome	 low	 internal	 cohesion	(Cohen	2013a,	2016,	2017).	Building	on	this,	I	contend	that	rebel	sexual	violence	in	inactive	 years	 enables	 rebel	 groups	 to	 build	 capabilities	 and	 thus	 increases	 the	likelihood	of	conflict	recurrence.	I	identify	four	observable	implications	that	follow	from	 this	 argument	 and	 illustrate	 that	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 substantively	facilitates	the	escalation	of	violence.	In	this	thesis,	I	draw	attention	to	the	deeply	gendered	nature	of	structural,	organizational,	 and	 conflict	 process	 factors,	 to	 then	 theoretically	 argue	 and	empirically	 illustrate	 how	 these	 influence	 conflict	 resolution	 efforts.	 I	 highlight	feminist	IR	theories’	relevance	and	explanatory	power	in	the	context	of	intrastate	conflicts.	Applying	a	gender	lens,	I	pose	new	questions,	provide	fresh	perspectives,	and	present	important	insights.	In	asking	and	addressing	these	questions	I	firmly	establish	 a	 gender	 lens’s	 value	 in	 illuminating	 previously	 unseen	 patterns	 and	causal	relationships	that	are	fundamental	to	conflict	resolution	efforts	in	intrastate	conflicts.	The	arguments	and	findings	of	this	thesis	present	important	implications	for	both	future	research	and	policy	makers,	which	I	outline	below.		
5.2	Future	research	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 demonstrate	 that	 combining	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 and	 systematic	analysis	 helps	 us	 detect	 and	 understand	 previously	 overlooked	 patterns.	 This	combination	 produces	 unique	 insights	 into	 all	 stages	 of	 a	 conflict	 cycle	 from	bilateral	talks	to	the	inclusion	of	intermediaries	and	the	relapse	into	fighting.	More	generally,	 feminist	 IR	 theory	 offers	 new	 theoretical	 concepts,	 approaches,	 and	arguments	 to	 traditional	 mainstream	 conflict	 research,	 which	 is	 critical	 for	 the	latter	 to	 continue	 to	 evolve	 and	 remain	 relevant.	 Put	 differently,	 the	merging	 of	these	 subfields	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 produce	 creative	 and	 counter-intuitive	research.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 and	 based	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 outline	 a	potential	future	research	agenda.	
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	 In	introducing	practices	as	a	measurable	concept	I	open	up	the	possibility	of	a	 new	 research	 agenda	 that	 combines	 statistical	 analysis	 with	 theoretical	arguments	 previously	 thought	 to	 be	 unobservable.	 The	 concept	 of	 practices	enables	 researchers	 to	 make	 norms	 and	 beliefs	 tangible	 and	 analyzable	 to	 a	greater	 extent.	 This	 could	 facilitate	 research	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 issues	 from	gendered	 socialization	 to	 political	 systems.	 One	 concrete	 avenue	 for	 future	research	could	be	examining	the	temporal	and	spatial	diffusion	of	practices	across	countries	and	conflicts.	For	example,	in	West	Africa,	particularly	in	the	conflicts	in	Liberia,	Sierra	Leone,	and	Côte	d’Ivoire,	combatants	of	previous	wars	often	fought	as	mercenaries	 in	 subsequent	 conflicts	 in	 neighboring	 countries.	 Sexual	 violence	was	 a	 prominent	 feature	 in	 all	 three	 conflicts	 and	 the	 respective	 governments	repeatedly	blamed	foreign	fighters	for	such	violations.	Thus,	future	research	might	examine	 the	 question	 to	 what	 extent	 practices	 of	 sexual	 violence	 diffuse	 from	conflict	to	conflict.				 Building	on	the	 findings	of	 this	 thesis,	another	potential	avenue	 for	 future	research	 is	 to	 conduct	 qualitative	 case	 study	 research	 to	 trace	 the	 causal	mechanisms.	 Whether	 it	 is	 through	 single	 or	 comparative	 case	 studies,	 it	 is	important	 to	 test	 the	 theoretical	 argument	 through	 in-depth	qualitative	 research	to	complement	the	statistical	 findings.	Process	tracing	in	particular	would	enable	researchers	 to	 examine	 the	 causal	 pathway	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 sexual	 violence	 and	actors’	responses	to	it	in	a	complex	environment	where	outcomes	cannot	be	solely	explained	by	one	or	two	independent	variables	(George	and	Bennett	2005).	Such	research	would	aim	at	understanding	how	leaders	and	combatants	perceived	the	violence	perpetrated	by	the	other	side,	how	it	shaped	their	view	of	the	conflict	as	well	 as	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 other	 side	 and	 themselves,	 and	 consequently	their	 decisions.	 Such	 a	 research	 project	 would	 entail	 archival	 work	 as	 well	 as	qualitative	interviews	to	trace	the	individual	links	of	the	causal	mechanism	on	the	micro-level	and	to	rule	out	competing	arguments.			 This	 thesis	 finds	 that	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 has	 strong	 effects	 on	 conflict	resolution	efforts.	This	raises	the	question,	what	role	does	sexual	violence	by	state	forces	play	and	how	does	the	international	community	react	to	it?	Research	by	Lisa	Hultman	 and	 Karin	 Johansson	 shows	 that	 in	 terms	 of	 peacekeeping	 deployment	the	identity	of	the	perpetrator	does	not	play	a	significant	role	(2017).	At	the	same	time,	 there	 might	 be	 other	 ways	 governments	 are	 held	 accountable	 such	 as	
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sanctions	 and	 reduction	 of	 aid	 from	 democratic	 donor	 countries.	 Accordingly,	future	research	should	explore	what	role	conflict-related	sexual	violence	plays	 in	shaping	 international	 sanctions,	 trade	 relations,	 and	 economic	 and	humanitarian	aid	donations.			 This	 thesis	 has	 opened	 up	 the	 research	 into	 temporal	 effects	 of	 sexual	violence.	However,	there	still	is	a	lot	to	learn.	I	show	that	sexual	violence	takes	on	a	particular	 role	 in	 conflict.	 It	 not	 only	 targets	 the	 direct	 victims,	 but	 also	 the	masculinity	of	the	belligerent	who	fails	to	protect	its	constituents.	Considering	my	findings,	 future	 research	 should	 explore	 to	 what	 extent	 sexual	 violence	 affects	long-term	stability,	economic	development,	institution	building,	and	trust	in	others	and	 the	 government.	 In	 other	 words,	 how	 does	 sexual	 violence	 affect	 the	relationship	to	fellow	citizens	and	the	government,	particularly	in	cases	where	the	government	is	the	sole	reported	perpetrator	of	sexual	violence?		These	questions	are	particularly	pertinent	 in	the	context	of	conflicts	along	ethnic	 lines.	 For	 example	 during	 fighting	 in	 South	 Sudan,	 Dinka	 combatants	perpetrating	rape	in	recent	years	rationalized	and	justified	their	actions	as	revenge	for	Nuer	men	raping	Dinka	women	and	girls	in	1991	(Amnesty	International	2017,	25).	This	highlights	the	long-lasting	effects	of	sexual	violence	and	the	potential	for	such	incidents	to	be	used	to	mobilize	for	revenge	and	renewed	conflict.	In	line	with	recent	research	on	the	role	and	importance	of	revenge	in	civil	wars	(Balcells	2010,	2017),	this	calls	for	an	in-depth	look	at	the	dynamics	of	revenge	and	to	what	extent	sexual	violence	functions	as	cause,	catalyst,	excuse,	and/or	justification.			
5.3	Policy	implications	Unwilling	 to	 give	war	 a	 chance	 (Luttwak	1999),	 conflict	 resolution	 efforts	 in	 the	form	 of	 negotiations	 and	 mediations	 present	 the	 most	 promising	 approach	 to	ending	and	preventing	armed	conflicts.	This	thesis	presents	a	number	of	 insights	for	policymakers	and	practitioners	in	the	field	of	conflict	resolution.	In	general,	the	thesis	highlights	the	importance	of	paying	attention	to	the	different	explicitly	and	implicitly	 gendered	 aspects	 of	 intrastate	 conflict.	 Applying	 a	 gender	 lens	 brings	into	 focus	 the	 gendered	 nature	 of	 violence;	 the	 gendered	 dynamics	 between	conflict	 parties;	 and	 the	 gendered	 aspects	 that	 underpin	 armed	 groups’	mobilization.	 Thus,	 to	 effectively	 manage	 and	 resolve	 intrastate	 conflicts,	
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policymakers	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 need	 to	 engage	 with	 and	 address	 these	gendered	aspects.		Furthermore,	 this	 thesis’	 findings	 and	 the	 following	 policy	 implications	speak	 to	 core	 pillars	 of	 the	 WPS	 agenda:	 women’s	 inclusion	 and	 participation,	protection	 of	women	 in	 conflict,	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 violence.	 In	 2000	 the	UN	Security	 Council	 adopted	 Resolution	 1325	 calling	 for	 women's	 participation	 in	peace	 and	 security	 governance,	 the	 protection	 of	 women,	 and	 prevention	 of	violence.	Since	 then	seven	additional	 resolutions	 (1820,	1888,	1889,	1960,	2106,	2122,	and	2242)	have	cemented	the	WPS	agenda.	In	line	with	these	core	pillars	of	the	 WPS	 agenda	 I	 highlight	 six	 specific	 policy	 implications	 arising	 from	 this	research.			First,	the	thesis	highlights	that	previously	neglected	gendered	aspects	such	as	 patriarchal	 gender	 relations	 in	 society	 are	 influential	 in	 shaping	 conflict	management	choices.	Policymakers	and	practitioners	often	focus	on	armed	actors’	capabilities,	 the	 intensity	 of	 fighting,	 and	 the	 costs	 of	 conflict.	 In	 illustrating	 that	the	exclusion	of	women	from	public	 life	 is	associated	with	a	smaller	likelihood	of	negotiations,	 the	 thesis	 draws	 attention	 to	 practices	 of	 subordination	 and	exclusion.	 Understanding	 that	 fundamental	 societal	 norms	 and	 practices	 are	important	factors	that	influence	conflict	management	efforts	in	intrastate	conflicts	is	 critical	 to	 improving	 policymakers’	 approaches.	 The	 implication	 for	policymakers	and	practitioners	is	clear:	practices	of	subordination,	exclusion,	and	oppression	present	 impediments	 to	nonviolent	 conflict	 resolution.	Arguably,	 this	can	be	extended	beyond	gender	to	other	sources	of	oppressive	hierarchies	such	as	class	 and	 race.	Hence,	 in	 line	with	 the	WPS	 agenda’s	 call	 for	 increased	women’s	participation	 policy	makers	 ought	 to	 strive	 to	 implement	 programs	 that	 counter	marginalizing	practices	and	dismantle	oppressive	hierarchical	structures.	Concrete	examples	include	legislative	changes	to	patrilineal	inheritance	and	property	laws,	increased	 access	 to	 sexual	 and	 reproductive	 health	 services,	 and	 the	implementation	of	quotas	to	ensure	women’s	inclusion	in	all	spheres	of	public	life.		Second,	 such	 hierarchical	 relations,	 particularly	 patriarchal	 gender	relations,	 are	 by	 definition	 deeply	 entrenched.	 They	 tend	 to	 change	 slowly	 and	often	 only	 incrementally.	 Importantly,	 however,	 they	 do	 change	 and	 on	 a	 global	scale	 there	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 improvement	 of	 women’s	 security,	 women’s	rights,	 and	 women’s	 inclusion	 over	 time	 (Karim	 and	 Hill	 2018).	 Furthermore,	
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although	it	might	not	be	quick,	norms	and	practices	are	susceptible	to	change	and	manipulation	 from	 the	 outside	 (Finnemore	 and	 Sikkink	 1998).	 Accordingly,	 the	policy	 implication	 is	 that	 building	 sustainable	 peace	 requires	 a	 comprehensive,	long-term	 approach	 that	 recognizes	 the	 importance	 of	 gender	 relations	within	 a	society.	 The	 findings	 in	 this	 thesis	 strongly	 support	 pursuing	 and	 implementing	feminist	 policies	 rooted	 in	 values	 of	 equality,	 care,	 empathy,	 nonviolence,	 and	respect.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	important	to	refrain	from	an	instrumental	approach	of	 considering	 gender	 relations	 as	 a	 tool	 or	 objective	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 peace.	Equality	in	terms	of	women’s	inclusion,	women’s	rights,	and	women’s	security	is	a	fundamental	human	right.	It	should	be	pursued	as	such.		Third,	 the	 results	 show	 that	 diplomatic	 interventions	 in	 the	 form	 of	mediation	are	more	likely	when	rebels	are	reported	to	perpetrate	sexual	violence.		This	 indicates	 a	 general	willingness	 of	 the	 international	 community	 to	 intervene	diplomatically	 when	 confronted	 with	 explicitly	 gendered	 human	 rights	 abuses,	which	corroborates	other	research	indicating	that	the	deployment	of	peacekeeping	missions	 is	 more	 likely	 when	 conflicts	 feature	 sexual	 violence	 (Kreutz	 and	Cardenas	2017;	Hultman	and	Johansson	2017).	However,	the	findings	also	suggest	a	pro-government	bias	in	the	interventions.	Government	forces	are	far	more	often	reported	 to	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence,	 yet,	my	 findings	 show	 that	 this	 does	 not	increase	the	likelihood	of	a	diplomatic	intervention	by	a	third	party.	In	light	of	the	prevalence	 of	 government	 abuses	 and	 considering	 the	 WPS	 agenda’s	 focus	 on	protection	of	women	and	prevention	of	violence,	it	is	crucial	that	the	international	community	finds	an	effective	way	of	addressing	state	sponsored	abuses.		Fourth,	 the	 findings	 indicate	 that	 sexual	 violence	 might	 be	 an	 important	indicator	for	‘ripeness’.	The	implication	being	that	potential	intermediaries	should	pay	close	attention	to	news	reports	of	rebel	sexual	violence	and	coordinate	 their	diplomatic	 efforts	 accordingly	 to	 maximize	 the	 chances	 of	 initiating	 a	 process.	Reaching	the	table	is	a	critical	first	step	towards	comprehensive	resolution.	Hence	understanding	 the	 influence	 of	 rebel	 sexual	 violence	 on	 a	 government’s	 decision	process	 to	 come	 to	 the	 table	 is	 crucial	 for	 international	 actors.	 Recent	 research	corroborates	the	notion	of	sexual	violence	as	an	indicator	for	ripeness.	Tiffany	Chu	and	Jessica	Maves	Braithwaite	(2018)	show	that	negotiated	agreements	are	more	likely	 when	 both	 sides	 in	 a	 conflict	 perpetrate	 sexual	 violence	 arguing	 that	 the	perpetration	 indicates	 that	 they	 are	 organizationally	 weak,	 less	 likely	 to	 win	
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militarily,	and	thus	more	likely	to	sign	a	deal	to	avoid	further	costly	stalemate	and	salvage	at	least	something	from	the	conflict.	This	suggests	that	while	rebel	sexual	violence	gets	a	government	to	the	table,	it	is	the	latter’s	indisposition	that	ensures	that	an	agreement	is	signed.	Combined	these	findings	underline	the	importance	of	sexual	 violence	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 efforts,	 which	 policy	 makers	 and	practitioners	 can	 leverage	 to	 maximize	 the	 likelihood	 of	 having	 their	 mediation	offers	accepted.		Fifth,	 in	 illuminating	 the	 short-	 and	 long-term	 consequences	 of	 sexual	violence	 the	 findings	 underscore	 the	 need	 for	 greater	 sensitivity	 and	 self-awareness	 of	 international	 actors.	 While	 any	 nonviolent	 conflict	 management	efforts	are	generally	preferable	to	continued	fighting,	this	can	also	be	problematic	because	the	involvement	of	a	third	party	elevates	a	rebel	group’s	status	and	grants	it	 legitimacy.	The	involvement	of	 intermediaries	thus	might	inadvertently	reward	rebels	 for	 bad	 behavior	 and	 contribute	 to	 a	 perverse	 incentive	 structure.	 Put	differently,	 rebels	 might	 see	 perpetrating	 rape	 as	 a	 tactic	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 the	negotiating	table	and	international	recognition.	This	entails	 the	danger	of	 further	entrenching	the	dominant	narrative	of	‘rape	as	a	weapon	of	war’	(Crawford	2017),	which	 fails	 to	 reflect	 the	 robust	 body	of	 research	 examining	 the	diverse	 reasons	and	motivations	underpinning	conflict-related	sexual	violence	(Wood	2014;	Cohen	2016;	 Baaz	 and	 Stern	 2009,	 2013,	 2018).	 In	 combination	 with	 the	 increased	international	 attention	 to	 conflict-related	 sexual	 violence	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 (e.g.	UN	 Security	 Council	 resolutions	 1820,	 1960,	 2106),	 this	 has	 the	 potential	 to	exacerbate	 the	 perpetration	 sexual	 violence	 (Autesserre	 2012;	 Meger	 2016).	 In	other	words,	the	onset	of	mediated	talks	in	response	to	sexual	violence	might	have	the	unintended	consequence	of	making	sexual	violence	an	attractive	tool	for	other	rebel	 groups,	 thereby	 proliferating	 the	 sexual	 violence	 generally.	 Thus,	 policy	makers	 and	 practitioners	 ought	 to	 be	 aware	 of,	 reflect	 on,	 and	 consider	 the	potential	consequences	how	explicitly	and	implicitly	gendered	features	of	conflicts	are	 shaping	 their	 decisions	 and	what	 long-term	 consequences	 could	 result	 from	their	involvement.		Sixth,	 the	 observed	 relationship	 between	 sexual	 violence,	 conflict	management,	and	conflict	recurrence	highlights	the	importance	of	paying	attention	to	 the	 gendered	 organizational	 dynamics	 of	 armed	 groups	 and	 their	 impact	 on	conflict	processes.	These	 findings	 thus	challenge	policy	makers	and	practitioners	
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to	intensify	their	efforts	to	prevent	conflict-related	sexual	violence	during	combat	and	 after	 the	 official	 cessation	 of	 hostilities	 to	 prevent	 conflict	 recurrence.	Furthermore,	they	present	a	call	to	make	more	and	better	use	of	gender	advisors	in	peace	processes,	to	increase	civil	society	and	women’s	organizations’	participation	in	peacebuilding,	and	to	strengthen	the	gender	dimensions	in	peace	agreements	as	well	as	security	sector	reform	and	DDR	programs.	Another	concrete	step	would	be	increased	 monitoring	 and	 prosecution	 of	 human	 rights	 abuses	 during	 and	 after	conflicts	to	curb,	prevent,	and	pre-empt	further	violations.		The	 inherent	complexity	of	 intrastate	conflicts	precludes	any	mono-causal	explanations	 for	 how,	 when,	 and	 why	 conflict	 resolution	 might	 start,	 stop,	 or	succeed.	There	are	structural,	organizational,	 and	conflict	process	 factors	 that	all	contribute	 to	 these.	 This	 thesis	 demonstrates	 that	 these	 factors	 are	 inherently	gendered;	 it	 shows	 that	 a	 gender	 lens	 offers	 new	 perspectives	 to	 mainstream	conflict	 research,	 which	 can	 help	 detect	 previously	 overlooked	 patterns	 and	relationships;	 it	 underscores	 that	 effective	 conflict	 resolution	 requires	 an	understanding	of	 the	gendered	 influences	 in	 intrastate	 conflicts;	 it	 highlights	 the	importance	 of	 sex-disaggregated	 data;	 it	 illustrates	 that	 systematic	 analysis	 and	feminist	 IR	 theory	 are	 compatible;	 it	 underlines	 benefits	 of	 bridging	 these	 two	approaches;	 and	 it	 calls	 for	 further	 exploring	 the	 potential	 synergies	 of	 such	research.	This	thesis	identifies	gender	as	an	integral	component	to	understanding	intrastate	 conflicts	 and	 resolution	 efforts	 in	 them,	 demonstrating	 that	 going	forward	a	gender	lens	will	be	indispensable	for	both	researchers	and	practitioners.			 	
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